University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1991

The status of ecophilosophy and the ideology of nature.
Nancy Huffman Shea
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Shea, Nancy Huffman, "The status of ecophilosophy and the ideology of nature." (1991). Doctoral
Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2071.
https://doi.org/10.7275/r2bj-q526 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2071

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE STATUS OF ECOPHILOSOPHY AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF NATURE

A

Dissertation Presented

by

NANCY HUFFMAN SHEA

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1991

Department

of Philosophy

©

Copyright by Nancy Huffman Shea 1991
All Rights

Reserved

THE STATUS OF ECOPHILOSOPHY AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF NATURE

A

Dissertation Presented

by

NANCY HUFFMAN SHEA

Approved as

to style

and content

Rol

^

Robert Ackermann, Member

by:

For

my

parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I

thank

my

committee chairman, Robert Paul Wolff

for his

continual guidance, Benjamin Kaghan for his careful proof-reading
of

my

manuscript and most importantly

unwavering support.

V

my

husband. Jack Shea

for his

ABSTRACT

THE STATUS OF ECOPHILOSOPHY AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF NATURE
FEBRUARY

NANCY HUFFMAN SHEA,

B.S.,

1991

NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY

SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY

M.S.,

M.A.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph.D.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by;

Ecophilosophy
nature, generated

is

Professor Robert Paul Wolff

an attempt

by the need

to

render a

new philosophy

to liberate nature

from the inherently

domineering disposition of humankind. Although
this effort,

what

is to

I

believe that the current ambiguity of

survive) carries with

oppression.

I

Habermasian

it

of

am

I

its

the potentiality for

sympathetic to

content (who or

new forms

of

argue that ecophilosophy suffers from a kind of
self-deception, taking on a vague concept of nature that

deceptively appears to do the philosophical work of healing the

epistemological gap between nature and humans.

My

unifies this loosely-defined vision along the lines of

reconstruction

an equivocal use

two key concepts, the domination of nature and nature
the potentially subversive character of

its implicitly

itself,

of

revealing

universalist

philosophy of nature.
Ecophilosophers, rather than disUnguishing themselves,

improve upon Francis Bacon's suggestion that attention
liberate us.

to

fail to

nature

will

Their satisfaction with ecological solutions indicates that

they miss the essential ideological consequence of the

VI

modem

project:

the dominatLon by

some humans over others has been

covered over by a self-deceptive belief in the liberating character of
scientific

methodology.

By arguing

for the

emancipatory capacity of

ecology, they get themselves into a Marcusian-like bind, advocating
this

new

science while at the

same time

rejecting scientific rationality

as a pivotal component of their notion of the domination of nature.

Because of

this they are forced to argue that ecology is qualitatively

different, offering a

new kind

of rationality that contains the necessary

ingredients for radically changing society.

Ecophilosophers must reconsider the epistemologically naive

and

ideologically negative repercussions of this position as

1

demonstrate with an analysis of the potentially repressive
relationships that exist between fourth world cultures and the

environmental community.

I

conclude by subjecting the Habermasian,

universalist framework to revision as indicated by the possibilities of a

new

eco-vision, emerging from the contextual epistem.e of a reworked

ecofeminist perspective.
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CHAPTER

I

THE DOMINATION OF NATURE

Science
that

much

increasingly establishing environmentalists' claims

is

of the activity of

modern

humankind's long-term health and

industrial society

welfare.

is

risking

An obvious example

is

the

recent alarm over global warming, reputedly caused by excessive fossil
fuel

use and large scale deforestation that significantly increases the

production of

CO2

in the atmosphere.

This global climatic shift

is

believed to have the capacity to activate catastrophic events including

polar ice-cap melting and world-wide drought.

Large scale scientific

speculations such as these, along with widespread air and water
pollution

and species

scientific disciplines

extinction, are

(human

spawning a variety

new

ecology, conservation biology, "gaia"

research) as well as massive social and political

movements

Greens, the Deep Ecologists, the Ecofeminists).

movements, yet

of

actively fueling their platforms,

group of philosophers who intend

to

(the

Tangential to these
is

a loosely delineated

ground and give meaning

claims of these social activists with a

new philosophy

Beyond producing a framework

to the

of nature.

for political action,

these

"ecophilosophers"! believe that their holistic concept of nature entails

a fresh philosophical perspective.

The synthetic character

ecophilosophy defies straight-forward analysis; therefore

impose order on the

of this project to

field

by imputing

of

it is

the focus

to

ecophilosophy a handful of shared, operating assumptions in order
evaluate the

field.

ecophilosophy

is

The outstanding presumption

to

that informs

a belief that the general conceptual framework within

1

which we think about nature

is

contaminated by our desire

dominate nature. Ecophilosophers employ the noUon

of domination to

describe the relationship between

humans and nature

situate their criticisms within the

more

ecophilosophers for two reasons:

moral consideration quite

in order to

traditional arena of

This way of conceptualizing the problem

relations.

to

is

human

important to

they believe that nature deserves

like that

which humans give each

and

other,

second, they believe that since the sixteenth century, references to

nature employ political language in order
relationship between nature

to validate

and human beings. While

philosophy of nature legitimizes a power relation of
the new, ecophilosophical concept, would restore

men,

women and
Assuming

ecophilosophy
evaluate this

assumptions.

an

exploitive

this old

man

over nature,

harmony between

nature.

the defensibility of this characterization of

(I

develop

field is to
If it

it

further in chapter three), one

way

to

determine the outcome of these operating

can be shown (and

I

believe

it

can) that these

ecophilosophical assumptions and the parallel epistemological
perspective from which they are derived complement the very
tradition
fails

which ecophilosophers claim

to attack,

as a radical critique of the modern age.

assessment

is to

show

then their theory

One way

to justify this

that the ecophilosophical vendetta against the

"domination of nature" employs the same conceptual framework as the

modem

inclination to defer social critique to scientific knowledge

instigated

by the Baconian

revolution.

A case

can be made that while

ecophilosophers read the ideological character of modernity as a
universal disrespect for nature upon analyzing their claim one

2

discovers

superseded by the dominant tendency of

tJiat it is

contemporary thinkers (including ecophilosophers)
idealize that

which can be known. Thus,

their

nature (which they proffer as a critique of

to unjustifiably

new

modem

philosophy of
soeiety) contains

the residue of an epistemologieal superiority that matehes the
sixteenth century arroganee which they blame for legitimizing the

mastery of nature.

As a

result, in deference to their

new philosophy

of nature, they

are forced to adopt

an attitude which maintains the

politically powerful,

wealthy and educated. This follows

(as

1

argue) that the cunning nature of

modem

interests of the

society

if

is

we assume

the continued

domination and exploitation of some people over others masked by
faith in the

emancipatory capacity of

modem

the sixteenth century as a program for

science.

human

What

begins in

liberation becomes,

with the advent of modern capitalist relationships, an ideological cover
for the coercive

behavior needed to provide the amenities promised by

industrialization.

Many

autonomy and personal

men and women

deluded

satisfaction (in the factory or in the family),

believing themselves to be free.
fortified

Since this

it),

modern condition

valorization of nature (as

by the ecophilosophical

characterizing

sacrifice their

1

is

am

their analysis fails to accomplish even their

most

clearly stated goals^.

In this chapter

such a

1

advance a perspective from which

critique of ecophilosophy

by examining the history

philosophy from the ancients to the seventeenth century,

to

launch

of natural
initiating

evaluation of the dominant theme in ecophilosophical literature,

domination of nature". As

my

an

the

survey shows, historians generally agree

3

that the sixteenth

modern4

and seventeenth centuries mark the beginning

new

science, paralleling a

to this point, interest in the

and medieval

beliefs:

new view

is

scientific

result^ determines

is

guarded by ancient

radical transformations within philosophy,

of nature:

epistemological effect

equated with

philosophy of nature

Prior

nature embodies Mind or God. The advent of

modern science mirrors
positing a

epistemological perspective.

of

that

mind

all

constructs nature.

human

knowledge.

The

knowledge comes

Since this

any contemporary attempt

modem

to

to

be

epistemological

fonmilate a

philosophy of nature, the efforts of ecophilosophers are meshed with
the epistemological arguments of

modern philosophy.

Ecophilosophers believe that they can explain the domination of
nature in the light of the transformation

an organistic one

to

a mechanistic® one.

of

our concept of nature from

My

goal for this chapter

is to

disentangle this history of scientific theory from the domination

theory of these nature writers by demonstrating that the successful

absorption of the philosophy of nature by the philosophy of science

deludes ecophilosophers
believe that they

(in

a long

line with other philosophers) to

can unambiguously know nature. This unjustifiable

philosophical stance

is

scientific perspectives.

masked

in

an

historical

account of shifting

Ecophilosophers mistakenly believe that by

rejecting a mechanistic view of nature they reject the reductionist

philosophy that parallels
I

its

development.

employ the thinking and influence

the historical context of this confusion

for

of Francis

two reasons:

the epistemological position that dominates
nature,

Bacon

to reveal

he embodies

modern accounts

of

and he has the reputation among many ecophilosophers as the
4

one responsible

for legiUmizing the

domination of nature.

By

considering the Baconian meaning of this concept in this

we

epistemological context,
credited to

it

find that

fails to elicit

it

the implications

by ecophilosophers. The characterization

of Bacon's

position as justification for the domination of nature prevents

proponents

ideology of the

modem

men and women

period:

the continued domination by certain

over others.

The Idea

A.
In his

from recognizing the subtle domination

(as well as critics)

Essay on Metaphysics

Nature

of

R. G. Collingwood argues that

.

it is

the function of philosophy to bring to light the presuppositions of

human

thought in the various periods

of

human

He addresses

history.

one such presupposition in his work The Idea of Nature that
"^

particular interest to this analysis, as

it

is

of

mirrors a fundamental

ecophilosophical tenet that our idea of nature determines our

treatment of

what we

it.

This suggestion amplifies

believe about nature determines

offers three "views of nature" that

moments, redirected the

to Collingwood's belief that

how we examine

it.

He

he believes have, at cmcial

scientific enterprise.

These three views neatly complement ecophilosophical

beliefs

about the power of nature conceptions. To portray their analysis:
ecophilosophers suggest that
holistic appreciation of

embeddedness

in

it.

of the rest of nature,
facilitate

it is

most natural (and

ethical) to intuit

a

nature determined essentially by our

Yet

we

when we

are

drawn

our newly acquired need
5

conjure up an identity independent
to a

mechanistic analogy to

to control nature.

Then as we come

to recognize the risk of this mechanistic

model (threats

term health and happiness), we are drawn

to.

and

to

ethically

our long-

bound

to.

consciously resume our place as mere elements in a web of
natural
processes.

This analysis

is

seemingly absurd when considered from the

perspective of the necessity of natural law.

whether

to

obey the law of gravity. Yet

where the time element

is

Humans do

in the case of "ecological law"

stretched beyond even an entire

generation, the appearance of choice emerges.
the sustainability of

not chose

human

life

Furthermore, since

in the absence of certain other

forms currently co-inhabiting the planet

is

not inconceivable, the

desire for the eco-activist to sustain these other elements

driven by a vision of a particular kind of
protection of these other

life

forms.

life

It is

life

must be

that presupposes the

possible to live

even prosper without the black rhinoceros, but

is it

and perhaps

ethically correct?

Ecophilosophers suggest that these ethical dilemmas,

initially

masked

by the development of natural science from cosmology through
Newtonian physics are coming

to the surface in the

wake

of profound

changes in our planetary perspective, driven by evolutionary theory

and

ecological sciences.

The subtle permeation

of ethical analyses

scientific discovery fuels the ecophilosophical enterprise.

here

is

the ethical implication of these

An examination
it

by

At stake

new conceptual frameworks.

of the history of science serves a dual purpose:

tracks the development of

modem

epistemology while concurrently

revealing the influence of this result on historians of science

themselves as well as the philosophers of nature. The history of the
rise of

modem

science, as given

6

by

'writers

such as Collingwood.

presupposes a privileged epistemological

position, since each

begins from an assumption about the nature of history
justifies the rendering of

shifts,

that

nature as organistic, mechanistic or

These designations, while intending

ecological.

itself

account

to explain historical

carry with them a belief in the scientific project:

ultimately and unambiguously

know

stance that justifies this judgment

The interpenetration

is

nature.

that one can

The epistemological

the heart of

my

critique.

of the philosophy of nature (questions into

the nature of being) and the activity of science forms a complicated
historical web.

of

Recent historians and philosophers of science, in need

an explanation

for the gigantic leap of scientific activity that

marks a

period such as the Renaissance, have characterized such change as an
all-inclusive, scientific

paradigm

(or world-view) shift that

whenever heretofore peripheral data

occurs

sets exert pressure on existing

conceptual frameworks®. The rapidity of these significant explanatory
shifts

and

their

immediate verification from a diversity

of sources

provokes the paradigm explanation. This conceptualization of a
shifting concept of nature

ecophilosopher
into the

who

mainstream

is

of particular interest to the

believes that as ecological data sets are
of scientific explanation, a

new

drawn

vision of nature is

immanent.

A

sympathetic analysis such as Collingwood's demonstrates that

the transformation of Greek cosmology into

has

its

modem

roots in the Greek fascination with form.

systems analysis

He argues that the

Greek's interest in natural events reflects their ontological belief that
the world of nature

what many

is

permeated by mind. This dominance of mind

writers call the Greek's 'organistic' view of nature.

7

is

"Greek thinkers regarded the presence of mind in
nature
3.S tn0 source of th3.t regularity or
orderliness in the
natural world whose presence made a science of
nature
possible. "9

For the Greeks, any plant or animal participates
psychically and
intellectually,
'soul',

'mind'

no less than materially

and

'body'.

in the life-process of the world's

Despite the fact that Greek scienUsts do not

have a philosophy of nature

interpreters argue that this

"organistic" philosophy of nature determines the thrust of their
scientific inquiry, since

they view the world of nature as both alive

motion) and intelligent (orderly).

human

entities share psychical

(in

Although this notion that non-

and

Greek cosmology from the duality

intellectual kinship distances

of

modem

science, for the

ecophilosopher the Greek perspective foreshadows the dawning of an
"ecological" philosophy of nature.

This ancient view of nature does not survive the transformative
period of the Renaissance as Collingwood describes,

"The central point of this antithesis was the denial that the
world of nature, the world studied by physical science, is
an organism, and the assertion that it is devoid both of
intelligence and of life. Instead of being an organism, the
natural world is a machine: a machine in the literal and
proper sense of the word, an arrangement of bodily parts
designed and put together and set going for a definite
purpose by an intelligent mind outside itself."

thus

its

relationship to

Although

for the

ecophilosophy remains unclear.

Greek thinker, the

orderliness of nature

remove

modem

is

intelligence perceived in the

inherent in nature

when Renaissance

intelligence from nature they invent a

divides nature from

humanity

for the

8

modem

thinkers

dichotomy that

purpose of understanding natural

systems. Yet a relatively straight-forward analysis
demonstrates the
roots of this separation in Greek ontology.

The independence

body and mind

of

(as

worked out by

Descartes) characterizes this clever shift in thinking
about nature.

By

the eighteenth century, the center of philosophical
thought shifts

from a theory of nature
nature

(for

to

a theory of mind so that the problem of

the philosopher) takes on a

any connection with something
essentially mechanical

"nature

is,

new

form:

utterly alien to

"How can mind have

itself,

something

and non-mental, namely nature?" As a

so to speak, a by-product of the autonomous and

existing activity of mind."^i

Immanuel Kant

result,

self-

plays a critical role in this

transformation since he redefines ontological explanations of nature by

arguing persuasively that "the mind

is

the lawgiver to nature" ^2^

Although he avoids the extremes of rationalism by grounding mind

in

experience, he does not resolve the problem of observation and

experiment.

What

thing-in-itself;

is it

that the scientist confronts?

what about nature? This

shifting

What about

the

understanding of

nature has drastic results in philosophy.

The developments

in science are less

ambiguous; the dawning

of

the sixteenth century heralds unprecedented progress in

understanding natural systems. The success of the

scientific

enterprise unleashes technological capabilities that change the

character of

human

life.

As a

result, science (as redemptive) takes

on

a prestige that rivals any ontological system to date. This utilitarian

advantage of modern science (predictions are followed by
gradually impinges
science

comes

to

upon any

results)

philosophical reconsideration so that

be equated with knowledge
9

itself.

Although the

t±ieories of Einstein

and Darwin change the

prominence exceeds

ideological

face of science, its

humble characterization by Kant.

its

Paralleling the overwhelming

dominance

of science. Collingwood

suggests that by the nineteenth century the science of
history radically

transforms our ideas of nature, providing a new analogy
cosmology.
at

It is

organism

of nature is overtly absorbed

Although Greek science
(like

modern

important to note that this change mirrors the point

which the philosophy

of science.

for

man

like nature)

analogy of the machine
targets history as the

(like

based on the analogy of the

and Renaissance science

man

modem

is

by the philosophy

like God).

reflects the

Collingwood correctly

preoccupation.

"Modem cosmology could only have arisen from a
widespread familiarity with historical studies, and in
particular with historical studies of the kind which placed
the conception of process, change, and development in
the centre of their picture and recognized it as the
fundamental category of historical thought."
For the Renaissance thinker, the unchanging and knowable objects of
natural science are matter and natural law. The

begins

when

modem

view of nature

historians are able to think scientifically.

"The historical conception of scientifically knowable
change or process was applied, under the name of
evolution, to the natural world."

Modem

science (because of

that change

is

but a process.

its

clear epistemological priority) reveals

not a cycle, but progress: nature

Collingwood believes that this

the philosophy of nature a teleology that

concept of a machine.
direction even

modem

was

Process, development

is

not a mechanism,

modem

view restores to

lost in the

Renaissance

and progress imply

beyond human comprehension. For

my

analysis, this

view crystalizes the modern epistemological dilemma that

10

nothing remains outside the boundaries of this all-encompassing
scientific analogy.

The ecophilosopher imputes

to a Collingwood-like analysis a

particular evaluative significance, arguing that the shift from
organistic to a mechanistic interpretation of nature

impact

much

like the

an

has normative

present interest in process analysis.

Focusing

on the relationship between humankind and nature, ecophilosophers

expand the

historical analysis

beyond

its

descriptive

and explanatory

purposes, deducing an ethical element (our description of nature

determines our treatment of

it).

It is

this value-laden analysis that

characterizes the ecophilosophical concept of the domination of
nature.

Since a mechanistic concept of nature

fortifies

a domineering

attitude (we control nature), a ecological perception facilitates (even

necessitates) a

welcomed attitude

shift (we are tutored

by nature).

Therefore, the prevailing concept of nature as process

dominant theme
ecology are

in nature writing

commonly

view of nature.

is

a

and the sciences of evolution and

cited as evidence of not only a new,

Interpreting the claim that the

but a better

modern mechanistic

view of nature encourages the rampant manipulation of nature, Carolyn

Merchant's suggests that although

into the sixteenth century, the root

metaphor binding together the

society

living

self,

and the cosmos

is

that of a

organism, by the late seventeenth century, the organicism of the

Renaissance begins to aehieve new synthesis with the mechanical
philosophy of the mid-century.

"Mechanism, which superseded the organic framework,
logic that knowledge of the world could
and that the laws of nature were
consistent,
be certain and
imposed on creation by God."^®

was based on the

She argues that the resulting new perspective on the
character

of

nature allows for new uses (and misuses) of nature,
concluding that
the reconceptualization of reality as a machine rather
than a living

organism sanctions the domination

She
sixteenth

(like

of nature.

other ecophilosophers) blames thinkers of the

and seventeenth centuries

for initiating the rejection of

holism in order to condone the treatment of nature as a manipulable
abstraction.

As a

result, the

most mathematical and

theoretical

sciences occupy the most revered positions, exemplifying the

tendency

to regard

nature as a

tool.

Since the characterization of

nature as a mechcinism sanctions misuse,

to rectify the dire

consequences of misusing nature, writers such as Merchant propose a
return to holism:

"The most important example of holism today

provided by the science of ecology."

is

Merchant believes that the

capacity of the twentieth century view of nature (nature as process)
will

be

to erase the belief that

To quote from another nature

nature should or even can be dominated.
writer:

"The ecological^® image of nature is that of an
interconnected network, where seemingly discrete things
arise and decay within a larger "web of nature". On this
view, a more fundamental unity of nature underlies its
apparent separateness. The ecological approach leads to
an understanding of the fundamental unity of humanity and
nature."

At stake here

is

return to holism

the correctness of the ecophilosophical claim that a
is

crucial to rescuing

humankind from

its

ethical

quandaries.

A

closer examination of the history of natural philosophy will

shed some

light

on the veracity

of this strategy.

12

Absent from the

histories of science is a thorough-going analysis of
the relaUonship

between

scientific speculation

and

the ecophilosophical delusions,

by this

project.

it

social theory.

must

Since this gap fuels

be, at least, partially rectified

Collingwood, in explaining the shift from organistic

to

mechanistic philosophies, examines the character of Ionian cosmology
to indicate the

of the sixth

originate

way

and seventh centuries

Greek thought,

revealing question:
in

600 B.

C.,

What

initiate their investigations of

are things

made

of ?.

Looking

for

all

is

living

being

contained in water as

things together.

a universal substance implies that the early lonians

assume that natural things

constitute a single world of nature;

to all natural things is that they are

substance.

nature with a

As an example, Thales,

which he conceives the earth as a

the primary substance, linking

made

what

is

of a single

This conclusion distinguishes Greek cosmology from the

modern focus on natural
his

B. C. who, according to Aristotle,

on water. Everything, he suggests,

common

These philosophers

formulates an explanation of the universe in terms of a

single principle in
floating

Greek’s conceptualize nature.

processes.

problem as the search

for

Since Thales does not construct

a distinguishing concept of nature, his

inquiries can be called cosmological, a concern for the construction of
all

things.

By

the

fifth

century, lonians lose interest in the goal of

Thales' inquiries evidenced by Anaximenes' studies into the behavior
of objects.

are made,
in space,

He concludes

that the thing out of which natural objects

no matter what they

thus he

are,

shifts the analysis

undergoes different arrangements
from substance

to spatial

arrangement, foreshadowing modern developments.

13

With
concrete

this shift the lonians

manner

abandon

their attempt to describe in a

the universal primary substance, permanently

shifting their inquiries to the behavior of objects.

Greek word
later is

for ’nature’ typically

a second sense used, the

lonians never apply.
that

means

sum

makes them behave as they

do:

result, the

the behavior of objects.

total of

For them, nature

As a

is

Only

natural things, which the

something inherent in things

"the nature of

oak

to

be tough’’2o.

Since this use of the word ’nature’ does not commit the user to a
singular philosophy of nature, the lonians have no concept of nature

which transcends understanding the behavior
Greek philosophy of nature issues from

of particular things.

this concept of nature.

Yet to understand the direct influence of the Greeks on the

modern idea

of nature

we must understand

Pythagoras. The theory attached to his

the influence of

name can be

traced to the

fifth

century B. C. at which time P3hhagorean cosmology resembles that of
the lonians:

a world suspended in an ocean vapor. Like the lonians.

Pythagoras wants to explain the differences in objects, but quite unlike
the conclusions they draw, he surmises that differences in nature are

due

to variation in geometrical structure.

deduces that the nature of things

who

is

ultimately Pythagoras

of

form rather than substance.

is

shifts

From

this Pythagoras

geometrical structure or form.

Greek thinking

to

an investigation

"The spectacular success of the Pythagorean revolution in
natural science is not difficult to understand, if one

remembers wherein that revolution consisted. It
consisted in giving up the attempt to explain the behavior
of things by reference to the matter or substance out of
which they were made, and trying instead to explain their
behavior by reference to their form, that is, their structure
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It

regarded as something of which a mathematical account
could be given. "21

The gestation
supremely

of this philosophical result, that the essence of
things

intelligible, ultimately gives birth to

is

the raUonal Cartesian

universe.
Influential historian of science E. J. Dijksterhuis22 agrees that

modem

science has

Greek thought

is

it

roots in Greek thought since emanating from

the idea that

something permanent and
epistemology.

mathematical
rationalist

two great

all

observed change

is

true, the cornerstone of

based on

modern

Pythagoras registers this noUon in his system of
entities

and

their inter-relations, revealing the

bent of Greek thought which eventually crystalizes as one

modem

pillars of

science.

The

empirical research and experimentation,

ancient thought, yet

when

other, the
is

finally articulated

Bacon, the necessary ingredients

of

importance of

only a minor theme in

by writers such as Francis

for the explosion of

modern science

are brought together.

To hold

to the immutability of being, Dijksterhuis believes that

the Greeks give
sense.

modem

up

their search for unity in a quantitative or qualitative

The resulting

theories of matter lay the

concept of nature.

of the first to

elements.

do this when he establishes his doctrine

produced by a mixing
all

for the

Following Pythagoras, Empedocles

Empedocles believes that

assumes that

groundwork

all

of earth, air, fire

is

one

of the four

qualitative distinctions are

and water; thus since he

processes in inanimate nature consist in the motion of

imperceptible corpuscles or particles which persist real and
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unchanged thirough

all

processes, his

is

the

first

example of a

corpuscular theory of matter.

The atomic theory

of

Greek philosophers Leucippus and

Democritus demonstrates that
unity of being, sacrificing only

possible to preserve the qualitative

it is

quantitative unity.

its

By imagining

small fragments of being scattered in a void, yet qualitatively
equal,

they deduce their intrinsically immutable atoms.

Democritus carries

his materialistic conception of the universe to such extremes that
he

imagines the

human

soul, the "vital principle", to be

atoms. According to Dijksterhuis,
theory that
particles

we

affect

modern science since

his

one another in any way other than through the

action they have on one another
it is

of

in Democritus' corpuscular

find the mechanistic root of

can not

one concept

it is

composed

upon coming

From

into contact.

this

possible to conclude that the motions of atoms are

governed by the laws of a science of mechanics.

Although Aristotle adopts a course that
to the

is

in complete contrast

Atomists, wishing to evolve a physical science of qualities rather

modem

than quantities, his influence on

science

is

complex.

Aristotle

opposes Platonism by radically rejecting the view that tme being
be found in a transcendental world
of philosophy in general
of the things

we

and that

of forms,

is to

arguing that the subject

of science in particular is

formed out

perceive by our senses. This sensual element

contrasts vividly with the more influential Platonic vision that

promotes as axiomatic approach
ultimately a second

and

to scientific explanation.

Yet

distinct pillar of scientific inquiry emerges,

unequivocally advocating careful observation and experimentation.
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Plato,

having accepted Pythagoras' solution

change, ponders the location of form in nature.

means
if

form

that nowhere in the world
is

to

is

to the

form

If

itself in

immanence theory

immanent

is

is

not in the

a separate world. Plato ultimately rejects an

of forms, developing his transcendent theory

by doing so protects himself from the skeptics who argue that
everything

is

it

form not embodied in matter, yet

be understood as transcendent, then form

world but by

problem of

and

if

always in flux then nothing can be true. Plato protects

the forms in a world untouched

by change, leaving

to nature that

which approximates form. The transcendent theory

of

form not only

influences the direction of natural philosophy, opening a gap between

nature and

reality,

but important elements

of this Platonic belief are

evidenced by the rationalist attitude of modern scientists.
experience

is

trustworthy only

if

Sense

ultimate explanations are intelligible.

Although not an important philosophical system. Neoplatonism
powerfully influences the development of modern science.
its

founder, argues that there

Plato

and

is

no

difference

Aristotle, creating a synthesized

Plotinus,

between the thought of

system

all

his own.

He

conceives of a lower world separate from a higher, arising from a
single original principle, the One.

The

first

emanation of the One, the

World-Spirit, is both the world of ideal forms and the conception of

those forms.

Since he displays a supreme indifference towards

concrete natural facts, believing that they are nothing but unreal

manifestations of the spirit that operates in them, he, to a

higher degree than even Plato, creates
for the neglect of,

nature.

On

and even contempt

all

for,

the psychological conditions
the empirical study of

the whole, Dijksterhuis argues, his
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much

is

the most potent

influence, retarding the growth of natural science.

supports the devotion of the thinking

facility to

systems that have no connection with sensible

an ever-growing tendency

to rely

learning to understand nature.

His theory

the construction of

reality

and

it

supports

on magic and demons instead

The retarding influence

of

of Plotinus is

the result of the fact that for several centuries Greek thought

is

interpreted as Neoplatonism.

The eventual "conception
or mechanistic"24
enterprise.

is critical to

of the world usually called mechanical

the advent of the

modem

scientific

Dijksterhuis believes that the mechanical conception of

nature leads to methods of research that engender the great
flourishing of the physical sciences:

"experiment as the source of knowledge, mathematical
formulation as the descriptive medium, mathematical
deduction as the guiding principle in the search for new
phenomena to be verified by experimentation. "25

The success

of the physical sciences allows for the incredible success

of technology

and

industrialization.

The conception

mechanical, Dijksterhuis believes, penetrates

all

of nature as

philosophical

thought, redefining the history of culture as a whole. The rediscovery
of ancient science designed to understand the principles

and

attributes of being as well as analyze cause, order, truth and
perfection, catapults the Renaissance thinkers into the flurry of

modem

scientific explanation.

such knowledge

is

assumed

where modern thinkers

The conditions

for the possibility of

in their organistic philosophy

first find

and

it is

hints of a philosophy of science in

the empiricist and rationalist arguments of thinkers such as Plato and
Aristotle.
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In the

Umes

of transition between ancient thought

renaissance of scientific thinking, the ancient curiosity
explanation

is

overcome by the awe

Essentially because

and the

for

natural

for the authority of revelation.

mathemaUcal invesUgation

is

abandoned, any

prospect of the development of quantitative physical theory
diminished.

Medieval thinkers abandon the Greek attempt to

understand nature by forsaking any sound methodology
nature.

is

Not surprisingly,

it is

for the

the revival of Greek thought that

study of
is

responsible for the resuscitation of scientific inquiry.
Initially, Aristotle is

retrieved from antiquity
Aristotle,

the only influential intellectual thinker

by medieval

scholars.

medieval thinkers discover not a

a rational basis for Christian

Yet in the writings of

scientific

methodology, but

belief.

"Once the Schoolmen had become acquainted with
Aristotle's Metaphysics the most astute among them at
once felt intuitively that here, ready to hand, was what the
Christian Church from the time of its inception had always
,

sought: a philosophical system which could be made to
harmonize with the Christian doctrine, and thus furnish a
rational basis for dogmatics and a weapon for
apologetics. "26

The great theologians that accomplish

this synthesis are:

the English

Franciscan Alexander of Hales, the German Dominican Albert von
Bollstadt, later

known

as Albertus Magnus, and the Italian

Thomas

Aquinas. Due to the work of these men, a unity of the religious and the
intellectual world-conception is brought about to a degree never

before realized.

Yet danger to the Church

is

imbedded

in this

synthesis since every blow which autonomous scientific discovery

launches against Aristotelian science

The modern separation

is

a blow to the Church as well.

of faith from fact is rooted in this downfall as
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science overcomes the conflict between

predominant theme

A

is

in the transition to sixteenth

Roger Bacon.27 Although Bacon

his contribution to science, he
scientific

methods

is

day and his suggestions

of his

is

end, yet he

argue

one of the

beneficial to material
life.

first to

life,

as a

and seventeenth
not important for

is

significant for his criticisms of the

His interest in scientific inquiry
is

religion (a

in medieval theology).

major pioneer

century science

and

itself

for

improving them.

ultimately devoted to a religious

means

for scientific discovery as

for prolonging

and improving

Dijksterhuis believes that this shift in the conception of scientific

methodology determines the success

of

modem

As

science.

well,

it

anticipates the spirit of Francis Bacon's revolutionary perspective on

the moral necessity of the scientific enterprise.

Although the thirteenth century
of

High Scholasticism, the pinnacle

exemplified by Albertus

is typically

of the theological thinking as

Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon's

break with accepted methodology leads
criticism

hailed as the period

to a

important century of

and doubt, the fourteenth century. Dijksterhuis argues that

the theological

and philosophical decline

of this period

is

essential to

the rise of scientific development since a wedge between science and
religion is initiated

The

full

by unease about the

development of

rational foundation of faith.

scientific inquiry is delayed for

two centuries

by a scholarly preoccupation with the past and university instruction
that honors oratory over the flourishing of

new

ideas.

Long-refuted

theories are revived time after time to be refuted once again so that
this conservative

tendency blocks innovative,
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scientific investigation.

Yet led by

Thomas Aquinas,

the

Church gradually reworks the

physical and cosmological structure of the
reflect the central stationary earth

new

Christian universe to

cosmology of

Aristotle.

This

preoccupation with Aristotle has mixed results.
"The very intensity with which Aristotelian texts were
studied guaranteed that inconsistencies of doctrine or
proof would be quickly noticed, and these inconsistencies
were often the seeds of important creative achievement."28
"The centuries of scholasticism are the centuries in
which the tradition of ancient science and
philosophy was simultaneously reconstituted,
assimilated, and tested for adequacy. As weak spots
were discovered, they immediately became focus for
the first effective research in the modem world.

The great new scientific theories of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries all originate from rents
tom by scholastic criticism in the fabric of
Aristotelian thought. "29

Kuhn's analysis suggests that despite the conservatism

of their

medieval predecessors, modern scientists inherit their boundless faith
in the

power

of

human

reason to understand nature.

While ancient and

modem

science are clearly separated

by a

period of great intellectual stagnation, the precise division between

medieval and

modem

science

is

not as easily distinguished. While

the ancients the fact that happiness

is

equated with a virtuous

life

for

(the

pursuit of tmth) nicely conforms with their cosmological pursuits, the

presence of Christianity forces early modern scientists
scientific

to

temper

their

enthusiasm with a world-view that accommodates an

omniscient presence.

Much

of the

new

science

the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but the

on the development

of

modem

science

is

is

heralded by signs in

first pivotal

Humanism,

influence

the revival of the

ancient heritage. The influence of Plato, in particular, dilutes the
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overwhelming influence

of Aristotle as Platonists

usher into

discourse a preponderance of mathematical thinking.

reverence for antiquity

is

However, this

not completely conducive to scientific

inquiry since the Humanists' rejection of Aristotle

means

also a

rejection of sense-perception as a vehicle for knowledge.

impending philosophical separation
the

modem

scientific project to

Humanism

Neoplatonism

of

mind from body

complete

is

The
necessary

for

itself.

as a source of resistance to Aristotle and the entire

tradition of university learning,
of

scientific

to achieve a

makes use

of the mystical philosophy

comprehensive and coherent world view.

"The Neoplatonist leaped at once from the changeable and
corruptible world of everyday life to the eternal world of
pure spirit, and mathematics showed him how to make
the leap. "30

Although not immediately apparent,

(man and God

this

new way

inclusive) reshapes both religious

of looking at nature

and

political

philosophy so that by the end of the eighteenth century an increasing

number

of scientists

existence of God.
to

and non-scientists

alike see

no need

to posit the

This tension between religion and science

ancient thought), although apparently resolved

separated from religion, continues

to

plague

when

modem

(so alien

science

is

philosophy as a

worry about the status of ethical language.

Endeavoring to explain

Kuhn concludes

this "paradigmatic" leap into

that the Copemican discovery

is

mechanism,

the symbolic act

which severs the relationship between the ancient and modern views
of nature.

"The conception of a planetary earth was the first
successful break with a constitutive element of the ancient
world view. Though intended solely as an astronomical
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reform, it had destructive consequences which could be
resolved only within a new fabric of thought.

Problems that derive from the Copernican innovation become the

most prominent landmarks

The

in the development of a

new

universe.

significance of Copernicus, according to Collingwood,

implicitly that the world

has a center

destroys the notion that the world

at

all.

The lack

is to

deny

of center

an organism while the

is

displacement of the earth vastly enlarges the scope of

human

power.

This perspective allows one to argue that any natural law discovered

on earth applies throughout the cosmos, thus elevating the supremacy
of natural law, bolstering the

modern confidence

Alexandre Koyre^^ believes that
the last great medieval philosopher,

it is

who

conception of the world and asserts the

in scientific inquiry.

Nicholas of Cusa in 1440,
first rejects

the cosmos-

infinity of the universe,

predating even Copernicus and Kepler. Cusa argues that in order to

transcend the limitations of rational thought we must recognize the
partial

and

relative character of

our knowledge. Given the

relativity of

our position in the universe, we must acknowledge the possible
existence of different and equivalent world-images.

ruminations we find evidence of a very

modem

In Cusa's

philosophical dilemma

that eventually undermines even the solid belief in the undisputed

destiny of scientific inquiry.

The dawning awareness that human knowledge
particular position in the universe constrains

confine their explanations to the
limitation,

modern cosmology

human

is

bounded by a

modern thinkers

point of view.

to

Faced with

this

leaps into the forefront as the tool by

which modern thinkers can understand the
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infinitization of the

The Copemican discovery (although arguably

universe.

less radical

th3Ji the criticism of Nicholas of Cusa) spreads
skepticism

bewilderment with a lasting influence. Yet Giordano Bruno

primary architect of the cosmology that
thought because
entails

an

Bmno

first

a

is

modem

successfully argues that the concept of

infinite universe,

God

overcoming a major block, preventing the

adoption of such a cosmological perspective.
the difference between the infinity of
stature as prophet of a

dominates

and

God and

modern astronomy

The overwhelming influence

Bmno, by maintaining
the world, achieves

(according to Koyre).

of the theoretical "mechanization of

the world-picture"33, launched by Copernicus' work,

Orbium Coelestium and ending

in

.

De Revolutionibus

1687 with Newton's Philosophiae

Naturalis Principia Mathematica produces a radically
.

new

understanding of nature and an enormous advance in men's knowledge

and technical
theoreticians

skill.

Interest in the stmcture of nature

away from

early Greek cosmology since the

categorization of the world into nature, humanity
distinct

moves

knowledge of each.

and God, demands a

Thinkers of the modern period begin

with an attack on teleology, rejecting any attempt

to explain

nature in

these terms.
"Typical of the whole movement is Bacon’s celebrated gibe
to the effect that teleology, like a virgin consecrated to

God, produces no offspring."^^
Their

new

theory seeks to explain

all

change and process by the action

of material things already existing at the

commencement

change by representing nature as possessing an
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of the

intrinsic activity of its

own. The Pythagorean doctrine of the

change

adopted:

Although

is

priority of

mathematics

is

a function of structure.

in the early

phase

new thought nature

of this

conceived of as a living organism, this conception

is

is still

gradually

overtaken by the view of nature as a machine. The mainstream of this

Renaissance thinking moves in a direction led by Descartes. The truth
of nature consists in

nature

and

is

man

Mind

that which

is

facts;

measurable and

what

is

and

real

quantitative.

intelligible in

God

Since both

transcend nature, nature functions as a machine devoid of

or Spirit.

qualities

mathematical

Minds form a class

become appearances

of beings outside nature

and

Minds apprehended by the sense

to

organs capable of comprehending the union of mind and body. Matter
is

separate from Mind, yet both

somehow proceeding from God.

This tenuous positioning of God heralds His eventual irrelevance
since by the seventeenth century, science discovers a very different

material world

moved by uniform and purely

Greek concept of nature as a vast

living

quantitative forces.

organism (by

its

The

very nature)

denies a material world void of the universal activity by which

everything apprehends the final cause of

Greeks never confront the duality

initiated

Christianity; therefore their ontology

result of this struggle

its

is

own changes

by the claims

(Mind).
of

similarly monological.

between science and

religion,

The

As a

by the eighteenth

century, matter becomes the quantitatively organized totality of

moving

things; thus

inherit the

it is

these eighteenth century thinkers that

problem of relating matter and mind (an alien notion

the Greek cosmologists).
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to

Koyre argues that Henry More, despite his confused philosophy,
gives the

new

science

some

of its

most important elements. He

succeeds in grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology,
the infinitization of space, rejecting Descartes' characterization of a

world that denies void space and spiritual extension since

excludes

it

a space for God. While Descartes' thinking leads to materialism and
the exclusion of

God from

the world. More establishes to his

satisfaction the concept of space as distinct from matter
their equation in the Cartesian concept of extension.

God

in the world

rendered

and refutes

More

reinstalls

by separating space and matter, arguing that

matter that supports extension or space, but
is

own

infinite.

He

it is

the world of science so that

finite

an organ

world.

Newton who
by the end

not

God. Extension

elevates space to an attribute of God,

through which God maintains his
Koyre argues that

Spirit or

it is

carries More's thinking into

of the seventeenth century,

Newton's victory over the materialists appears complete.
"The Newtonian God reigned supreme in the infinite void
of space in which the force of universal attraction linked
together the atomically structured bodies of the immense
universe and made them move around in accordance with
strict

mathematical laws."

which God's power

Although Leibniz conceptualizes a world

in

reduced to that of winding up the world

clock,

successfully that such a world

is

is

Newton argues

uncomfortably similar

to

a world

without God, a perfect mechanism moving without God's intervention.
Yet the force of attraction which Newton argues proves his
notion of

God

gradually enriches mechanism rather than supplants

it

time.
as even the material universe becomes infinite in both space and
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Since an infinite and eternal world does not need creation, space

becomes more and more the void
absence of

all

of the atomists, the

frame of the

being, including God's.

"Every progress of Newtonian seienee brought new proofs
for Leibniz's eontention; the moving force of the universe,
its vis viva did not decrease; the world clock needed
neither rewinding, nor mending, "36
,

The Divine becomes

less

and

less important to eonserve the world

until the inevitable separation of faith from science is eomplete,

eliminating spirituality from the purview of scientifie endeavor (and

eventually from knowledge

itself).

Dijksterhuis37 argues for the

same

result beginning in the

seventeenth century through the work of Descartes, Galileo, and

Gassend who conclude that

in

mathematies and meehanies

it is

possible to arrive at an extensive knowledge of nature without any

recourse to sense-experience.

These

mechanical systems

for physieal facts

to

aecount

scientists proceed to devise

even though the

metaphysical problem of the relation between physical and psychic

phenomena remains

unsolved. Although Newton seeks to blend a

eonsistent mechanistic philosophy with a belief in

and preserves the world, the mechanization
of

God as a

retired engineer.

ereates

of nature leads to a view

His elimination

is inevitable.

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, modern science

By

and the

the root

fruit of

position in the universe

master of nature. The
period

God who

is

is

a deep revolution of thinking as humankind's
is

transformed from spectator into owner and

scientific

and philosophical revolution

the destruction of the Greek

Cosmos

of this

(as well as that of the

Scholastics), the disappearance of a conception of the world as finite.
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closed

and hierarchically ordered.

It is

replaced by an indefinite and

even infinite universe bound together by
laws. Ultimately, Koyre
argues,

it

means

the discarding of

all

considerations based

upon

value-

concepts and the divorce of the world of value
from the world of
In his

book on Thomas Hobbes,

fact.

Friethiof Brandt^s agrees that

the greatest event in the history of philosophy since
classical antiquity
is

the birth of

modem

philosophy in the seventeenth century.

we think, universally admitted that this event
result of and took place in close interaction with
the appearance of the mathematico-mechanical view of
nature. Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all the
great names of the seventeenth century, are examples
hereof."39
"It is

also,

was the

Descartes and Hobbes, Brandt claims, are the
the disappearance of the Aristotelian world
world.

Dijksterhuis also believes that

scientific

it is

first to

means

recognize that

the rebirth of a

difficult to

new

point to a

thought about nature that has more influence than the

mechanical or mechanistic view.
of physical science,

It

precipitates the great flourishing

making the rapid development

of technology

possible, thus affecting the history of culture as a whole.

While some regard the adoption of
clarification of

human

this

view as the gradual

thought, others regard

disastrous on moral philosophy.

its

general influence as

These thinkers single out the

mechanization of nature as one of the main causes of
the technological twentieth century, inspiring

modern

period.

many

Representative are ecophilosophers

mechanistic interpretation of nature

to

spiritual

chaos of

critiques of the

who

utilize

the

support their "domination of

nature" theory, arguing that this reconceptualization of nature

sanctions

its

misuse. Although they characterize modernity essentially
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correctly (as a flagrant exploitation of nature

made

possible by a

limited moral perspective that allows technological expansion
to go

unchecked), they fundamentally misunderstand the ideological
peculiarity of this

modem

impact ontologically as a

My
science

brief survey

is

when

shift

failed

incorreetly charaeterizing its

philosophy of nature.

might suggest that the development of

the history of a curtailment of knowledge, tracing

demise from the Greek conviction that
ultimate reality to the

by the conditions
the advent of

modern

modern science marks

modern

is

limited

Yet historians generally agree that
increasing

through knowledge. The well-ordered, but
in light of the

its

their natural inquiries reveal

recognition that knowledge

of the observer.

modem

human empowerment

finite

infinite universe since the

Greek Cosmos pales
product of this

increased scientific sophistication (modern technology) drastically
alters

human

capabilities.

methodology

effective

for

concept of nature; thus

It is

modern

science that develops the

understanding and

it

expanded

utilizing this

becomes a modern tendency

presuppose

to

that in order to understand and benefit from nature, one must,
ultimately, defer to the results of science.

science

is

The history

the record of a philosophical reordering:

yields to the priority of scientific epistemology.

of

modern

nature ontology

While this

epistemological shift produces the modern scientific and
technological revolution, the

the totality of this result

conundrum remains: how do we

when knowledge

evaluate

itself is restricted to its

own

activity?

Ecophilosophers negatively judge the success of the
revolution, locating the failure in a disenchanted ontology.
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scientific

Although

Merchant and others suggest that the resulting mechanism be
replaced by a modern ecological view, believing that his

new

retrieves the superior, ancient concept of organicism,
they

understand that any 'new' view of nature
epistemological perspective.

The

is

ontology

fail

nested within the

ecologist, like

any

to

modem

scientist, explains

natural processes as an outcome of scientific investigation and her

methodology carries with

it

the limited purview of scientific

knowledge.

The Greeks have no conception

of the limits

on knowledge,

never anticipating the modern philosophical dilemma (what are the
conditions of knowledge?).
"If the word ’nature’ means the internal source of a thing’s
behavior (as the Greek’s does), a person who uses the
word does not thereby commit himself to the assertion
that anything signified by it actually exists. A man might
say that there was no such thing as ’nature’, meaning by
this... that there is no internal source from which the
behavior of things proceeds.

As Collingwood explains, the use
does not commit them to any

of the

word

which

word

exists as ’one’,

’nature’.

beliefs are not

Even the Platonic

determined by their use

shift to

an explanation based

form rather than substance does not result in a radical

Greek concept
of the

word

and that the

in its relation to behavior is called nature is in itself

substance or matter’’^^ these
of the

by the Greeks

scientific or philosophical theory.

Although the lonians believe that nature
"thing

’nature’

of nature.

’nature’.

in

shift in the

Their philosophies of nature are applications

They are ways

of explaining the various

kinds of

behavior which we find in the world, of explaining a thing’s nature.
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The advent
more

in a

radical

of

modem

way than

science changes the conception of nature

the utilitarian shift to a mechanical model

by abandoning any metaphysical appreciation
natural

phenomena as

of nature

and regarding

the hardware of scientific discovery.

"Formal and efficient causes were regarded as being in the
world of nature instead of being (as they were for Aristotle)
outside nature. This immanence lent a new dignity to the
natural world itself.
Since the

modern

scientist

presupposes that her results are

determined by the constmct of nature
paradigmatic model of

scientific change),

objectivity protects her results

internal review.

modern
any

she assumes the

veil of

from critique outside the bounds of

This elevated self-understanding, indicative of

science, emphasizes that caution

effort to

within the confines of a

(albeit

necessary

is

draw normative conclusions from

when

evaluating

scientific results.

To

suggest that we consider the science of ecology as a philosophical

constmct

of 'nature' requires understanding

constraints of this

for

most

abandonment

general search for evidence of purpose in

that the

cosmos

is

under the

of a holistic concept

striking in early conceptions of nature a yearning

purpose and order. He believes that the

belief in the unity

results

modern episteme.

C. J. Glacken‘^3^ tracking the
of nature, finds

its

and harmony

of the

classical world

human

life,

cosmos and on

evokes a

resting

on

their

their conviction

the product of a creator. This ancient

interpretation of regularity in the

phenomena

of the

heavens as

manifestations of divine interference with natural order distinguishes

Greek wisdom from science

of the

modern

period.

Glacken's

reflections, properly interpreted, provide additional evidence that
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Greek epistemology

differs greatly

unlike that supposed by Glaeken.

abandoned a search
theme

in

answers

for

most sciences

from the modern, but in a way quite

Modern

scientists

cosmic order and purpose

have not

(the

overarching

unifying theory), but they seek these

is for

in the natural processes themselves.

Their philosophy of

science precludes addressing these questions anywhere

else;

therefore their philosophy of nature precludes any talk about

and value that supersedes discourse on

scientific

meaning

models and

conflicting evidence.

Clearly the valorization of science reduces the critical space

needed

to plainly evaluate the products of the scientific enterprise.

Yet by characterizing this modern dilemma as the valorization of a

mechanical interpretation of nature
to target correctly the

for science.

of capitalist

(as

ecophilosophers

they

do),

fail

confusion instigated by the modern enthusiasm

Consider the analysis by Merchant of the growing impact

economies on the

utilization of natural resources.

Merchanb^^ considers the influence that the

rise of

manufacturing and

capitalism have on the development of scientific thinking.
believes that the

premodem peasant economic

source of instability with

its

She

system, acting as a

hierarchical structure of landlord

domination, combines with population pressure and technological
innovation to produce significant changes in nature as a whole in the
twelfth

and thirteenth

centuries.

This impact on resources by different interest groups

is

escalated by overpopulation and exacerbated by landlord demands.

means

that eventually there

is

not enough land per person to ward

famine in a poor harvest year. The growth
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It

off

of cities creates a bourgeois

class of entrepreneurs

who

help fund the development of strong

national states, undercutting the power of regional landlord nobility.

The emerging

based on nonrenewable coal and

capitalist society

metals ushers in a period of increasing resource exploitation and the

need

for

continued technological advance. These needs encourage the

flourishing of the scientific enterprise, producing drastic effects on
social events

and human

welfare.

Curiously she characterizes this change in natural resource
utilization as indicative of a shifting relationship to nature, arguing that

this blatant reconceptualization of nature provokes

By arguing

"death of nature".

this

way she

is

what she

calls,

the

claiming that scientific

theory (nature ontology) has absolute sway over political ideology,
collapsing the obvious distinctions between a model of nature that
drives particular scientific inquiry, the political utilization of nature for

the benefit of a select few and the practical use of nature by

enhance and sustain

life.

The depletion

capitalist

economy

by a new

scientific conception.

is

a grave

political

all to

of natural resources in a

consequence not

to

be overcome

Yet this tendency to draw naturalistic

conclusions from political premises haunts ecophilosophy.

R. Francis

In the

work

of Francis

Bacon's enthusiasm
belief that the

Bacon

this confusion is

most obvious.

for science lies at the root of a pervasive

standard

for all

genuine

Dijksterhuis notes that even

inquiry.

Bacon

human knowledge

if all

of Bacon's

modem

is scientific

work were

lost,

not one scientific discovery or concept would be missing, yet his

impact

is

his remarkable literary gifts and brilliant aphoristic style.
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Bacon does not confer on humankind new knowledge

new

rather a

agenda buried

political

unilateral respect for natural law.

speaks

by

for itself, that

in a simple

we

implicit belief that since observation

secrets of nature,

we

are morally

privileging the object,

he

and medieval

the ancient

methodology: a

When Bacon argues

listening,

are

all

of nature, but

that nature

the wiser, he reveals his

and experimentation disclose the

bound

By

to scientific progress.

shifts attention

away from the

rationality of

periods, justifying the worldly application of

scientific speculation.

Clearly scientists do not proceed in this simplistic fashion.

Experiments are guided by preconceived
prerequisite of scientific discovery.
fact to theory (which

history"45) fuels the

science

This dialectical relaUonship of

Robert Ackermann

modern

itself,

significant

If

modern

is to

redirect attention to

convincing others that everything observed in nature

is

suggested above, historians generally interpret the

I

for science evident in the late seventeenth

centuries as the beginning of a bold
relationship to nature.
is

scientific

and valuable.

enthusiasm

nature

motor of

heir to both rationalist and empiricist foundations. Bacon's

is

As

calls "the

analysis of scientific activity.

impact as the prophet of a new science
nature

ideas; imagination is the

They argue

new

and eighteenth

synthesis of man's

that man's role as manipulator of

eagerly endorsed as the essential process by which

humankind comes

to interpret the significance of ereation.

make

the changes of the earth he is capable of
to force the lower orders of life to do his
bidding are those qualities which bring him closet to the
divine and which mark him off most decisively from all
"...to

making, and
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other kinds of life. The conelusion is irresistible
that it
the uniqueness of man that enables him to
preform the
wonders he does preform. "46

Francis Bacon

knowledge
ignorance

is

is

part of the optimistic trend that man’s accumulating

used best

to increase his control over nature:

a second

is like

is

fall

of

human

man.

"Bacon's philosophy of man's attaining control over nature
arts and sciences and encouraging
invention is not divorced from religion; it is a vital part of
religion, being closely related to the history of the creation
and to the fall of man. "47

by cultivating the

By arguing

that the sciences are able to mitigate the physical

consequences

of the first

fall,

Bacon encourages the adoption

of

philosophies that advance an investigaUon and understanding of nature

from the assumption that these discoveries prevent man's second

from grace. This normative interpretation
the Baconian analysis at a time

when

fall

of scientific inquiry boosts

science

is

squeezing God from

its

fundamental framework.
This general attitude of the seventeenth century
reflected in the

Baconian enthusiasm

for

is

accurately

observing nature so that by

the end of the century philosophers of nature essentially abandon

metaphysics; natural philosophy gives birth
law, natural freedom,
to

and natural

to

natural religion, natural

equality; morality

becomes the

right

happiness; and science ensures the boundless progress of man. 48

While nature

itself is

as the upsurge of

life

no longer regarded as the work
as a whole, and of

human

desire to gain a better understanding of nature

life

is

glorification of

God, resulting in discoveries that

human

The pursuit

error.

of science

of a Creator,

in particular, the

upheld as a
alleviate the

and technology

is

pains of

promoted by

these views despite the fact that the actual success of science
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but

is in its

reliance

on the language

of natural relationships

of mathematics.

Mathematical formulations

combines with Bacon's enthusiasm

and his conviction that science

will

for science

produce a better world to produce

the fruitful scientific activity of the last four centuries.
It is

only recently that growing numbers of people have begun
to

question our overwhelming devotion to the

Lacking internal feedback mechanisms or
quality of

its results,

scientific enterprise.

criteria for

judging the

the vague limits of scientific inquiry are

troublesome. Hilary and Steven Rose:
"Ever since the scientific method became acceptable as a
way of learning about nature (including ourselves), some
people have questioned whether science is an appropriate
road to knowledge. The questioning has deepened and
expanded as science has increasingly been hailed as the
only way to comprehend natural phenomena.
In a similar vein,

Jacques Maritain argues that when physico-

mathematical knowledge

is

mistaken

becoming the primary center
philosophical thinking

is

for a

philosophy of nature by

of organization for all philosophy,

led astray.

"...from the moment physico-mathematical knowledge of
nature was mistaken for a philosophy of nature and was
asked to give an ontologic^ explanation of the sensible
real, the human mind was bound inevitably to tend toward
a mechanistic philosophy and to endeavor to explain
everything, -in the philosophical sense of the word
explain,- in terms of extension and movement.

Maritain suggests that since the beginning of the seventeenth century,
all

great systems of classical metaphysics take as key to philosophical

knowledge a so-called philosophy

of nature, the "mechanistic

hypostasis of the physico-mathematical method"^L
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This impact on philosophical thinking

is

clearly revealed in the

theory of Auguste Comte. The influence of Comte
on

(which

I

will

modem

consider in more detail in the next chapter)

fearless articulation of a Positivist Philosophy.

is

thought

his

Comte describes the

goal of positivism:

"For positivism, science, -and every valuable knowledge, -is
characterized above all by the elimination of every
ontological preoccupation; that is the privilege of the
positivistic age or state in opposition to the metaphysical
ortheological state. Science must therefore abstract from
the being of things and consider only the connections and
relations which constitute the laws of phenomena. "^2

Comte's belief that the
subjectivity,

positivist scientist, freed of her

can confront the corpses

of reality

own muddled

has roots

in Francis

Bacon’s fascination with empirical science. Bacon's modern influence
is

most apparent

in his identification of philosophy with empirical

science.

"The substance of learning becomes experimental
knowledge, and the instrument of education becomes
technical information for the satisfaction of man’s need
through the invention of "works"."^^

Although Bacon argues

for

a materialist scheme of knowledge, unlike

Comte, Bacon assumes that their are
knowledge.

Still

limits inherent in the

quest for

the seeds of a Comtian universe are dormant in

Bacon's systematics.

Although Bacon's vision of

which

is

absent in

modem

scientific

progress entails a limit

science, his failure to fortify that other

realm of knowledge endangers his

entire

believes that nature offers the key to a

since the ultimate end of science
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is

scheme.

new kind

of

Bacon ardently
life

for

humans

a practical one, the ease of

human

With

suffering.

this

he bounds his enthusiasm

for scientific inquiry

within the strictures of a revealed theology,
acknowledging that

knowledge from God

is

privileged because moral duties
precede

scientific investigation.

Yet Bacon feels

fragility of scientific investigation

it

necessary to protect the

from the conservatism of traditional

scholasticism because he believes that our ability to
"secrets" (for the sole

upon the autonomy

purpose of

relieving

of the scientific process.

between science and

rigid division

human

fact implicit in Bacon’s

thought

is

suffering)

depends

Therefore, he endorses a

The

religion.

nature's

utilize

and

dialectic of value

overwhelmed in the modern period

(by positivism) so that the gap between ethical and scientific

knowledge masks the modern epistemological dilemma.
this connection
critical if

we

between

scientific discovery

Exploring

and human morality

is

are to understand the long-standing ideology of nature.

Bacon’s largest work. The Great Instauration. designed to have
six parts: the classification

introduction of a

new

history, the "stuff’

and review

of the sciences; the

inductive method; the collection of a natural

on which his new method was

construction of tables showing discoveries
the

new method;

to operate; the

made through

the use of

the introduction of tentative doctrines gathered

from experiments; and the completion

of a philosophical synthesis

based upon tables inductively established^^, although uncompleted,
from 1620

new

to the

scientific

end of his

methodology.

life, it

drives Bacon’s attempt to initiate a

To aid

in its completion, he

works

to

supplant the prevailing Platonic and Aristotelian traditions by
inventing a
history

new method

of investigation supported

compendium.
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by a

large natural

According

to his

philosophy of science. Bacon attempts a

complete reconstruction of the sciences through a new method.
Rejecting Aristotle's three sciences (the theoretical, the practical and
the productive).
three parts:

Bacon recommends a

history, poetry

the

human

and philosophy. The variation amongst

human knowledge

the products of

faculties;

unified science divisible into

are the result of distinctions

memory produces

among

history, imagination poetry,

and reason philosophy.
remains that whatever effects are produced by
nature in her own workings, or by man in conjunction with
nature by art, are all natural, the works of God's

"...the fact

creations.

Bacon's philosophy of nature has two main divisions: the speculative
(inquisition of causes, searching the bowels of nature)

and the

operative (the production of effects, shaping nature).

Although clear about his two-fold purpose
(the discovery of the constitution of reality

and works). Bacon adopts a Platonic
constitution of nature.

method

is,

for

new method

and the production

of arts

strategy to explain the

The immediate purpose

both Bacon and Plato

for his

of the inductive

(as interpreted

by Bacon),

to

discover through the agencies of sense and reason the forms which
constitute things.

The form

"the very thing itself'^S;

it is

of a thing, according to both thinkers, is

constitutive of reality

appearance. Bacon praises Plato
believes that

he

and

distinct

for his recognition of form,

"lost the real fruit of his opinion

from

but

by considering forms

as absolutely abstracted from matter and not confined and determined

by matter". 57 Bacon chooses an immanent rather than transcendent
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theory of form, bestowing on nature the respect that careful

observation will reveal

A

its

true character.

large part of Bacon's

Aristotle's errors

embrace

and

work

is

an

effort to

to distance himself

Aristotle since

demonstrate

from the Scholastics

he believes that the method

practiced by Aristotelians

who

of investigation

is ineffective.

"The logic in vogue permits the human understanding to
range at will and then suddenly to fly up to the most highly
abstract "first principles", which, when once enunciated,

dominate

Bacon argues

all

for

further conceptions.^®

a

new method, an

inductive logic, which controls the

understanding, calling his "new organon"; a "clear and radiant

light",

the "formular^’^ of interpretation", the "art of discovery and invention",
"the thread of the labyrinth", "the key of interpretation",

"machine" constructed

to aid the capacities of

Since Bacon believes that the
is

first

is

not nearly so dangerous as

man.®^

purpose of every investigation

the discovery of nature, submitting the

experience

and a

mind
is

to empirical

subjecting

it

to the whirl of

abstract speculation.

"Knowledge begins with particulars, moves by ways of
notions to slightly general propositions, and from these in
turn progresses by unbroken scale of ascent to higher and

more general axioms."®®
Bacon believes that when the mind

what
The

it

confronts, this mingling of

result

is

of

man

mixes

mind and

its

own nature with

object distorts the object.

a false image quite unlike the original divine creation.

"The cure for the mind's waywardness
rules of a true inductive

method
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will

be found in the disciplinary

of inquiry."®^

Avoiding

t±ie

extremes of pure empiricism. Bacon suggests that

mind

since both the

of

man and

the senses are able to corrupt a pure

scientific investigation:

"The understanding, therefore, is not to be supplied with
wings but rather is to be hung' with weights. It must at
every stage of its activities be brought "to the particulars
themselves.

Understanding must proceed slowly and by gradual steps from
particulars to lesser axioms, then to middle axioms (the

most useful

axioms), and finally to the most general axioms. This method

contrasts most vividly with Aristotelian logic that Bacon argues

is

mere instrument, invented by man,

and

binding

it

to particulars.

for

Overcoming the Aristotelian method of

according to which one takes an intellectual leap

scientific discovery,

from experience

for governing his intellect

a

to principle

and then deduces

scientific principle

from this lesser principle. Bacon's new method requires that the
scientist rise

ascent, step

from sense and particulars gradually

by

first principle.

step,

The

human knowledge
human

power.

medicine:

A

under proper

in

an unbroken

direction, until finally arriving at a

logic of the Aristotelians provides poorly for

since

it

blocks the union of

human knowledge

with

properly evolved science matches the ascent of

It is first

'discovered', then its reasons

and causes are

assigned.

Bacon's method

is

designed

to

permanently separate

philosophical learning (maxims, deductive demonstration, ontology,
meditation) from experimental philosophy (inductive observation of
fact,

primacy of natural

history, distrust of logical principles, great

mechanical works). Anderson contends that his influence
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is

inordinately successful.

Natural philosophy leaves the universities and

does not return until attitudes

New

shift.

Educational theorists use the

Atlantis to shift education to technical training rather than
book

learning.

Even the language

of BriUsh philosophical scholarship takes

on a simplicity promulgated by the Baconians. God

is

entirely outside

Bacon's natural system that prevents acceptance of any other
ontological doctrine.

Bacon's persuasive attack targets most ancient and medieval
thinkers.

He

believes that few persons, other than the pre-Socratics,

understand the essence of

scientific pursuit.

"The sciences have been torn form their empirical roots.
Had they remained attached to the womb of Nature, they
would not have shriveled and died."®^

Only the early Greeks "have the discernment

of the natural

philosopher, and a savour of the nature of things, and experience and
bodies.

The

Greek

early

physicists.

Bacon

believes,

by submitting

themselves to the things themselves achieve their greatest

accomplishments, the simple investigations of what Bacon considers
the

first

and oldest of existing

Bacon imputes

things,

namely matter.

their success to the identification of natural

science with philosophy which gets torn apart by rationalism.

modern

perspective, Greek cosmologists unconsciously

identification

by embedding subject and

concept of nature:
different ones.

all

presume

this

object in a peculiar unified

objects share identifiable natures, albeit

Through

Greek attentiveness

From a

his

new methodology Bacon

to nature,

heralds the early

but unawaringly he adopts a

modem

epistemological position that distances the knowing subject from

42

As long as humans are subject

nature.

revelation, the epistemological split
isolation of fact from value that

modern

is

to

a higher judgment, divine

muddled by

religion.

Bacon justifies comes

to

Yet the

haunt the

atheistic world.

Although metaphysics
as a subclass,

is

concerning the

is

nature and mathematics
Ethics

is

Dictated by the dogmas of revealed religion,

all.

will of

man^S, moral philosophy

is

constructed as a

This fundamental division of science from

determined by the chasm between the truth of revelation

and the axioms discovered by the powers
outcome

in

of science rather than its master.

faithful servant to theology.

theology

the ultimate science of nature, physics,

concerned with processes

becomes the handmaiden
not a science at

is

of this distinction, lodged in

of

man. The ultimate

modern

thinking, surfaces as a

naive belief that the progress of scientific inquiry necessitates parallel

moral strengthening, so that even the demise

of religion

does not

render a reconsideration of the radical removal of ethics from the

realm of knowledge.
Bacon's overall scheme

is to

merge metaphysics with physics

order to guard science from idle criticism and to ground
inquiry in nature.

He

all scientific

believes he can accomplish this by separating

revealed theology from philosophy, thereby maintaining a sharp

separation between faith and reason, and preserving both. This
cleavage

is

found in

many

of his writings.

"The "singular advantage", says Bacon "which the Christian
religion hath (over pagan religions) towards the
furtherance of true knowledge is that it excludeth and
interdicteth human reason, whether by interpretation or
anticipation, from examining or discussing of the the
mysteries and principles of faith."®®
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in

Bacon explains

work

his

to segregate

philosophy from theology and

extend physics into metaphysics, arguing that in order
integrity of

each he must obtain

justification.

for

to

to protect the

each equal, but separate

At the edge of the medieval period, he

is

keenly aware of

the vulnerability of science to religious attack; therefore he
suggests a

daring scheme for safeguarding scientific

arguing that

activity^^^

is

the

naturalistic bent of ancient scientists that freed these thinkers to look
"directly" at nature,

uncontaminated by normative explanations. This

belief underlies his

own

scientific

methodology, believing that

unfiltered, nature's "secrets" will ultimately confirm

and

glorify the

rationality of divine creation.

Bacon
promotes

believes that this

human

utility

method (an attempt

to

redeem nature)

and the common good through the

careful

observation of nature produces this result.
"To produce works, man must know causes; and these he
can discover only through what he observes of nature's
structures and ways. What in knowledge is the cause is in
operation the rule. The chain of natural causes cannot be
broken. Nature, therefore, to be commanded must first be
obeyed. When this is done, human power and knowledge
will meet in one."

Compensation

for

human

insufficiency is a major

end

of the

new

induction.
better and how much more worthy of human
capacity it would be, if, through a new and adequate
method for discovering nature's activities, secrets for the
relief and benefit of mankind could be "speedily and
suddenly and simultaneously hastened and anticipated.

"How much

Such

benefit

commences with

the collecting of natural history and

gradually proceeds, by the controlled observation of things, to the

formulation of general axioms. The summation of this approach
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is

recorded in Bacon's utopian account of the benefits of pure scientific
activity,

New

Atlantis

Although

I

.

consider, in detail, the laudatory and dilatory

influences of Bacon's

new method

in chapter two, the outstanding

results are seen in the development of

modem

Bacon's

Hume

first

position to

outstanding descendent.

its logical

rationalist slumber".

philosophy.

Locke

is

carries the empiricist

end and successfully "awakens Kant from his
Finally, in a thinker

content of philosophical reflection

such as Comte, the whole

is identified

with a universalized

natural science. Metaphysics, as understood by Aristotle,

all

but

disappears.

C.

The Domination

of Nature

Before considering these broader implications, a closer analysis
of Bacon's project

sheds

light

on the epistemological dialogue about

the status of both nature and science.

If

we

are to read Bacon's

investigations optimistically, as does J. Weinberger'^^,

we would

conclude that careful attention to the Baconian agenda

modem

dilemma.

a

clarifies

Weinberger suggests that the most pressing

problem of the modern age

is

the "problem of technology".

As a

result

of our technological successes, Weinberger believes, we:
"feel

besieged by the very means that grant us power

(science),

and we are

alternately proud

and ashamed of our

impious mastery over nature"^ k
Weinberger thinks that Bacon

problems of the

modem

tells

us more about the causes and

age than any other thinker.

Beyond

Weinberger believes that Bacon himself understood the
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limits

that,

and

problems of his new project beyond
truth of this claim

is

point of view"72.

"its

beyond the scope

Although the

of this project, Weinberger's

analysis of the political nature of Bacon's project

is helpful.

Weinberger argues that Bacon's utopia, the New Atlantis while
promising perfect justice and beneficial

living,

contains "a secret, an

excessively difficult, and unspeakable political teaching"'^^

Weinberger

locates the roots of this secret in classical thought.

"The ancient utopian thinkers took human society to be an
order of several productive arts pursued by persons who,
unlike the brutes, act not out of mere necessity but for the
sake of the good, for self-sufficiency. As it is imaginable by
the rational animal, perfect self-sufficiency is the godlike
freedom from the need to produce.

Weinberger believes that while luxury provides apparent
sufficiency, the very existence of ancient society

mistaken

belief that the productive arts

perfect self-sufficiency.

The continuing

objects demonstrates that the drive
rational.

gods)

This

human

is

and

self-

depends upon the

their objects

thirst for

can provide

new and

not essentially practical but

longing to be perfectly self-sufficient

becomes the ultimate source

better

of social injustice.

(like

the

Therefore,

since philosophy naturally springs from and supports the rational

pretensions of the arts, only political philosophy can expose

its errors.

Weinberger's suggestion that the ancient Utopians use myth to
hide the dangerous link between man's practice of the productive arts

and the

rational longing for self-sufficiency while the

moderns (from

Machiavelli to Hobbes)^^ believe that religion can be stripped of

mystery helps

to explain the

elimination of

myth

its

importance of the Baconian agenda. The

reveals that

all

human

endeavors, especially moral

ones, are actually comprised of desires served by technological and
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advance.

scientific

perfect justice

The modems

by producing a

believe that

perfect

it is

economy

possible to achieve

of liberated desire

and

physical satisfaction by overcoming classical utopian thought
that

impedes the power

of

men

demonstrable principles

to

conquer nature and

to discover

of justice.

Weinberger believes that the mystery inherent in the

New

Atlantis reveals Bacon's cognizance of the error inherent in the

"modem

project".

With

it

Bacon protects the

secrets of knowledge

from vulgar capacities (Machiavelli and Hobbes).
"While recommending the mastery of nature, he doubts
whether the artful conquest of nature's penury can
accomplish its tme go^, which is to overcome mankind's

obstreperous

political nature.

Weinberger believes that Bacon

knows

to

by way

New Atlantis

of

to

present

of the ancients' "enigmatical method"'^®. This

explains the peculiar

House

compelled to recommend what he

be problematic; he therefore has no choice but

his teaching

Bacon's

is

way

in

which the

results of scientific activity in

are carefully guarded by ritual and secrecy in the

Solomon.

Consider the odd formulation of New Atlantis ^^. Bacon believes
that he captures the future of scientific inquiry

1624

when he

writes

it

(just before his death).

"The description of Solomon's House is the description of
the vision in which he lived, -the vision not of an ideal
world released from the natural conditions to which ours
is subject, but of our own world as it might be made if we
did our duty by it; of a state of things which he believed
would one day be actually seen upon this earth such as it is
by men such as we are; and the coming of which he
believed that his own labours were sensibly hastening.
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in

Bacon believes boat

his utopian institution, Solomon's House, or the

College of the Six Days' Works, embodies the model society
instituted
to interpret

benefit of

New

nature and to produce great and marvelous works

for the

men.
Atlantis

is

a tale of a fated ship's crew sailing from Peru

China. After depleting food supplies and giving themselves up as

they enter the coastal port of an
island entreat

them

to leave,

unknown

Taken

to

The people

lost,

of the

but upon learning of their plight and

their Christian beliefs, invite the ship's
city.

island.

to

a central abode

crew

to rest

and recover

(the Stranger's House), they are

spend three days without leaving

their quarters.

in the

asked

to

At the same time

they are given restorative medicine and food and in three days are

astonished by their rate of recovery.

At the end of this time they are visited by the Christian governor

who asks only
his

knowledge

by the

brotherly love in return for his assistance.
of Christianity, he tells

pillar of light.

society of Salomon's

He explains

them the story

that one of the wise

House made a

Surprised by

of the visitation

men

of the

prayer;

"Lord God heaven and earth, thou hast vouchsafed of thy
grace to those of our order, to know thy works of creation,
and the secrets of them; and to discern (as far as
appertaineth to the generations of men) between divine
miracles, works of nature, works of art, and impostures
and illusions of all sorts. I do here acknowledge and testify
before this people, that the thing which we now see before
our eyes is thy Finger and a true Miracle; and forasmuch as
we learn in our books that thou never workest miracles but
to a divine and excellent end, (for the laws of nature are
thine own laws and thou exceedest them not but upon
great cause,) we most humbly beseech thee to prosper this
great sign, and to give us the interpretation and use of it in
mercy; which thou dost in some part secretly promise by

sending

it

unto us."®^
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man

The wise

is

drawn

to the pillar

and receives from

ark of cedar, the Holy Word and other books of the

The land

is

thus saved from

infidelity

by an

ark.

world by a great deluge which destroys almost

A

all

New
it is

under the reign

upon making

seeks to

make

his

of

King Solamona. He

kingdom

flourish

and

is

in a small

Testament.
lost

men and

few escape to higher ground and slowly begin

Atlantis

Intent

but

it.

from the

beasts.

to rebuild

a generous king.

his people happy,

he

the land self-sufficient without need to receive

strangers or to travel.
"Ye shall understand (my dear friends) that amongst the
excellent acts of that king, one above all hath the preeminence. It was the erection and institution of an Order
or Society which we call Salomon’s House; the noblest
foundation (as we think) that ever was upon the earth; and
the lantern of this kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of
the Works and Creatures of God."®2
"But thus you see we maintain a trade, not for gold, silver,
or jewels; nor for silks; nor for spices; nor any other
commodity of matter; but only for God's first creature,
which was Light to have light (I say) of the growth of all
parts of the world.
;

The

result is the

New Atlantis upon which

the crew has landed.

His

explanation complete, the governor leaves the crew, granting the

permission to participate in the joys of island

men

life.

Waiting expectantly, on a visitation by one of the Fathers of

Salomon's House, the

visitors are eventually tutored in the

Salomon House. The foundation

wonders

of

of the school is the quest for

knowledge, the knowledge of ultimate causes and secrets of motion
for the

purpose of enlarging the bounds

effect all things possible.

experimental

of the

Human

Empire and

The tutor explains the amazing

facilities at their disposal;
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deep caves

to

diversity of

(for refrigeration.

conservation of bodies, imitation of natural mines,

curing diseases), high towers
snow), great lakes

(for

for

upon

(for trials

fountains, large baths

experiments and

(for

(for

artificial

view of meteors, winds, rain and
fish

and

the cure of diseases), orchards and gardens

artificial selection),

parks

(for

beasts and birds

(for

experiments), shops of medicine, factories, furnaces,
(for

experiments in

light

and

radiation),

nutrition

perspective-

sound-houses

demonstration of the production of sound), perfume-houses
imitating

and multiplying

and

fowl), artificial wells

medical research), bake houses and breweries

houses

metals and

smells), engine-houses

and houses

(for

the

(for

of the

deceits of the senses.

Yet the experimentation continues under the most

strict ethical

guidelines.

"But we do hate all impostures and lies; insomuch as we
have severely forbidden it to all our fellows, under pain of
ignominy and fines, that they do not shew any natural work
or thing, adorned or swelling; but only pure as it is, and
without all affectation of strangeness."®'^
Detailing the process of study, collecting information, reading books,

experimenting, organizing information, applying
raising

it

into greater observations, axioms

it

to

man's

life

and

and aphorisms, he

concludes his explanation; "...upon every invention of value, we erect a

him a

statue to the inventor, and give

With that the

man

bounties to be had

liberal

and honourable reward."®®

entreats the visitors to spread the good
if

undertaken

in "God's

bosom"

news

of the

in the utopia of

New

Atlantis.
If

we assume

(with Ricoeur®®) that utopias serve the useful

purpose of shattering current

ideologies, Weinberger's suggestion that
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t±ie

New

Atlantis captures the "naive utopianism" of

modern thought

allows us to recognize the inherent limitations of Bacon's belief
(that

only the hope that man, the productive animal, can overcome the

own

limits of his

material existence redeems

a successful utopia forces
political

its

human

readers to distinguish the import of

autonomy, the reproductive capacities

Weinberger

calls the

modem

While

suffering).

of

human

culture,

a "sinful version"®'^ of

scientific project

Bacon's naive utopianism. Yet he believes that Bacon, the father of this
enterprise,

shows the way

that has been lost.

longer political
believes that

is

The temptation

more

realistic

utopian wisdom

of a justice so perfect that

the real "problem of technology".

Bacon

nature to meet

to the older,

it is

no

Weinberger

realizes that the utopian vision of controlling

human

need

is naive,

prevails as a force to reckon with.

that the political will always

Since the productivity of nature can

never bring about political justice. Bacon combines the promise of new

freedom with a

realistic appraisal of its limits, according to

Weinberger,

Although Weinberger correctly casts Bacon as a harbinger

need

for

of the

a political critique of the modems' philosophy of nature,

whether Bacon 'knew' of the dangers inherent

in his project, is not

important here. The modern belief that the unbounded study of
nature

produce an enlightened and just society which Bacon

will

promulgates and

many

agree has

failed,

Weinberger

calls

a "problem of

technology (an unease about our mastery over nature) and
"

ecophilosophers characterize as the "domination of nature". While
they align themselves with the sentiment that
failed,

modem

society has

their concept of the "domination of nature" unfortunately
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serves to conceal the

modern

project:

more fundamental

agenda of the

failed political

the continued domination of some

humans by

While the locus of the disenchanted modern agenda

is

others.

a Baconian

restriction of knowledge, the solution is a poliUcal criUque of this
result.
It is

William Leiss®^ that develops a radically different analysis of

the concept of the "domination of nature".

By demonstrating

the

general social benefits that were thought to accrue as a result of

encouraging the steady growth of science and technology, he shows

how

this

concept serves as the guiding S3mibol

social enterprise.

blinds

for

an extraordinary

Yet, Leiss argues, the utilization of the concept

some users

illusory distinction

to its results since this concept is rooted in

between nature and

society.

an

Social development

is

actually a series of increasingly complex states of nature.

What
itself.

is

needed

is

a thorough understanding of the concept

Ecophilosophers use the term, the "domination of nature",

already assuming man's wrongful relationship to the rest of nature. In
this way, the

concept validates a

relationship between

evaluation of

modern

critical

stance which portrays the

humankind and nature per
society.

se as vital to

They can then argue that

since

conceptualizes himself as the most important being on earth,

an

man
it is

this

"anthropocentric"®^ attitude that allows for and even encourages the

wanton misuse
this that

of non- human nature.

They

believe that

follows from

our attitude toward external nature determines the normative

character of our behaviors. While any person
kill

it

an animal, an attitude

may

cut

down a

tree or

of respect or disregard determines the

appropriateness of the act. The "domination of nature
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is

something

more than the mere

utilization of nature,

exploitation, the roots of

which are

in the

it

symbolizes an attitude of

mechanization of nature and

the domination talk initiated by Francis Bacon. The results, they
argue, are clearly visible in the current environmental

^ as a victim of a

Disputing the characterization of nature

human

crisis.

conceptual framework, Leiss believes that the concept of the

"domination of nature" functions ideologically:

fundamental

social contradictions.

its

use indicates

Acting ideologically,

it

serves to

conceal:

"one of the most fateful historical dynamics in modern
times: the inextricable bond between the domination of
nature and the domination of man"90.

By masking

the

new forms

of domination taking

human

society, the goal of liberating the

focus of Leiss’ work
species that

is

is to

supposed

psychic constitution of

shape

condition

is

in the capitalist

The

reversed.

analyze the dialectic of domination in which a
to

its

conquer nature

own

nature.

is itself

dominated by the

Leiss suggests that the

dialectical reversal of the goal of mastering nature (a better

can be seen in the class-based environmental
of violent conflict to a global setting.

The end

crisis

life

for

all)

and the extension

result

is

the

internalization of a compulsive character of consumptive behavior

which destroys personal autonomy and negates the

effort to

win

liberation from external compulsion.

To shed

light

on

this result, Leiss clarifies

which humans represent
scientific

to

some

of the

ways

in

themselves the relationship between their

accomplishments and

improvements. Francis Bacon

their expectations of social

is
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an example. Like Weinberger, Leiss

believes t±iat the effort to control nature
ideas.

is

modern utopian

linked to

Although this mastery over nature has been essentially

achieved through science and technology, the

efforts to

have a close relationship with the evolution

new means

of

dominating other men. Thus the rationality of the new
methodology, although considered
of liberating society, fails to

continues to defy

scientific

be an independent force capable

overcome

become the

modern

the undertaking

for

social

development that

attempts at rational control. Sources of

all

satisfaction of desire

believes that

to

master nature

objects of political conflict.

Leiss

society is caught in the persistent illusion that

known

as the "mastering of nature"

Leiss believes that the terror

relationship to technology

is

and

is itself

desire that fuel early

recognizable in

modem

mastered.

humans'

fatalism.

While

the ancients believe that the instruments of mining and metallurgical

operations are 'demonic' and mysterious, people continue to accept
the fmits of

human

ingenuity while, at the same time, dreading the

eruptions of uncontrollable malevolence. The readiness to take charge
is

evidenced in the degree to which Genesis

is

interpreted in political

terms providing the modern notions of mastery, domination and
conquest. The secularization of Christianity results in the extension of

human power
dominion of

in the world.

man

Leiss believes that the acknowledged

over nature in Christianity

is

firmly associated with

the ongoing successes in science and technology.

Yet the lust to

command

arouse emotions of fear and
evaluate our

modern notion

nature's secret energies continues to

important to

guilt.

He

of the

mastery of nature in the
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believes

it

is

light of its

association with

evil, guilt

and

The Faust legend, which

fear.

originated in the late sixteenth century and

became

extraordinarily

popular, obviously struck a powerful sympathetic chord, one which
still

resounds today. The dogma of material progress or mastery over

nature lacks a determinate, fixed content.

"Our idea of mastery over nature is formed against this
background by Bacon and others, and the traces of the
struggle to remove its diabolical overtones are still
discernible.

The great idea that possessed Bacon, according

to Leiss, is that of

organized scientific research by which he attempts to legitimize and

He captures

valorize the scientific enterprise.

Atlantis

.

By

this idea in the

New

the nineteenth century, although Bacon’s epistemology

found wanting, his passionate advocacy

is

for the sustained progress in

the mechanical arts and the physical sciences

is

the heart of his

effectiveness.

Leiss believes that Bacon's concept of the mastery of nature has

not been analyzed

critically.

panacea or denigrated as a

Either

modem

Bacon's greatest achievement

mastery over nature.

By

is

it is

blindly accepted as a

curse.

its

it

once again

To quote again from the New Organon

man by

human

connection to megalomaniacal

delusions of the alchemists, he safely weds
Christianity.

Instead, Leiss argues that

his clear recommendation for

severing

modem

to

:

same time from

his state of
innocence and from his dominion over creation. Both of
these losses however can even in this life be in some part
repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts

"For

the

fall fell

at the

and sciences. "92

By taking

great pains to stress the innocence of the scientific

endeavor, the separation of natural knowledge and moral knowledge
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gradually becomes a cardinal principle of
establishes

it

modem

through his interpretation of the

fall

thought.

and seeks

Bacon
to allay

fears that the scientific investigation of nature will shake the
grounds
of faith.

Yet there
justified the

is

a hidden dichotomy in Bacon's argument. Bacon

mastery over nature by referring

to the condition of

man

before the Fall, but the recovery of dominion through arts and science
in

no way insures the restoration

religion.

of innocence

which

is

the

domain

Bacon, by coupling domination and innocence, claims

identified a

way

to achieve

to

of

have

both domination and innocence through

science.

Yet his method demands that the means of mastery are quite

different

from the means

to innocence.

Herbert Bernstein in his essay, "Idols of Modern Science and the

Reconstruction of Knowledge"^^, argues that Francis Bacon intends his

work

to serve

handiwork,
religion

God's ultimate good, that science, by revealing God's

will reveal the

can mediate

scientific

can not corrupt because

Baconian agenda up

moral

knowledge and moral behavior (science

scientific

for failure in

religious constraint.

The

Yet Bacon's conviction that

object.

knowledge reveals God) sets the

a social climate that abandons

result of the decoupling of science

and

ethics is evident in the positivist agenda.

Throughout the centuries, variations
rationality of science

of this

theme recurs: the

and technology works as an independent

infuse rationality into the social process as a whole.

"The measure of Bacon's success

is

indicated by the fact

that the metaphor of "conquering" nature by means of
science and technology appears everywhere today and

56

force to

seems so perfectly opaque both to learned
commentators and to the general public.

The success

of Bacon's

agenda

is

social

evident in the conviction of

thinkers that the growth of knowledge brings, not only

relief

many
from the

inconveniences caused by the man’s dependency upon nature, but also
those resulting from the tensions between men.

Bacon

believes that

the mastery of external nature entails the mastery of internal nature.
It is

in the

New

Atlantis Leiss believes, that
.

mastery of nature in terms of

its

Bacon

relationship to social progress.

contrasts Bacon's vision to More's Utopia written at the
,

More appeals

reveals the

same

Leiss

time.

to the dedication of individual self-development as the

overriding social objective responsible for the limitations imposed on

new

the production of goods. Bacon's

that the qualities of scientific research

disinterestedness,

and

scientists' social role.

analytic rigor

on the assumption

society rests

-

-

impartiality,

would be operative

in the

Bacon unthinkingly assumes

Leiss believes that

that religion would operate as the primary source of ethical restraint.

Bacon did not

detail the social

and

political

arrangements in his

society since the scientific research establishment of

exercised complete control over

its

own

New

Atlantis

activities.

Utopia ..the "moral progress" of individuals was to be
the mediating link between scientific progress and social
progress, the third term in which is manifest the
And it is just this element of
rationality of the whole.
moral progress that is so conspicuously absent in New
"In

.

Atlantis ."Q^

Leiss suggests that the political

component

Bacon's utopia. Weinberger believes that
'covered up'

by the mysteries

of the

its

is

entirely absent from

absence

is

consciously

Solomon House. Either way, no

outstanding thinker after Bacon devotes comparable attention
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to the

concept of the mastery over nature. Those who follow find the form
of
his concept sufficient for their

own

purposes.

Leiss believes that Bacon's concept and

method supports the

elevation of the mechanical arts alongside the progress of science.

This connection between science and material comfort

is

at the root

of the great scientific revolution of the seventeenth century.

that the conquest of nature

is

realized through science

appears more and more self-evident
therefore few think

phenomenon. The

necessary

it

modem

after the

to analyze

it

and technology

seventeenth century and

as a separate

epistemological position brings to

completion the idea that a single method can be applied in
sciences, a

The idea

method as valuable

all

to studying society as nature.

the

Leiss

believes that in the transformation of natural philosophy to natural

science and the philosophy of nature, the debates in science turn from

forms and essences to descriptive analyses leading

to

laws of

Interest in the philosophy of nature

observable behavior.

wanes

after

the middle of the nineteenth century; the philosophy of science and
the sociology of science emerge.

The tenuous status

of scientific objectivity has

by many other thinkers. The epistemological status
is

been challenged
of

modern science

a direct result of the history of the philosophy of nature. At one

point, all of nature,

human and nonhuman,

changing relationship of religion

and natural science
inquiry.

This shift

shifts,

is

subject to God's law. The

nature has a profound influence on

to

the status of scientific discovery.

is

As the relaUonship between

religion

so does the ethical restraint on scientific

demonstrated

in the

thought of Francis Bacon.

Bacon wholeheartedly endorses the growing recognition
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of the

power

He develops a methodology

of scientific inquiry.

which confirms

his growing suspicion that scientific methodology

must be grounded
He

nature.
morality.

for the sciences

in the observation

and prediction

of the behavior of

boldly conceptualizes nature as a distinct from

Bacon

lays the

groundwork

for

human

removing questions of

technology from the realm of ethics. The important result
justification of a radically
is

new

is

the

epistemology so that the study of nature

elevated to the preeminent source of objectivity.

association of knowledge and science

The unmediated

the residue of Bacon's call to

is

"dominate nature".

The

final result is

sixteenth century.

He argues that
this

what

Leiss calls the domination ideology of the

Bacon presses forward

the study of nature will reveal her secrets and that with

knowledge the manipulation of natural processes

project initiates the social enterprise

The

industrial revolution.

tendency

its

mask

to

Baconian fen/or

is

modern

ideological

we now

of the

is

possible.

in three ways.

mastery of external nature.
all

It is

genuine

others.

It is

in the

of nature".

1

with science.

knowledge

and

The

lost in the

suppressed by

human knowledge

the result of the careful application of the scientific method.

is lost

This

of this enterprise is

some humans by

undermined

epistemological belief that

is

the scientific

call

component

the domination of

recognition of this result

the

his scientific methodology.

And,

it

misguided attack by ecophilosophers on the "domination

have traced the Baconian roots of the
1

turn

now

to critique this result:

to scientific results.
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modem

fascination

the restriction of

I

will define 'ecophilosophy' in

more depth

in chapter three.

encompass a

The term

is

used

to

loosely defined movement as suggested by Alan Drengson in
Ecophilosophy: A Field Guide to the Literature Donald E. Davis. (San Pedro:
& E.
Miles, 1989), pg. xi: "...ecophilosophy represents a holistic coming together
of
environment, activity, and idea; a way of thinking that will concretely aiuminate
humankind's rightful place in the natural world." It is "...a healing movement toward
creation of a new culture of wholeness and harmony with Nature." In contrast. I use
the
term according to a more narrow interpretation as defined by David Rothenberg in
Ecology.communit y and lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
pg.
2: Ecophilosophy offers "...the basis of a new ontology which posits humanity
as
inseparable from nature. From this ontological beginning, ethics and practical action
are to fall in place."

R

.

.

Hwa Yol Jung: "According to deep ecology, the
ecological crisis is the result of thinking about Nature in terms of the extrinsic
rationality of utility and domination, which turned out to be the most glaring and
lethal failing of modem thought since Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon. To overcome
this failing, we need to think about Nature in a radically new way. that is, in terms of
seeing that Nature has intrinsic meaning and value of its own." from "Shallow thinking
on Deep Elcology" The Tmmpeter Journal of Ecosophv 7(Spring, 1990).

^Consider a quote from deep ecologist

^Ecophilosophers agree that the liberation of nature is the vital ingredient necessary
for the liberation of humanity as well. This vision of harmony motivates their work.
place tfie start of the "modem period" at the turn of the sixteenth century, the point of
transition between medieval and modem science.
use the term '"he modem epistemological position or resulf'to refer to the modem
philosophical restriction of knowledge to that produced by the scientific method. The
"modem epistemological dilemma" is the constraints placed on ethical discourse by
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CHAPTER

II

THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
The

call to

dominate nature,

for scientific discovery,

becomes, by the eighteenth century, a

belief in the rational capacities of

this

"domination ideology"

modern

society.

by Baconian enthusiasm

initiated

is

humankind. The

wide suffering perpetrates on

itself

this chapter

underpinnings of this

I

of this

of eliminating world-

examine the philosophical
argue that ecophilosophers

modern dilemma. While these

philosophers insist that their program to "liberate nature"
against domination ideology,

I

of

unparalleled destruction, violence

result, continuing to

misunderstand the root

illusory success of

apparent in the paradoxical results

Humankind, although capable

and oppression. In

solid

is

a revolt

suggest that by grounding

ecophilosophy in a pre-critical concept of nature

(a universally-

dominated, external nature), they demonstrate that they lack the
necessary epistemological insight
counterideology:

to avoid slipping into

the ideology of nature.

ideology as suggested by Karl

Mannheim

a kind of

The conservative function
in Ideology

and Utopia

of

.

implicit in the word 'ideology' (is) the insight that
in certain situations the collective unconscious of
certain groups obscures the real condition of society
"...

both
supports

to itself

my

(essential to

and

to others

and thereby

stabilizes

it,"i

contention that without a thorough critique of knowledge

undermining

ideological thinking) ecophilosophers,

supporting a tyranny of 'one nature', acquiesce to the continued

unequal distribution of power and wealth in our
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society.

by

The

potentially imperialist nature of the relationship between

environmentalists of the West and fourth-world^ peoples provides an

example of the conservatism implicit in an ideology of

Take the case of the Inuit^ who, despite

'one nature’.

their best efforts at organizing

as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (which brings together

indigenous peoples from around the globe), lack the
financial

power

seal hunt.

to fight a well financed

One

and

political

media campaign against

their

Native leader explains his frustration this way;

"They came up with a stroke of genius several years ago
when they invented the term 'baby seal', nobody talks
about baby horses, baby cows, baby pigs. Many animals are
routinely slaughtered for food and clothing, yet
kill a seal, you commit murder."'^

somehow

when you

Technological advance

is

perpetrated in

new forms

of oppression;

massive advertising campaigns with world-wide distribution force
arctic peoples to defend

of rationality^ will help

and
us

to

rationalize their use of nature.

A

critique

understand the connection between

ecophilosophy and nature imperialism.

A.
It is

The

Dialectic of Enlightenment

the work of critical theorists®, in particular

Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who,
Dialectic of

Enlightenment

,

first

"why mankind, instead

condition, is sinking into a

in their consequential work.

address the pervasive and ideological

Horkheimer and Adorno determine

character of modern thinking.
discover

Max

of entering into a truly

new kind

of barbarism"^.

to

human

Not unlike

ecophilosophers, they argue that a fundamental intenUon to dominate

nature underlies and undermines modern society. While
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ecophilosophers are quick to point to the environmental

crisis as the

direct result of this intention, critical theorists suggest that the

results are better understood as indicative of a two-fold 'revenge of

Beyond widespread biospheric

nature'.

Adorno believe that

deterioration,

and technological progress has required

scientific

the suppression of critical components of

and the

playful), resulting in

Horkheimer and

a

human

"terrible anger"8

nature (the erotic

weakening human

resistance to manipulation by resourceful demagogues.

"Man must subject himself

to a terrible discipline, in
of his own nature that
the controls of the scientific

which he must deny those aspects

are incompatible with
experiment, as well as the order and regularity imposed by
the factory."^

Horkheimer and Adorno's description

of the

development of modern

thought does not emerge from a constructive view of history; they

oppose

all

closed systems of thought.

tenuous relationship between

reality

From

the start, they evoke the

and truth by recasting the

problem of modern decadence within an

historical

and

dialectical

context.

The relationship
philosophy.

A

of truth to reality colors the history of

contrasts a Platonic

standard history of epistemology

theory of truth (according to which propositions are true because they

correspond to a reality independent of

human

Humean

to

coherence theory. According

perception) to a

Hume,

since knowledge

is

simply a relation of ideas having no knowable correspondence with a
reality

behind our impressions,

science)

can do

perceive

and

is to

reflect.

all

that a system of knowledge (a

systematize statements about the

way we

Critical theorists suggest that as all-inclusive
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conceptions of reality these traditional formulations ultimately
deprive

philosophy of

its

The core

true critical function.

of the

Horkheimer and Adorno analysis renders truth

as a dialectical relationship between enlightenment

begins as

myth contains within

which, supposing

itself to

it

and myth; what

the roots of enlightenment thinking

have overcome myth, reverts

to

it.

Beginning with Francis Bacon, this relationship manifests in history as
the rise of the Enlightenment, the belief that through reason

humankind
itself

is

ultimately capable of asserting

from mythology and superstition.

itself

over and liberating

Horkheimer and Adorno locate

the fundamental structure of enlightenment thinking in a concept of
nature:

a radical disjuncture between subjectivity and nature which

drives the

machinery

of the Enlightenment.

Nature

is useful.

"What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in
order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the
only aim.

Ruthlessly, in despite of

itself,

the

Enlightenment has extinguished any trace of

its

own

self-

consciousness." ^2

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, enlightened belief
possibility of

overcoming the power

relationship between

deemed an

humans and

of nature

nature;

object of manipulation, even

in the

connotes a peculiar

since anything material

is

humans, equally embodying

the natural, are subject to manipulation. This concept of nature
necessitates an

all

embracing attitude

of utility

toward natural objects,

explaining the transformation from liberating reason into dogmatism
(or

Enlightenment into totalitarianism).
Historians typically associate the instrumentalization of nature

with the advent of modern science (chapter one).
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Horkheimer and

Adorno argue

that,

although

it

manifests

itself in

the development of

science and the spread of capitalist economies, this concept
of nature

predates the
deities

modem

period with roots in myth and magic, Greek

and the Judaeo-Christian

tradition.

In Dialectic of

Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate, using the
character of Odysseus, an early example of the attempt by a subject to
radically disengage from nature.

After

Odysseus discovers that "only

perpetual presence of mind forces an existence from nature"^"*, he
able to overcome the forces of nature by cunning.

is

Struggling to sail

past the alluring and deadly songs of the Sirens, Odysseus succeeds by

denying pleasure

He plugs

to his

their ears with

crew and depriving himself of the

wax and binds

himself impotently to the mast.

Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that Odysseus' escape
a delusion propagated by enlightenment (and
the subject

ability to act.

is

capitalist)

an

allegory of

thinking that

is free.

"Odysseus is represented in labor. Just as he cannot yield
to the temptation to self-abandonment, so, as proprietor,
he finally renounces even participation in labor, and
ultimately even its management, whereas his men despite their closeness to things - cannot enjoy their
labor, because it is preformed under pressure, in
desperation, with senses stopped by force. The servant
remains enslaved in body and soul; the master
regresses.

Although Odysseus masters "the capacity of representation" and

overcomes nature, at the same time, his o'wn capacity
in the world regresses.

way from mythology
reflection.

for participation

Horkheimer and Adorno believe that on the

to rationality,

When humans

thought loses the capacity of

distance themselves from nature to
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self-

comprehend

it,

they unselfconsciously use the knowledge to

dominate, abandoning their

own

advance.

In a similar fashion, the mathematization of nature

by

modem

science, the final manifestation of the Enlightenment, sets forth
a

purely rational, ideational world as the only tme

reality.

"Man learned to master nature, but only by imitating her
most rigid and routinized aspects. The dimension of
reason concerned with the potential of things to be more
than they

are... is split off as idealism, where it remains
impotently confined to higher realms. Reason becomes
powerful only by becoming an instmment."^®

This concept, that knowledge

is

exclusively accessible through

marks the dawning

scientific representation,

With a radical separation

of fact

and value,

of the era of positivism

early positivist writers seek

to establish the authority of observation envisioning society to be, like

biology, a

complex

of facts governed

by

laws. Auguste Comte,

stressing that the abstract study of nature

necessary for the establishment of unity in
order of the
the
to

is all

human

phenomena by which humanity

first to clearly state

that

is

is

life,

by

absolutely
"...the

regulated"^®,

the positivist belief in the ability of

laws or

is

one of

humankind

permanently transcend mythology and superstition. Comte

imagines a redeemed social world, as the result of his positive
principles,

because he believes that the knowledge produced by

following the laws of nature provides the kind of solid proof needed to
free

humankind from

social

phenomena, as

in all others, as necessarily resting

order of nature, progress
Religion, absorbed
positive

Since the positivist regards

illusion.

is

order, in

upon the

simply the development of that order.

by existence, remains within the construct of

knowledge as a facet of

human
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I

all

life.

The undisputable

benefit of this kind of thinking

is

the

production of useful, technical knowledge capable of liberating

from natural necessity, from the drudgery of work.

humans

Horkheimer and

Adorno argue that the moral impetus behind such a program fades
quickly as social programs are absorbed by natural science while the

capacity for critical analysis
that since fear

is

is

undermined. Furthermore, they believe

the root of the desire to dominate nature, the

pervasive influence of positivist thinking comes as no surprise.

"Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no
longer anything unknown. That determines the course of
demythologization, of enlightenment, which compounds
the animate with the inanimate just as myth compounds
the inanimate with the animate.

Enlightenment

The pure immanence

fear turned radical.

is

mythic

of positivism, its

ultimate product, is no more than a so to spe^ universal
taboo. Nothing at all remains outside, because the mere
idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.'i^

Although enlightenment thinkers believe that knowledge disenchants
nature by transcending superstition and unconscious
dialectic of

enlightenment thinking

in the struggle to

come

to

is

error, the

the fact that reason, originating

terms with nature by turning against the

Enlightenment

subject, initiates the decline of critical thought.

thinkers, w’hile believing themselv^es to be free from the tvTanny of

nature

(free of fear), are

ov^ercome by the all-consumptiv’e nature of

enlightenment thinking.

The

fate

and resuscitation

of critical thinking is the

preoccupation of Jurgen Habermas

vv'ho,

in his recent

philosophy and sociology, reworks the notions of
adv'anced by Horkheimer, Adorno and others.

surrounding his work

is

of particular
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in

critical theorv’

The

importance

work

controv'ersy

to this project

as

because

it

turns on the divergent ways in which

characterized the limits of
of

and relationship

human knowledge

to external nature.

by rejecting the mystical notion

critical theorists

have

including our knowledge

Habermas distinguishes himself

of the "resurrection of fallen nature"20

alluded to by Horkheimer and Adorno and radically embraced by

Herbert Marcuse. Habermas argues against Marcuse’s suggestion that

a

new

science and a

humankind from

new technology

are possible and necessary to free

the oppressive character of

modern

economies by maintaining that the only conceivable
toward external nature
potential for use 21
.

determine the way

is

For Habermas, two essential

humans come

communication (freedom and

new

human

orientation

one that understands nature in terms of

to

control of nature (material comfort)

the possibility of a

capitalist

know
and

the world;

he

is

interests

interest in the

interest in interpersonal

responsibility).

science,

human

its

While Habermas rejects

aligned with other critical

theorists (in the tradition of Dialectic of Enlightenment) positing

modem

science as necessarily one-dimensional and instmmental.

Yet his answer to the resulting "revolt of nature" departs from a

Marcusian pessimism when he suggests the
concept of reason:
the

the disenchanted concept of

autonomous realm

chapter four

1

possibility of a dual

of

modem

science and

communicative interaction. Although in

return to this solution (and the debate between

Habermas and the Marcusians), Habermas' denunciation
is sufficient to justify

my own

thorough attack on positivism
from the intmsion of

of positivism

critique of ecophilosophy.22
is

his attempt to protect 'reflection'

scientific reason.
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Habermas'

B.

While positivism

is

The

Spirit of Positivism

considered by

many

rather unsuccessful philosophy of science,

philosophers to be a

Habermas

believes that

by

reconstructing the history and influence of positivism as a general

theory of knowledge he can demonstrate the need for a re-integration
of "knowledge

and human

interests".

As a philosophy

of science,

positivism renders the predictive success of scientific observations the
status of objectivity.

Habermas demonstrates, through a persuasive

reconstruction of Continental philosophy from Kant to Marx, that this

preoccupation with objectivity that defines positivism, results in the

modern

collapse of the philosophical priority of epistemology.

Physicist and philosopher Ernst

Mach

influences the forming of

the infamous Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century.

Ackermann23 notes that these
scientific

knowledge

because of

its

is

early positivists feel intuitively that

the paradigm example of

Mach

greater certainty.

and imaginative models do

Robert

not,

human knowledge

believes that scientific theories

by themselves, have any claim

to truth,

that our thoughts derive whatever truth they have only by their

representation of our experience.
generalize that which

we

Thinking serves merely as a way

to

perceive with our senses.

"The positivist suggests that whatever meaning is assigned
to the term explanation beyond the meaning "generalized
description" is going to confuse us, tempt us to go beyond
what we can justify, and lead us to pervert and
misunderstand the proper methods of science.

Mach concerns

himself with liberating science from metaphysical

speculations believing that he retains the possibility of knowledge by
allowing science to get on with the job of acquiring knowledge.
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Under Mach’s
logic as
to

influence, positivists turn to

modern symbolic

developed by Whitehead and Russell in Princinia Mathematic

demonstrate that

all

meaningful sentences can be translated into

symbolic expression and judged true or

false.

those dependent upon facts for their truth or
positivists as either

meaningful

scientific

Synthetic sentences,
falsity,

are classed by

sentences or meaningless

unscientific sentences (the metaphysical, aesthetic, political...).
their goal is to rid science of anything other

synthetic sentences that are precisely the
science, the positivist

program

is to

build

Since

than the meaningful

domain

up

of empirical

knowledge on

scientific

the basis of accumulating simple, verifiable sentences and the

sentences that they imply. The function of a philosopher of science
to clarify the distinctions

is

between meaningful and non-meaningful

sentences.
Positivist

philosophy of science

is

haunted by

its

rejection of

explanation because explanation schemes are prior to and different

from mere description in important ways. Ackermann believes that
the roots of positivism are in a confusion within the philosophy of
science:

positivists believe that

it is

possible to "sweep out

everything"25 and to reconstruct a legitimate scientific knowledge

based on undeniable assumptions. Although the impossibility of the
project, given the

workings of

logic,

suggests an obvious objection to

positivism, the "crippling objection"^®, according to
fact that positivism itself

cannot account

This limitation leaves no room in

its

for

Ackermann,

all

framework

intuitions as to the
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the

any general sentences.
for general

laws until

the rejection of general law undermines any notion of scientific
explanation, violating

is

meaning

of science.

Although the

schemata

for

logical positivists fail to provide a

grounding

scientific inquiry, the positivist theory of

knowledge lingers in the authoritative character of

As Habermas suggests,
positivism beyond
science.

promising

it is

modem

science.

possible to project the influence of

technical recommendations in the philosophy of

its

Roy Bhaskar makes a

similar point;

"Positivism is a theory of the nature, limits and unity of
knowledge. But it is not a theory of its possibility.
Knowledge is, for positivism, quite unproblematic - a given
fact, it never inquires for a moment into its conditions or
conceives that it might not be. (In this it is irredeemably
pre-critical.)"27

Under the pervasive
of

positivist influence, the

problem

of the possibility

knowledge goes unnoticed.
Policy

based on

scientific findings is

for noting the influence of

a particularly fruitful arena

a general positivist theory of knowledge.

Environmental philosopher, Kristin Shrader-Frechette^s agrees that
one of the theoretical ghosts haunting supposedly factual research
positivism, the belief that wholly neutral

possible

and

desirable.

and

objective science

She believes that claims on behalf

is

is

both

of complete

neutrality appear reasonable because they ground the implicit belief
that;

"(p)ure science is disinterested, dispassionate,

and

allegedly

no value component. "29 Shrader-Frechette believes that while

has

it is

possible to avoid bias values (deliberate misinterpretations and

omissions to serve one's own purposes), since science
values and normative constraints

it is,

is

laden with

in principle, impossible to avoid

constitutive values (adherence to values underlying particular rules of
scientific

method) and, in practice,
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it is

hopeless to try to avoid

contextual values (personal, social, cultural, or philosophical
emphases

and

goals).
It is

impossible to avoid these contextual values because

science takes place in a socially-defined setting.
points to

human

all

Shrader-Frechette

interferon research (allegedly having therapeutic

value in treating cancer) to suggest that the scientific activity

surrounding such work

is

often heavily influenced by the profit motive.

Since value judgments are inherent in the adoption of a particular

methodology and interpretation

is

often required in the absence of

adequate data, politically-determined assumptions cannot be escaped.
Shrader-Frechette argues that the pursuit of the ideal of
neutrality,

by avoiding

ethical

and methodological

analysis, implicitly

sanctions the values inherent in the research.

"The most objective thing to do, in the presence of a
fallacious assumption, is often to be critical of it."^®

While some would argue that such criticism

is

the job of the public and

policy makers, Shrader-Frechette believes that this

because research that does not engage
built-in value

is

not plausible

in normative analysis serves the

systems inherent in the work. Shrader-Frechette

believes that the concrete role of the ethical analysis (reflection)

show

that

result.

if

is to

certain assumptions are used, then certain consequences

Scientists,

under the sway

of objectivism,

fail to

recognize the

problematic character of the "possibility of knowledge".

Raskin and Bemstein^i concur, noting that the suspicious
character of

modem

science

is

that

it

exists both as absolute

knowledge and as a particular and specialized result determined by
socially

and

historically defined choices.
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Since the goal of science

is

consistency within the experiment,
practitioners of science

would be

consistency and overlook
not.

Scientific

the scientist

(if

it

seems obvious that the

sensitive to that

which supports

entirely unconsciously) that

methodology, as a

human

must produce ordered

which does

creation, is whimsical.

results,

how whimsy

Since

gets

funnelled into consistency determines the constraints of scientific
practice.

the prevalent attitude of scientists and philosophers that,

It is

since science

is

that activity which leads to disinterested knowledge,

good science takes place on a

level that is

Ackermann32 notes that

internal).

in the last century the

between science and society has been
scientific

above criticism (other than

boundary

drastically reduced.

research has become so expensive that

it

While

requires the direct

support of a large portion of the population, the large variety of
potential areas of research for the individual scientist

make

it

likely

that he or she will be influenced by personal success and acceptance

rather than the greatest possible benefit to humankind. The effort to
drive a
to

wedge between science and

society is motivated

by the desire

maintain the epistemological purity of science. Ackermann rejects

the suggestion that science, exemplified by irreproachable scientific
activity, is

driven by pure motives. Raskin and Bernstein argue, in a

similar fashion, that because science

more

capital

enmeshed

some

in

needed

to

is

dependent on

perform the science, the more scientists are

power structures.

Every "knowledge event" replicates

historical or social event so that the

endeavor

is

capital, the

most abstract

subject to moral considerations.
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scientific

Even mathematics

gets

bound up with
physicist’s war,

life

(WWI might be

called the chemist's war,

and WWlll could be the war

Although there appear

to

WWll

of the mathematicians).

be no ethical guidelines which force

social behavior into particular projects or aims, to

be anti-science

miss the point since science, through technology,

offers the

potentiality of relief from suffering.

world view which prejudices the
perspective.

is to

However, we should question the

scientific

view and restrains a

critical

Scientific pursuit is originally intended for the

enhancement
those

the

of

life

who search

as evidenced by Francis Bacon

who admonishes

out knowledge:

"that they consider

what are the

and that they seek

it

true ends of knowledge,
pleasure of the mind,
or for intention, or for superiority to others, or for profit,
or fame, or power or any of these inferior things; but for
the benefit and use of life, and that they perfect and
govern it in charity (The New Organon). ^3

not either

for

Historically (chapter one), the collapse of religion (and mythology)

breaks the

tie

between

social

good and

scientific truth while

philosophically the collapse of knowledge into scientism34 has the

same

result.

Raskin and Bernstein believe that a new view

break the distinction between pure knowledge and

knowledge and reveal that knowledge

Habermas, they are not

willing to

is

of science

would

politicized

bound up with power. Like

throw out rational endeavor, but

envision the reconstruction of knowledge as a rational process that

includes self-consciousness.

make

explicit its

own

Science must accept the challenge to

historicity

part of scientists. Although

through self-consciousness on the

Habermas argues against a 'new science

he believes that an immanent critique of the
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positivist spirit will reveal

abandonment

that the

of reflection restricts the rational capacities of

humankind.

The

spirit of positivism is revealed in

Auguste Comte's

first

great

work, Cours de Philosophic Positive where he presents a positive
,

human

philosophy of the history of the
history, as the

overrides

the

mind progresses

and excludes those

to a

mind. According

new system

When

of its past.

to

Comte's

of knowledge,

it

in the theological state,

mind seeks absolute knowledge and supposes

phenomena

all

produced by the action of the supernatural. Meshed

beings are capable of producing phenomena. Finally,

applies

itself,

mind

gives

up

be

in the

metaphysical, the mind believes that abstract forces inherent in

positive state, the

to

when

all

in the

the search for the absolute and

through reasoning and observation,

to the

study of

natural laws.

Comte argues that

known

since

Bacon

all

perceptive thinkers have

that no real knowledge exists but that which

observed

is

based upon

fact.

philosophy is that
regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural
laws The goal is to discover natural laws reducing them to
the smallest number possible. Our real business is to
merely analyze accurately the circumstances of
"...the first characteristic of the positive

it

.

phenomena.
In the pursuit of this positive agenda, the logical laws of the

mind are revealed so that
to

the sciences

may

a positive condition, forming a solid base

Since

"...the positive

lead the

human

philosophy, in

its

human

progress from an abstract
for social reorganization.

poliUcal form, will necessarily

race to the social system that

is

most suitable

to the

nature of man..."^®, the antagonism between moral and intellectual
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desires vanishes

when

the positive point of view

is

established as the

only true one.

According

to

Comte, although positivism consists

integrated philosophy
of society,

and

such a system

polity,
is

an

of

and serves as the basis

of the science

incomplete without the consideration of

the affections.

"The

first condition of unity is a subjective principle, and
this principle in the positive system is the subordination of
the intellect to the heart. Without this the unity that we

seek can never be placed on a permanent basis, whether
individually or collectively.
Yet,

Comte argues,

existing outside of
solid proof

needed

this unity is insufficient without

humans

freedom and union. As

Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, motivating the

human

denial of essentially non-rational

reaffirmed rhetorically.
social

phenomena

objective basis

in the external world, providing the kind of

to secure a basis for true

fear of anything outside of

an

control

human

positivist

which presses

agenda

is

a

forth the

capacities that can only be

Since the positivist regards

artificial

(as in all others) as resting necessarily

order in

upon natural

laws, moral progress is simply the development of the order of nature.

Habermas launches

his critique of positivism

underlying intentions of early positivism, despite

by considering the

its failure

as a

persuasive philosophy of history. Clearly, Habermas argues, Comte's

paradoxical philosophy of history (progression from the theological, to
the metaphysical, to the positive) does not correspond to the status of
law-like hypothesis in the empirical sciences, failing to
positivist

meet the

standards set by Comte himself. Habermas resolves the

paradox by reinterpreting early positivism as an attempt
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to justify the

scientists' scientistic belief in

themselves that by constructing the

history of the species as the history of the realization of the positive

history confirms that which positivists invent.

spirit,

this intention of early positivism a

"

Habermas

calls

psuedo -scientifir propagation

of

the cognitive monopoly of science"^®.

Although, Habermas argues, early positivism

rehash of commonplaces of the empiricist and

is

boring in

its

rationalist traditions,

revolutionized philosophy's position with regard to the
sciences. Its specific achievement is to take assertions of
pre-critical epistemology and pry them out of the system
of reference of the perceiving and judging subject, and to
reduce them to stipulations of a methodology of the
sciences by putting scientific-technical progress, as the
subject of a scientistic philosophy of history, in the place
of the epistemological subject."®®
"it

Since the philosophy of science needs a scientistic philosophy of
history to proceed,

an analytic philosophy

of science merely rids itself

of Comte's philosophy of history while retaining its metaphysical

Habermas

residue.
to

believes that in order for the philosophy of science

begin the process of self-reflection,

roots, since early positivism
to the

it

must

free itself

from

early

marks the path that reduces epistemology

philosophy of science.

Gertrud Lenzer argues, in a parallel vein, that since

who

its

first

Comte

bridges the gulf that separates the study of natural

phenomena from

the study of

methodology that allows

method

it is

human phenomena

for the application of the positive-scientific

to the analysis of social

positivist spirit

(by providing a

phenomena), we can move beyond a

by understanding Comte's

intent.

in effect did was to intercalate between the
study of biological and social phenomena the study of brain

"What Comte
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functions. It was in this way that he posited the individual
person as being controlled by biological and physiological
mechanisms on the one hand, and as open to control by
means of social forces and mechanisms on the other. "^o

Even the most recent developments

and the philosophy

artificial intelligence

Lenzer

how

tradition in

in general

demonstrate

of science

to

powerfully these disciplines of thought are informed by a

which Comte figures as one

Viewed

of the generative spirits.

historically, the increasing consolidation

of the scientific spirit as the

dominant form

represents the ultimate realization of the

With

systems theory,

critical theorists,

positivist spirit

of

and prevalence

modern consciousness,

spirit of

modem

positivism.

Lenzer believes that the triumph of the

comprises the reduction of quality to quantity in

all

realms of existence--in the realm of society and humanity as well as in
the realm of nature.

Isaiah Berlin, in 1953,

comments on Comte's

methodology;
"He did not say that history was, or was reducible to, a
kind of physics; but his conception pointed in that
direction--of one complete and all-embracing pyramid of
scientific knowledge; one method; one truth; one scale of
rational, 'scientific' values.

These generalizing social theories not only become more and more
elaborate during the course of tme; they also generate and advance
their

own

practice in the form of methodologies and methods.

The heritage
to

of

Comte's philosophy

is

the reducton of science

methodological mles and procedures that guarantee scientific

objectivity: actuality, certainty, exactness, usefulness
validity.

fancy

is

Habermas points out that Comte's appeal
advanced

in the

and

relative

to fact rather

than

absence of any ontological definition of the

factual.
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the delimitation of the object domain of science
leads
to the question of how science is to be defined.
At
the only level positivism allows, science can be
defined
only by the methodological rules according to which it
proceeds. '"^2
...

back

Although from the empiricists Comte adopts a respect

and a

utility principle,

for

phenomena

he realizes that the power of control over

nature and society can be multiplied only by following rationalist
principles: only acquaintance with laws allows the scientist to both

explain and foresee facts.
really in the laws of phenomena that science
consists, for which the actual facts... always provide only the

"It is

indispensable raw material....

Comte can

and observation)

mean them

combine

freely

rationalist

and empiricist principles

in his scientific methodology because

to function as

components

(theory

he does not

of a theory of knowledge.

They

are merely the normative rules of scientific procedure through which

science itself receives

its definition.

Habermas argues

that because early positivism retains, in an

uncritical fashion, the metaphysical separation of the world (one realm

retaining the authentic, unchanging, and necessary character of being

while the other, the

all- changing

and accidental character

appearances), the positive status of exclusive
accidental,

can be claimed

considered

trivial.

for

Habermas

reality,

phenomena which had

of

the realm of the

previously been

believes that the problems of

metaphysics are not adequately dismissed by Comte, but merely
supplanted, since the metaphysical

Habermas argues

is

preserved in a subordinate

role.

that being unreflectively put aside, the metaphysical

retains substantial power.
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Knowledge

is identified

with

knowledge that has been

scientific

produced by an object domain defined by

its

own methodological

rules

of inquiry.

"Since these rules ... are derived by projecting individual
rules of pre-critical epistemology onto the level of
methodology, they can be suited for a definition of science
only if they have already been selected according to an
implicit preunderstanding of science.

Once epistemology has been displaced, the only system
available to separate science from metaphysics

is

of reference

the very

metaphysical system that has been withdrawn. Habermas explains:
science differs from metaphysics in describing facts
relations between facts, the problem of demarcation
leads to the problem of what the significance of the
positivity of facts actually is. Epistemology, having been
disavowed, revenges itself with an unsolved problem that
now has to be dealt with by an ironically restored ontology
of the factual.

"If

and

Habermas thinks

that Ernst Mach's doctrine of elements

is

an

excellent example of a positivist's attempt to justify the object

domain

of the sciences as the exclusive sphere of reality.

Mach, according

to his doctrine of the elements, attempts to

explicate the world as a

show

allowing

an

total of facts and, at the

that facts are the essence of reality.

Habermas

to

sum

argues,

him

ego.

Mach

reifies

to avoid the

The doctrine

same

In order to accomplish this,

the knowing ego as a fact

problem of the derivation

of elements,

time, to

among

of facts as related

by justifying the strategy

"thinking nothing of one's ego, and resolving

it

facts,

of

into a transitory

combination of changing elements"*^®, unmasks the

fictions of the

natural life-world and denounces the process of reflection that arises
therein.

Since everything

is

reduced
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to

a complex of

facts,

we cannot

go beyond a description of the law-like relations between facts.

Science

itself

domain

of science is all statements

between

cannot be considered problematic because the object

facts.

The function

Habermas

of

believes that,

which describe

knowledge

on

itself

and

facts

relations

remains obscure.

scientistic presuppositions,

positivism suspends the theory of knowledge in favor of a philosophy

By measuring knowledge

of science.

only in terms of the actual

achievements of the sciences, reflection abolishes
science a legitimate object domain.

Even though

itself

granting

modem

positivism

eventually rejects Mach's solution, the central problem remains:
reflection persists as that existing prior to science.

"Objectivism, which makes a dogma of the prescientific
interpretation of knowledge as a copy of reality, limits
access to reality to the dimension established by the
scientific system of reference through the methodological
objectification of reality. It prohibits discerning the a
priori element of this system of reference and calling into

question in any

Habermas

way

its

monopoly

of knowledge.

believes that the turn toward positivism can be rectified

only through the restoration of a

From
positivist to

critical science of

man.

the perspective of critical theory, what appears to the

be the ultimate foundation

observed nature,

is

for

knowledge, the world of

the dependent and derived world of

Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that the process

of

'our' objects.

knowing cannot

be severed from the historical struggle between humans and the world

because the privileged position
for

of objectivity,

knowledge, stipulates in advance what

which

is to

(Opinion surveys are designed by sociologists

positivists claim

be ascertained.

who

actually create

opinions where they do not exist by the pre-selection and generality of
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their questions 48)

intrinsically impossible, according to critical

it is

theory, for science to account for

the illusory quality of

modern

its

own

objectives or purposes given

science's claim to neutrality.

Alongside external nature

is

the world of

human

activity,

Horkheimer and Adorno’s "second nature". When these
historical events are given the

designation distorts

reality,

same

social

and

status as natural laws this

implying a general view of the structure of

men and women

the object of social science. Although

are of nature,

they create the history that embodies the possibility of nature to attain
self-consciousness.
relations

By

giving

an ontological status

between individuals and

potentially

autonomous realm

to specific historical

society, positivists

bind the only

of reason with the constraints of

modern

scientific rationality.

Clearly the goal of the Enlightenment

and women from both the drudgery

of

is

work as

the liberation of

well as the illusions of

superstitious belief.

Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the

nature of this vision

is

continuing domination by some
radical separation of subject

its

humans

and

intended limits, driving the
over others.

What

object with the intent of

the subject becomes increasingly oppressive as the subject

dominated by a second nature, the
this

phenomenon

capacity for social control over

over their
ideological
in the

dialectical

the element of barbarism that goes unnoticed:

the domination of nature overcomes

Although

men

is

begins as a

empowering
is

reification of the social.

apparent in capitalism's increasing

men and women who

own work, Horkheimer and Adorno

are denied power

believe that the

consequences of enlightenment thinking can best be seen

work

of Kant, de

Sade and Nietzsche. These thinkers replace
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weakened

religious influences with a

new

rationality.

Although Kant

believes his categorical imperative determines an objective criterion

human

for decisions of the

Hegel that Kant's reason
the context.

is

will,

"disassociated"49,

Since Kant's only

justification

can be made

reasoning

unable

is

Horkheimer and Adorno agree with

for

demand

result,

to ethical decision

moral

the Marquis de Sade

The champion

who

organ of calculation neutral to the ends of

any moral

belief

of

such

"mercilessly declared"^®

the shocking side of Enlightenment thinking.

Nietzsche's claim that

making.

satisfied to sanction utilitarian or

decisionist (private individual choice) ethics.
is

to

to evaluate substantive goals.

Enlightenment thinkers are

systems

As a

claim.

Without any evaluative component

ethical

remains indifferent

consistency of application, a

is

any general

it

its

Reason becomes an
productions

can claim

much

as

validity as long as

it is

grounded in want or need. Both de Sade and Nietzsche underscore
the unity of instrumental reason and domination.

Adorno believe that Nietzsche
this result, calling

it

one of the

first to overtly

the instrumentalization of truth.

argues that, since there
outside), the subject is

becomes that which

is

Horkheimer and

is

is

no ultimate

dominated by

imposed as

recognize

Nietzsche

criterion of truth (nothing is

social conditions

truth.

Domination

and truth
is

the "universal

character of reason"^ h

The

"revolt of nature"

on the everyday

activity of

can be prevented only by

human

concept of legitimate knowledge,
technical function.

In the

name

beings.

Positivism,

critical reflection

by

reifying its

restricts scientific findings to

of a separation

between

fact

and

fancy, questions of value are reduced to the province of private
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a

individuals

making philosophical inquiry a meaningless

The

operation.

debate as to the status of rationality cannot take place because science
is identified

with knowledge as such.

"Positivism marks the end of the theory of knowledge. In
its place emerges the philosophy of science.
Transcendental-logical inquiry into the conditions of
possible knowledge aimed as well at explicating the
meaning of knowledge as such. Positivism cuts off this
inquiry, which it conceives as having become meaningless
in virtue of the fact of the modern sciences. Knowledge is
implicitly defined by the achievement of the sciences.
Hence transcendental inquiry into the conditions of
possible knowledge can be meaningfully pursued only in
the form of methodological inquiry into the rules for the

construction and corroboration of scientific theories.

Habermas explains

that for the positivist thinker, driven by the

scientistic self-understanding of the sciences, positivist theory

assumes the

prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from

epistemological self-reflection.
"Positivism stands and falls with the principle of
scientism, that is that the meaning of knowledge is
defined by what the sciences do and can thus be
adequately explicated through the methodological analysis
of scientific procedures.

A

positivist

philosopher of science renounces inquiry into the

"knowing subject" by

prioritizing the rules according to

are constructed and corroborated.
significance because

it is

which one's subjectivity

whom

The

life

which theories

of the subject loses

reduced to psychological investigation in

is identified

with the empirical person to

the subject of knowledge has been reduced.

Habermas
knowledge

is

believes that the counterpart of this restriction

the

independent and

empowerment

of logic

and mathematics as

self-sufficient formal sciences.
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on

When

the problem of

the foundation of these scienees

with the problem of knowledge

is

no longer discussed

itself,

in connection

the notion that knowledge

describes reality becomes prevalent.

Kantian terms, both (positivism and formal science)
ignore the synthetic achievements of the knowing subject.
The positivistic attitude conceals the problems of world
constitution. The meaning of knowledge itself becomes
irrational-in the name of rigorous knowledge.
"In

Habermas

believes that positivism has effectively repressed older

philosophical traditions by monopolizing the self-understanding of the

Although he believes that the

sciences.

illusion of objectivism

can no

longer be dispelled by a mere return to Kantian reflection, he offers an

immanent

critique "forcing

reflection in
I

terms of

its

methodology

to carry

out a process of

own problems.

attribute to ecophilosophy this positivist influence because

believe that the ecophilosophical critique of

as a critique of the domination of nature,

is

modern

society,

mired in a

theorists attribute the decay of

disposition to dominate nature,
critical

modem
I

will distinguish

respond adequately

C.
If

rendered

critical

human

ecophilosophy from

theory by employing Habermas' immanent critique of the

positivist spirit thereby supporting
fails to

society to the

I

positivist

understanding of nature. Since both ecophilosophers and

turn"

self-

my

contention that ecophilosophy

to the misdirection of

An Immanent

knowledge

is

scientism.

Critique of Positivism

modern epistemology begins with

(all

modern

knowledge by a

Kant's "epistemological

subject),

it is

Kant that

recognizes that inquiry beyond the limits of the inherent conditions of
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consciousness

is

me3.ningless. Thus, he does not so

Hume's skepticism as

to

show

that

fruitful investigation (ontological or

Hume, by not

much snswer

recognizing that any

metaphysical) must begin with "an

analysis of the limits and preconditions of knowing"56^ misconceives
the problem of knowledge.

Robert Paul Wolff explains;

might be meaningful to ask what the character of
experience would be for a creature whose sensory organs
were receptive to magnetic fields or radio waves or indeed
other physical forces of which we are not now aware.
Perhaps we can even consider the possibility of a
sensibility whose basic form differs from our threedimensional space. But it is self-contradictory to inquire
what objects are like independently of being perceived and
conceived-what they are like to God, for example, or more
absurdly still, what they are like in themselves.
"It

Kant's task

is; "to

demonstrate the possibility of non-trivial knowledge

about the world" and

"to

reintroduce the knowing subject into the

world of objective existence".^®

Kant believes that although Descartes makes the

first

step in the

process of recognizing the priority of the epistemological, instead of
carrying out the consequences of his

works

initial recognition,

Descartes

at;

"reestablishing contact between the conscious subject,

whose substantial nature he never doubted, and an
independent, objective world order".
Descartes' failure to achieve this reconciliation pivots on his abstracted
definition of 'object'.

object

In order to restore contact

Kant redefines the ontological

between subject and

'object' epistemologically

as "the

object of knowledge".

To transcend the extreme

subjectivist

consequence of this

reconstruction, Kant renders his concept of the object of knowledge
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no more than that something, the concept of which expresses
such

as

a necessity of synthesis"60.

Since there

is

no object independent

of

the conditions of knowledge, the necessity and universality of

knowledge turns on the innate rules of the mind. For Kant knowledge
not a state of mind, but an

is

activity.

While Kant revolutionizes

epistemology by redefining the object of knowledge, his resolution

launches a

new

era of philosophical thought.

Kant uses the term

comprehend the

infinite

dialectic to refer to the hopeless attempt to

and ultimate structures

of the universe after

discovering that any attempt to apply our concepts to the infinite
results in contradictory yet logically valid pairs of 'antinomies'.

"What Kant discovered, according to Hegel, is the dialectic
of reason, which can, at one and the same time, entertain
opposing and even contradictory attitudes toward the
world.

As a

result,

Kant proposes that as humans we confront the world

two very different ways: as a knowing
of

understanding

acts in freedom

to experience

self that applies the categories

and as a

willing, rational self

and stands outside the forms

God. Although Kant's two-fold notion of

and the noumenal world, allows him

in

to

of time

reality, the

account

for

which

and space before

phenomenal world
moral 'knowledge',

the tension that results from the fact that our moral actions are

preformed outside the physical world upon which they have
drives the

German

idealists to

affect

attempt to synthesize theory and

practice.

Kant proves that a necessary presupposition
accountability

is

intelligible world,

human

of

moral

freedom; thus, this concept becomes, in the

a parallel to the Newtonian principle of causality in
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t±ie

sensible world.

His third critique, the synthesis of these two

worlds, has tremendous impact on more 'romantic' philosophers

want

to defend a purposeful, supersensible world.

image as the centerpiece of

idealists take this

who

The German

their entire philosophy,

using art to synthesize the worlds of understanding and reason.

Although the philosophical interpretations
"epistemological turn" are the backdrop to

of Kant's

modern

positivism, the

story begins, according to Habermas, with Hegel and the

Habermas

idealists.

German

believes that because Hegel fails to properly

interpret the "critical philosophy", he fails to guard philosophy from

the constraints of positivism ^2

German

.

idealism, taking

up

philosophy after Kant, does not move in a single direction. Fichte
shifts the focus of philosophy

away from Kant's

epistemological

revolution to the Critique of Practical Reason where freedom and
rational

autonomy

are primary.

Since for Fichte Kantian philosophy

represents the search for a better
status of

human

life,

he seeks

to salvage the

primary

morality from the imposing mechanical images of

Newtonian science. Fichte, believing that dogmatism
universal causality and the absence of

human

freedom)

(the belief in
is

morally

reprehensible, reduces nature to a postulate of practical reason.

"Nature (Fichte argues)
will. "63

is

posited by us in order to act out our moral

Fichte concludes that both Descartes and Kant miss the fact

that the self

boundless

is

self,

the source of everything, that there

an absolute Ego which

is

immanent

is

but a single

in all of

us and

acting through us. This one, active and morally striving self has for

primary concern moral

self-realization.
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its

The champion

of romanticism (the spirit of subjectivism) is

Schelling who, while adopting Fichte's interpretation that
everything

must be deduced from our
critical

position as moral agents, adds his

own

appraisal of Newtonian physics and develops a philosophy of

nature which puts Newton at the lowest

From Kant's

third critique

and the

level of

nature interpretation.

role of art in synthesizing the

natural and the practical, he defends an image of nature as a unified,
living

and developing being. Rather than collapsing

all of

Nature into a

postulate of practical reason (Fichte), Schelling seeks to retain an
objective space for nature while

and

still

achieving the identity of Nature

Spirit.

Although Fichte
freedom, he does

fails to

show

the

achieve a space for nature by over-playing

way

to

overcome his incomplete system

with his concept of the absolute Ego. Schelling, assuming that Kant
provided for knowledge of the supersensible world in the third
critique,

produces the ultimate unity of the Nature and

Spirit (at the

base of our experience) in our intuition of the Absolute. Schelling's

premise (Hegel's
as

too) is that

we can understand

we understand nature because nature
According

to the

German

is

ourselves only as well

"slumbering

spirit".

idealists, the correct philosophical

interpretation of nature consists in seeing

it

as a series of stages which

culminate in a gradual triumph of unity, not as stages in a temporally
arranged, evolutionary picture. This concept of nature, in

its

completeness, as an ever-living "Now" of present existence, girds up a
revelatory philosophy of nature that explains

understand the

detail of nature as learned

how

it is

that

we may

from experience.

Since

can learn from experience only within a framework which makes
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we

learning from experience possible, the natural world has to

more

us than the joint existence

to

classification

and arrangement

of a large

is all

number

mean

of entities

whose

a matter of detailed empirical

encounter.

The philosophy
by

this

Nature

of Hegel

and

classical

German

idealism

is

driven

philosophy of nature: one must know what sort of thing a
(in

individual

general terms)
life.

in order to

is,

come

to

terms with one's

Hegel explains in his Philosophy of Nature that physics

and philosophical nature are not

to

be distinguished from each other,

as perception and thought they are both thinking apprehensions of
nature, partly practical and partly theoretical.

"The practical approach (the physics) to Nature is, in
general, determined by appetite, which in self-seeking
need impels us to use Nature for our own advantage, to
wear her out, to wear her down, in short to annihilate
her." "The cunning of his reason (the theoretical) enables
him to preserve and maintain himself in face of the forces
of Nature, by sheltering behind other products of Nature,
and letting these suffer her destructive attacks. Nature
herself, however, in her universal aspect, he cannot
overcome in this way, nor can he turn her to his own
purposes.

The

interest of philosophy

subject

and the

with nature?

If

object.

How

we venture

think through nature, "we
are, into

or

is to

do we, as subjects, come into contact

to bridge this gulf

make

an Other than she

make them our own, and

have a

resolve the tension between the the

and mislead ourselves

Nature, which

is."®^

We

is

to

an Other than we

transform things into universals,

yet as natural objects they are suppose to

free, self-subsistent being.
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One

solution to the the contradiction of subject and object

"primal state of innocence", the state prior to the
Spirit is identical

fall

of

the

is

man where

with Nature.

"A natural unity of thought and intuition is that of the child
and the animal, and this can at the most be called feeling,
not spirituality. But man must have eaten of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil and must have gone through
the labour and activity of thought in order to become what
he is, having overcome this separation between himself
and Nature. The immediate unity is thus only an abstract,
implicit truth, not the actual truth; for not only must the
content be true, but the form also. The healing of this
breach must be in the form of the knowing Idea, and the
moments of the solution must be sought in consciousness
itself."®®
It is

the study of Nature that liberates the Spirit in her, for Spirit

present in her insofar as
itself.

it

is in relation,

is

not with an Other, but with

Nature, as Idea in the form of otherness, drives the Hegelian

system. Although the Idea displays
within the finitude of that moment,
limitation of this sphere

itself in
it is

nature only so far as

it

can

able to break through the

and necessarily pass

into a higher stage.

The

goal of philosophy is to reveal this process.

Hegel rejects the notion that

and Reality in a kind

it is

possible to reconcile Concept

of correspondence theory of truth.

Rather, he

is

convinced that an adequate theory of Truth must show us the
structure of reality (the Absolute) as a whole and all-embracing

coherence of

reality.

For Hegel, in a narrow sense, the 'problem of

truth' is skepticism; the notion that either

no truth

exists or that truth

cannot be known. Hegel's epistemology turns on two assumptions:
first,

that our contact with truth

is in

some sense a way

of

consciousness (Cartesian starting point) and second, that skepticism
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has been overcome

Although Kant redefines the problem

to

disengage the skeptic, asking not whether our concepts conform

to

objects, rather,

(Kant).

how our

concepts determine the objects of our

experience; even in Kant,

answer
itself,

who Hegel

to the skeptic, there

believes to provide the final

remains the residue of the "thing-in-

introducing the possibility of a

new

skepticism.

Hegel reforms

Kant's ambivalence by claiming that the objects of our experience are

the "things-in-themselves".

Since for Hegel, objects of knowledge must be wholly within the

realm of consciousness, idealism (the view that objects are in some
sense

"in"

or dependent on consciousness) becomes the obvious

preference.

Spirit

produces sensations

perceptions because there

determinations of

Absolute

is

human

in ourselves that

we share

as

no physical world apart from the

is

consciousness.

Since Kant's notion of the

as unconditioned, unmediated and undivided, only God

could comprehend such a unity and so for us, this ultimate unity

is

a

matter of rational faith and not knowledge. For Hegel, the Absolute

known through

is

the Concept.

Kantian epistemology

is

an enterprise directed

beginning with the intention of Descartes,

it

at the whole, yet,

appears that

epistemology cannot dispense with the strategy of beginning without
presuppositions.

granted except

its

presupposition

is

While epistemology presumes

to take

nothing for

pure project of radically doubting, in truth
that of normative science.

statements of mathematics and physics as

its first

By presupposing the

valid, the critique of

knowledge can use these principles and draw conclusions about the
organization of our cognitive faculty, producing
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its

second

presupposition:

the concept of a completely fixed, knowing subject, a

normative concept of the ego.

By subjecting the presuppositions
criticism, Hegel believes

of epistemology to self-

he undermines the Kantian ego

(split into

the ego as unity of self-consciousness and the ego as free

removing from the process of knowing any
critical

will)

fixed point of entry.

This

consciousness, aware of the superficiality of any beginning,

is

absolute knowledge.

"A critique of knowledge that has dissolved the normative
conception of both science and the ego in radical doubt is
relegated exclusively to what Hegel calls phenomenological
experience."®'^

Since Kant rejects the common-sensical idea that one simply "sees"
oneself in experience, arguing that one discovers the activity of the
self

through reflection on experience,

outrageous claim that the
general

self,

common

self is ultimately

totality of

is

beings but the

is

ensnared

in a circle:

knowledge does not possess the spontaneity

condemned

to

but a

one

this, this

human

self,

well.

Hegel recognizes that epistemology
critique of

not an individual

And beyond

to all of us.

consciousness includes not only the

whole universe as

this allows Hegel to argue the

being after the

fact.

of

an

origin;

Hegel justifies the

epistemological circle in the phenomenological experience as the

form of reflection

itself.

One must have known

in order to

know

explicitly.

known can be remembered as a result
and comprehended in its genesis. This movement is the
"Only something

experience of reflection."®®
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the
it

Habermas
fulfil

believes that although Kant's critique of knowledge does
not

the intention of First Philosophy (beginning without

presuppositions), to

abandon

the critique of knowledge.

this intention does not entail

"The latter has only to cast

consciousness by being turned against

Habermas

off its false

metacritique.

believes that while Hegel rightly criticizes the

unacknowledged presuppositions
through the epistemological
its false

itself in

abandoning

of epistemology, arguing that

circle the theory of

knowledge can cure

consciousness, Hegel incorrectly believes this

of the falsity of critical philosophy.

circle is

a sign

Although he successfully destroys

the renewal of First Philosophy;
in do doing he imagines himself to be overcoming the
critique of knowledge as such. This opinion insinuates
"...

because from the very beginning Hegel presumes as
given a knowledge of the Absolute while indeed the
possibility of just this knowledge would have to be
demonstrated according to the criteria of a radicalized

itself

critique of knowledge."^®

Hegel's theory

knowledge
because

is

is to

it is

half-hearted, according to Habermas.

Absolute

proceed with the phenomenological experience, but

absolute,

phenomenological

it

does not need to be justified by the

self-reflection of the

mind.

knowledge presupposes just what his theory
possibility of absolute knowledge.

Hegel,

Hegel's theory of

calls into question;

the

by reinterpreting the

"epistemological circle" gains reflection, but by proposing

it

as an

all

inclusive process, he sacrifices critique.

Habermas
Kantian

know

error,

believes that, although Hegel correctly locates the

"what

is

demanded

the cognitive faculty before

97

is

thus the following; we should

we know"^^,

this 'problematic

method’

recommended by

is still

investigations.

positivists for methodological

Hegel’s reconception of epistemology did not rectify

the scientist’s dilemma.

Since not

problematic, the scientist

is

all

principles

forced to

can be taken as

assume the frame

of reference

of a particular investigation as true for the course of the investigation.

Although the repetition of this process
all

presuppositions

will

come

is

presumed

guarantee that

to

into question, the choice of the first

frame of reference and the sequence of the additional remain
arbitrary.

rational

By abandoning

the critical philosophy, epistemology loses

autonomy.

Robert Solomon suggests that Hegel unselfconsciously realizes
that

all

human

forms of consciousness are part of the same grand tapestry
experience, different perspectives of the

Hegel has in mind, according to Solomon,
reality as

come

to

is

same

not so

reality.

much

of

What

a view of

a view about views. Since we want to "grasp" the world, we

understand that

through the

reality

can only be only comprehended

totality of different viewpoints.

comprehension

is

the principle behind

all

and

Total

human

unified

experience and

it is

this that defines reason.
"...

here

we begin

to see the possibility of a

deep tension in
a philosopher

Hegel’s philosophy; on the one hand, he is
whose main claim is to give us a unified all-inclusive worldview, which he calls "the Absolute." On the other hand, he

the philosopher of change, the phenomenologist of
forms, who appreciates, as Kant and most philosophers
did not, the rich variety of forms of experience and the
"'72
complex transformations between them.

is

For the second Hegel, the Absolute
reached.

It is

is

only a distant goal, never to be

the motivation of a grand journey.

unable to articulate this larger

vision, that the
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In fact, Hegel is

world

is

an irreducible

plurality of possible

human

human

experiences and consequently, of possible

worlds.

Rather, Hegel believes that he

is

making epistemology

superfluous by eliminating Kant. He presumes that the

phenomenological experience terminates in absolute knowledge.

by following Hegel through an immanent

critique of Kant,

it is

Yet,

clear

that without the epistemological predispositions of Descartes, the

union between mind and absolute knowledge

fails.

"The apparent dilemma of knowing before knowledge,
with which Hegel reproached epistemology, now returns
in Hegel’s thought as an actual dilemma; namely, that
phenomenology must in fact be valid prior to every
possible mode of scientific knowledge.

While Hegel

is

convinced of the necessity of the progression of

phenomenological experience, Habermas argues that Hegel could

make such a

claim only retrospectively from the standpoint of absolute

knowledge.
"Thus the paradoxical result of an ambiguous radicalization
of the critique of knowledge is not an enlightened position
of philosophy with regard to science. When philosophy
asserts itself as authentic science, the relation of
philosophy and science completely disappears from
discussion. It is with Hegel that a fatal misunderstanding
arises; the idea that the claim asserted by philosophical
reason against the abstract thought of mere understanding
is equivalent to the usurpation of the legitimacy of
independent sciences by a philosophy claiming to retain
its

position as universal scientific knowledge.

Habermas

believes that while the fact of scientific progress

independent of philosophy unmasks Hegel's claim (however

misunderstood as

fiction),

philosophically

positivism.
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it

serves as the foundation of

After Hegel’s metacritique of Kant which subjects the critique
of

knowledge

to un3delding self-reflection, philosophy

position with regard to science.

modem

is

its

the subject of

philosophy until the threshold of the nineteenth century.

Until this time,

and theories
science.
or

Epistemology

abandons

of

modern science does not

coincide with knowledge,

knowledge do not merge with the philosophy of

Even when Descartes subjects

Kant redefines the object

to

doubt modern metaphysics,

of knowledge, philosophy retains a

sovereign role in relation to science.
After Kant, science

philosophy.

no longer seriously comprehended by

is

Science can be considered epistemologically, as one

category of knowledge, as long as knowledge
either absolute

knowledge or the

business of research.
sciences

is

If

is

not equated with

scientistic self-understanding of the

a concept of knowing that transcends the

lacking, the critique of knowledge reduces itself to the

function of the philosophy of science.

mid-nineteenth century
knowledge.

It is

is

Philosophy of science, since the

the heir to the Hegelian theory of

a methodology pursued with a scientistic

understanding which means that science believes
is identified

with science.

its

Positivist

in itself.

Knowledge

Positivism strengthens the belief that

science possesses exclusive validity because
of self-reflection.

self-

it

excludes the possibility

threads in ecophilosophy are apparent in

Hegelian notion of nature: as an all-encompassing avenue to

Self,

nature retains a pre-critical status.
Positivism,

behind the

by leaping over epistemological

level of reflection attained

reflection, regresses

by Kant. Since

positivists are

blinded to the fact that the methodology of the sciences
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is

intertwined

wit±i

the process of personal and cultural growth of the

human

species, positivists erect the absolutism of pure methodology.

Although Hegel's phenomenological

self-reflection of

knowledge

is

the

necessary radicalization of the critique of reason, Habermas believes
that Marx,

who

could have contested the victory of scientism,

misunderstood Hegel.

Marx completes the

Marx makes

Rather than restoring the power

of reflection,

disintegration of the theory of knowledge.

explicit the basic

phenomenology: that mind

is

assumption

of Hegel's

the absolute.

"For us the mind has nature as its presupposition; it is the
truth and thus the absolute ground of nature. In this truth
nature has disappeared, and mind has emerged as the Idea
Existing for itself: both the object and the subject of the
Idea is the notion.

Habermas
nature

is

believes that

Marx

is correct in his critique of Hegel:

that

the absolute ground of mind.

"Here the mind presupposes nature, but in the sense of a
natural process that, from within itself, gives rise likewise
to the natural being man and the nature that surrounds
him - and not in the idealist sense of mind that, as Idea
existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own selfcreated presupposition.

Marx goes beyond naturalism by arguing

that

man, even as an

being, is not anthropological but epistemological.

as two-faceted:

the subjective nature of

objective nature of his environment.

mediates

itself

Nature

man which

is

objective

recognized

confronts the

As two components, nature

through the reproductive process of social labor.

"Marx calls labor a 'condition of human existence that is
independent of all forms of society, a perpetual necessity
of nature in order to mediate the material exchange
between man and nature, in other words, human life
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For Marx, labor

both a fundamental category of

is

an epistemological category constituting
in the

itself

human

existence and

as objective nature only

mediation between the subjective and objective nature of

man

through the processes of social labor. In materialism, labor has the
function of synthesis.

Habermas argues

that since

general "world-constituting,

Marx never meant labor

life activity",

social labor is

to

be a

fundamental

only as the category of mediating objective and subjective nature. As
the

mechanism

object

of the evolution of the species in history through labor

and subject are changed. The human species

is

not

characterized by any invariant natural or transcendental structure, but

only by a

mechanism

of humanization. This synthesis of

nature in social labor to Marx

accomplishment

is

the empirical and transcendental

of a species-subject that

Unlike Hegel's absolute synthesis,
the

medium

of labor rather

about through the

man and

for

produces

itself in history.

Marx synthesis takes

place in

than thought. Unity, which can only come

activity of

a subject, remains in some measure

imposed on nature by the subject.
"The unity of the social subject and nature that comes into
being 'in industry' cannot eradicate the autonomy of nature
and the remainder of complete otherness that is lodged in

As the

correlate of social labor, objectified
nature retains both independence and externality in
relation to the subject that controls it. Its independence
manifests itself in our ability to learn to master natural
processes only to the extent that we subject ourselves to
them. This elementary experience is expressed in the

its facticity.

language of natural

Habermas

believes that

'laws' that

Marx

we must

is correct:

'obey'."'^®

nature retains a substantial

core that does not reveal itself to us. Although nature retains
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its

'otherness',

it

enters as 'other' into a relationship with

humans

through the labor process.
Since nature, as

'other' or 'in itself,

means nothing

to

humans

outside the historical dimension provided by labor processes, the

synthesis which occurs through labor does not generate a logical
structure nor does

it

create

an absolute unity

of

man and

nature.

"This conception has the important epistemological
function of pointing to the contingency of nature as a
whole; in opposition to the idealist attempt to reduce
nature to a mere extemalization of mind, it preserves
nature's immovable facticity despite nature's historical
embeddedness in the universal structure of mediation
constituted by laboring subjects.

The knowledge generated by the synthesis

in labor takes

on existence

as a productive force, causing nature and the subject to change so that
in labor, the subject

forms

its

own

Habermas, along with Marx,
consciousness, which Kant thinks
consciousness,

is

consciousness of
itself in its

identity.

believes that this identity of
is

the unity of transcendental

identity achieved through labor.
itself in

a

strict

sense only

if it

The subject

attains

becomes aware

of

labor as the:

"self-generative act of the species in general and knows
have been produced by the 'labor of the entire

itself to

previous course of world history'."®®
It is

correct to speak of nature becoming

man

both as the product of

natural evolution and as the world -historical process of humanization.

Although Marx correctly

criticizes Hegel's

absolute mind, he

unable to see the import of his own work, according to Habermas.
Instead,

reducing

Marx deludes himself about
it

to the activity of labor.
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the nature of reflection by

By

eliminating reflection as a

is

motivator of history and condensing everything into produetive
activity,

and

Marx

loses the ability to distinguish between natural seienee

Habermas

critique.

believes that Marx's materialism

fails to

prevent the positivist atrophy of epistemology by restrieting the
capacity of reflection to the instrumentalism of natural science.
"In his empirical analyses Marx comprehends the history
of the species under categories of material activity and the
critical abolition of ideologies, of

instrumental action and
revolutionary practice, of labor and reflection at once. But
Marx interprets what he does in the more restrieted
conception of the species' self-reflection through work
alone.

In this way, he closes the space for critical social theory
classifying the critieal seienee of

rejecting as necessary

Marx argues

for

man

with the natural seiences,

an epistemologieal

a single science of

by mistakenly

justification of social theory.

man and

nature.

"So far as production establishes the only framework in

which the genesis and function

knowledge can be
interpreted, the science of man also appears under
categories of knowledge for control. At the level of the
self-consciousness of social subjects, knowledge that
of

makes

possible the control of natural processes turns into
knowledge that makes possible the control of the social
life process.

Habermas

believes that

processes,

is

science, the

deemed

when knowledge, used

to steer social

identical to knowledge produced

power of technical control dominates

by natural

social activity.

against this unfortunate intrusion by scientifie rationality

communicative interaction that Habermas builds his case

autonomous category

upon
for

an

of knowledge.

Although technological progress
innovations,

It is

Habermas understands
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is

marked by epochal

the social

self- formative

process as

marked not by new

technologies, but by stages of reflection through

which the dogmatic character of domination and
dispelled.

He contends

that, while these

converge, they are interdependent.

man and

fails

nature

production.

is

two processes do not

Although Marx

this dialectic of the forces of production

production, he

ideologies are

tries to

and the relations

capture

of

because his materialist concept of the synthesis
restricted to the categorical

Habermas

framework

believes that reflective knowledge

of

of

must be

reclaimed from Hegel.

Marx had not thrown together interaction and work
under the label of social practice (Praxis), and had he
"If

instead related the materialist concept of synthesis
likewise to the accomplishments of instrumental action
and the nexuses of communicative action, then the idea of
a science of man would not have been obscured by
identification with natural science. Rather, this idea would
have taken up Hegel's critique of the subjectivism of Kant's
epistemology and surpassed it materialistically. It would
have made clear that ultimately a radical critique of
knowledge can be carried out only in the form of a
reconstruction of the history of the species, and that
conversely social theory, form the viewpoint of the selfconstitution of the species in the medium of social labor
and class struggle, is possible only as the self-reflection of
the knowing subject."®'^
Philosophy's position with regard to science would be clear

had

if

Marx

rejected Hegel's substitution of absolute knowledge for

epistemology.

Instead, positivism regresses behind the level of

reflection obtained

by Kant and successfully

sets

about the task which

epistemology had abandoned and from which Hegel and Marx believe

themselves exempt, that of elaborating a methodology of the sciences.
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D.

The emancipatory

The Fate

of Nature

possibility of Marx's re-concepUon of the

relationship between theory

and pracUce stands

the conservatism of positivist social theory.

ultimate aim of Comte’s system

is to

Lenzer notes that the

bring about, through the

systematization of individual and social

Marx conceives the

in direct contrast to

the end of history.

life,

relationship between theory

at freedom, positivism fixes the parameters of

and practice as aimed

knowledge and action

within the predominant configurations of the present as
other

mode

of knowledge

"speculation, imagination

that

Comte

is

and action

falls into

reality.

Every

the realm of

and the unrear®^. However, Lenzer suggests

not a conservative in any ordinary sense. He

the theoretical exponent par excellence of

modem

While

is,

modern capitalism

in fact,

or of

industrial society.

'Yet more disturbing still is how well Comte foresaw—
what Mill in turn feared— the capabilities of anticipating
and thereby mitigating, on an ever-growing scale, those

modem societies that threaten to disturb by their
opposition the continued expansion of the predominant

forces in

forces."®®
Mill points to

tendency
Mill,

the

Comte's Svsteme as an extreme expression of the

for society to take

work

of

Comte

power over the

individual.

According

put:

"an end to the notion that no effectual moral authority can
be maintained over society without the aid of religious
belief; for Comte's work recognizes no religion except

humanity, yet it leaves an irresistible conviction that any
moral beliefs concurred in by the community generally
may be brought to bear upon the whole conduct and lives
of its individual members with an energy and potency tmly
alarming to think of."®^
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to

Mill fears that

power of

by omitting the influenee

Comte has done

self-reflection),

society, providing only

of the psychological (the

an

little for

historical analysis.

the science of

Lenzer believes that

Comte’s separation of theory from practice augments the power of the
existing forces

existing

and the governing classes so that theory serves an

and developing

and economic

social

positivist theorists legitimize these
final

Ultimately

practice.

powers by arguing that

completion of the positive philosophy

it (is)

necessary

"for the

to create

the positive science of society- -social physics."®®

By reducing

traditional philosophy (epistemology) to a

philosophy of science as

proper domain, Comte achieves the basis

its

Habermas and Lenzer agree

of his grandiose program.

that this

restriction of philosophy is explicitly directed against its metaphysical

and

critical role,

conscious

a role that

activity.

Reason

is

is

banned from the realm

reduced

to

of proper

an instrument

of computation.

the logical instrument and
supreme method of positivism, which in conjunction with
observation of natural and social phenomena would yield
and attain to the highest generalities and laws of

"Mathematical analysis

is

phenomena."®^
Since the positive philosophy recommends the direct study of the

laws of nature, the conception of
external world.
ruling nature,
itself,

Humankind
man, and

man

is

reduced

to that of the

restricts its investigations to the laws

society (the domination of nature), yet,

is,

ultimately subject to them.

Already, in chapter one,

domination of nature functions

I

suggested that the concept of the
ideologically,

With the philosophical manifestation
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masking

its

own

failure.

of this failure in place the

impact

of this scientific rationality is revealed in the relationship

science, technology

and

social conflict.

between

William Leiss believes that the

"domination of nature" remains a powerful ideology as long as
misinterpreted as a universally successful

modem

it is

To understand

activity.

this

delusion, Leiss suggests rethinking the problem by

considering separately the relationship of both science and technology
to

domination.

While modern science displays an increasing mastery over

its

subject matter, achieving greater generality and coherence, this

accomplishment

is

simultaneously translated into ways

need, giving rise to the popular belief that nature

Although

it is

supposed that

this

is

meet human

being mastered.

mastery over nature

for greater rationality in the structure of society,

place (modern science)

is

to

is

the foundation

mastery

in the first

never transferred intact to social processes

through the mastery of nature in the second case (technology). Clearly
then, concepts of

power and domination, which do not make sense

with respect to scientific knowledge

itself,

may be

appropriately

employed in connection with the technological applications
scientific

of

knowledge.

the idea of the domination of nature has any meaning at
all, is that by such means-that is, through the possession of
superior technological capabilities-some men attempt to
dominate and control other men. The notion of a common
domination of the human race over external nature is
nonsensical. "91
"If

The Enlightenment goal

humankind
nature

is

fails

to

because

master nature

it is

for the

emancipation of

driven by the belief that the mastery of

a universally rational process: the domination of external

nature through science and technology.
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While Leiss rejects the notion that science
argues persuasively that social oppression

is

generated from an

unequal distribution of technological mastery.

Edmund

repressive, he

is

Leiss, appealing to

Husserl92, suggests that to understand the

man we must

notice that the world

is

of

modern

'known' in two distinct ways:

a familiar "life-world" and as a world of natural
Since the mathematization

life

as

scientific objects.

(or instrumentality) of

science

masks

the

relationship of science to ordinary experience, two problems arise:

the

wo rid

life-

is

permanently devalued as the realm of the subjective,

and the abstract-universal character
it

to

possess a direct relationship

Habermas explains

this

scientific rationality.
efficient technical

of science

to specific goals of

phenomenon as

The

means

makes

resulting social

dilemma

life

human

is

for controlling behavior are

of a general positivist spirit (as characterized

everyday

because the absence

impossible

for

practice.

the particular character of

absence of rational guidelines and direction. This

in

it

that increasingly

produced

in the

effect is the result

by Habermas), pervasive

of religion conceals the fact that

science has nothing to say about moral

life.^^

Husserl distinguishes two realms of nature: the intuited and the
scientific.

The

familiar

and universal idea

culture

and history has been the

human

development,

it is

it

which transcends

object of mastery in every stage of

the nature that

universality distinguishes

of nature

is

used, bought and sold.

from the multiplicity of

constructed by man's intellectual and practical

scientific

activity.

domination ideology issuing from the sixteenth century

when we consider

Its

nature

For Leiss, the
is

elucidated

the confusion surrounding the concept of the

mastery of nature. Which

'nature' is the object of
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Baconian mastery?

To master
"take the

scientific

mask and

veil

nature means that the scientist

able to

is

from natural objects which are commonly

concealed and obscured under the variety of shapes and external

appearances"^^ and reveal the secrets embedded in nature (Bacon).
Yet,

from the viewpoint of everyday

life,

oyer the nature of everyday experience.

science casts a

Harmony and

consistency, the goals of a theoretical structure, have
to intuited nature.

"veil of

ideas"

internal
little

application

The ongoing interaction between these two worlds

of nature is manifest in the efforts to achieve mastery with respect to

each.

Can mastery

in

one be translated into mastery in the other?

Leiss thinks not.

"Mastery of nature as the outcome of scientific rationality
operating in the domain of scientific nature, when it is
translated into the mode of mastery in an essentially
different

domain

(practical action within the natural

environment) cannot and does not preserve

its

character

intact.

A gap

opens between the mastery

and the mastery
S)anbolization.

of nature in world of

of nature according to the

The mastery

and technology per

human

activity

mathematical

of nature is not the project of "science

but

is

the product of a larger social task.

Issuing from Marx's notion that

human

beings share a dialectical

relationship with nature (mediated by labor), Leiss argues that this

relationship
scientific

is

further complicated

and technological

activity (technique) take
itself.

From

by the interpenetration

rationality.

on a

The products

of scientific

social role quite unlike that of science

the perspective of this mastery,

it

makes no sense

speak of a "nature per ^". Technological mastery

human power

of

in the world, translating the
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is

to

the expansion of

mastery of nature into the

mastery of man.
everyday

life,

In the struggle to

eome

to

terms with nature

in

to establish cin existence, the artifacts of scientific nature

(technology) are applied.

The barbarism inherent

dialectic of the Enlightenment) is

made

in positivism (the

manifest in the realm of

technological mastery.
In this context, technological rationality distinguishes itself from

science because the kind of mastery over nature achieved

is

directly

determined by the immediate connection between technology and
practical life-activity.

Technological expansion opens up

new

opportunities for economic surplus (the motor of capitalism), leading
to the

development and satisfaction of new needs. Particular natural

resources become essential to continued economic expansion, so the

uneven distribution

of these resources magnifies the material

and

technological imbalance between nations, thereby amplifying the

threat of global conflict.

Since the struggle for an expanded market

extended through intensive propaganda and marketing

is

to the

psychological realm, the rising expectations of the world populations
exert further stress on

an escalating

potential for global conflict.

Technological rationality, capable of producing weapons of total
destruction, borders on the irrational.

function of scientific rationality

is

The

technical, cognitive

impotent in the realm of global,

social conflict.

According to Leiss, the connection between the domination of
nature and domination over

man

is

evident in this unchecked

relationship between technological advance and social conflict.

Rising

material demands, supported by massive advertising campaigns,

transplant the struggle to produce these needs from a local to a global

111

context, resulting in the need for

domination.

new techniques

for political

According to Horkheimer, social conflict

element that necessarily

ties

is

the binding

together domination of nature and

domination over man.
"The link between the struggle for existence and control
of the natural environment is illustrated best by the fact
that the intensity of the possible exploitation of human
labor is directly dependent upon the attained degree of
mastery over external nature."®^

As technological advance
techniques for

political

intensifies class conflict, the search for

domination

is intensified.

new

Self-preservation

is

the final product of restricted enlightenment thinking (Horkheimer

and Adorno) where
remains.

all

purposes have been driven out and only one

Since adequate security

is

never obtained, this goal drives

the struggle for mastery as an end in

itself.

The domination

of

external nature expresses itself as a mastery of internal nature,
individual self-denial and instinctual renunciation for survival, so that

the revolt of nature

is

never appeased; the rebellion of

human

nature

manifested in the form of violent outbreaks, arising out of the
irrational structure of social relations.

denial of internal nature appears

The persistent mastery and

more and more

irrational in

view of

the extant possibilities for the satisfaction of needs. The unequal
distribution of these skills

and precludes the

and products drives the mastery

of nature

setting of limits.

For Leiss, the mastery of nature has been and remains a social
task,

"...the greater the attained

power over nature, the weaker the

individual vis-a-vis the overwhelming presence of society."^®
Correctly,

Ackermann,

(writing against the philosophical effort to
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preserve

t±ie

epistemological purity of scientific practice] suggests

that the payoff from science for society comes through the application
of science to the

achievement

mastery of nature.

is clearly

A

diminution in technological

not the route for improving the

Rather, technological inventiveness

must be

human

life.

applied on an even wider

scale.

clearly utopian to imagine that at this point a
diminution in technological achievement might make our
lives better. Technological inventiveness might be applied
to problems of wider social significance, and the benefits
of technological achievement might be more widely
shared, but human life would undergo drastic changes for
the worse if technological levels of achievement were to
lessen suddenly.
"It is

For Leiss (and Habermas), only collective rational control
technology from

its

service in the cause of

human

will liberate

conflict since

responsibility for the task cannot be placed under the auspices of
scientific rationality.

whereby every victory

Until then

we remain

in science

victims of a dilemma

when immediately

translated into

technological advance entails the real possibility of catastrophe

because the production occurs

The

absence of rational

in the

illusion of the "mastery of nature" is the unquestioned belief

that this project produces universal liberation.

contends,

is partially

(philosophically

This delusion, Leiss

the result of the Baconian rendition of the idea

assumed by

positivist epistemology)

irreparable gap between scientific rationality and
is

restraint.

also the result of a confusion about

mastery.

The nature

liberating

humans from drudgery

of everyday
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life

is

which

which masks the

human

freedom.

'nature' is the

product of

which contains the potenUal
confounded with the

It

conflicts

of

inherent in teehnological rationality.
"nature per

It

makes no sense

to talk of

in the eontext of soeial relations.

The indigenous, fourth world peoples

of the aretie, they serve as

obvious examples of the conflicts inherent in technological
rationality.

Not only are they experiencing increasing internal social
result of

advancing technology, but their very livelihood

by the expanding social needs

of others.

While

many

conflict as a
is

threatened

recognize the

tenuous relationship between environmental fervor and cultural
integrity, the root

endeavor by

cause

humans

is glibly

proffered as

(primitives excluded) to

an

historically

dominate nature. The

desire on the part of first world nations for wilderness

being served up to native peoples in

mastery as

new forms

scientifically driven needs.

modern

and

wildlife is

of technological

An advocate

for native

sovereignty expresses her frustration in this way;
"(It) has gotten to the point where words themselves are
being used to replace weapons. Words, millions and
billions of them, bombard the average city-dweller from
every side as she goes about her daily work. Our love affair
with communication has persuaded us to believe that any
issue can be the right issue IF the right words are used to
defend it, IF the right words can convince the right
people. As a result there is an assumption being made in
certain quarters, that those who do not or cannot
articulate themselves or their feelings have, in fact,
nothing to sav "
.

When

considered in the context of ideology, the alarm over global

environmental health
preservation.

is

the ultimate expression of the drive for

The proponents

of this

alarm believe themselves

self-

to

be

operating at such a comprehensive level that they can justify the use of
greater

and greater techniques

1

of global persuasion.

14

Fourth world

cultures are likely targets of this kind of manipulation since they lack

the power structures to overcome this influence.

The environmental case

is

particularly insidious because

proponents of a "biocentric view"io^ of the planet appeal
'innocent' relationship

to the

between native peoples and nature as a case

point of a non-utilitarian attitude toward nature:

passive and innocuous (nature-loving) natives.

we admire you

in

as

These well-intentioned

nature lovers are confusing scientific with technological mastery: they
overlook the fact that while
sophisticated

means

pre-modem

cultures developed

of technological mastery, they constrained the

tension between their technological mastery of nature and the
potential for social conflict with a universally applicable, religious

stmcture.

demands

Since the power of religion

is

waning and large scale

social

are stressing limited and scarce resources, the potential for

social conflict

and

for

new means

of political

domination

Leiss concludes that thoughtless appropriation

and detractors

fuels the ideological

is escalating.

by both advocates

power of the concept of the

"mastery of nature".

"Domination of nature and its surrogates have become
labels for a powerful ideology in modem society, and this
process not only affects the understanding of them, but

meaning

of the liberation of nature.
Under present circumstances the latter, instead of
becoming a rational concept, must remain only a

also prejudices the

counterideology. " ^
I

address the complexities of moving beyond this modern situation in

chapter four;

I

now conclude my

critique of ecophilosophy

by

reconstructing the ecophilosophers' concept of nature (historically
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and philosophically)

to

determine the counterideological tendencies of

their effort.
^Karl

Mannheim

Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
.

19361

pg. 40.

^Fourth -world refers

to culturally distinct and historically original groups of people
residing in countries inhabited and governed by western European colonists.
^Inuit are the indigenous peoples of polar regions including such tribes as the Tlingit.
Haida, Aleutians, Athabascans, Inupiat and Yu'plk.
“^Rural Alaska Resources Association Newsletter, April 1, 1986, pg. 3 (P.O. Box 200908,
Anchorage, AK 99520).

^Max Weber

Introduced the concept of rationality to refer to capitalist economic
activity linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technological development
(see Jurgen Habermas, 'Technology and Science as Ideology" in Toward a Rat ional
Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).
^Critical theory, although not a unity of thought, is often referred to as a 'school of
Its origin in the Institute of Social Research, established in
Frankfurt, Germany in 1923, produced the following key figures: Max Horkheimer,
Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann,

Western Marxism.

Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Henryk Grossmann, Arkadij Gurland and Walter
Benjamin. A second, more recent group of critical theorists, Jurgen Habermas and
contributors Albrecht Wellmer, Claus Offe and Klaus Eder, have reworked the original
notions of critical theory. At a general level, critical theorists are interested in the
production (and absence) of institutions which would ensure individual freedom and
social justice (from David Held's Introduction to Critical Theory)
^Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York:
The Continuum Publishtng Corp., 1982), pg. xi.
®C. Fred Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas (Tampa:
University Presses of Florida, 1985), pg. 7,
.

.

.

^Alford, pg. 17.

lOOne example: G. Bakker and L. Clark, Explanation: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science (Mountain View: Mayfield Publ. Co., 1988).
1 Horkheimer and Adorno use the term 'enlightenment' to refer to the restricted
1
.

dimension of Enlightenment thinking.
l^Horkheimer and Adorno, pg. 4.
l^David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (Berkeley: University
,

of California

Press, 1980), pg. 152.
^
^

'^Horkheimer and Adorno, pg. 33.
^Horkheimer and Adorno, pg. 35.

^^Alford, pp. 17-18.
I'^The positivist school is a family of philosophies characterized by an extremely
positive evaluation of the power of science and the scientific method. In early versions,
the power of science was believed capable of reforming both philosophy and society.
Later versions have concentrated on the reform of philosophy itself. Positivist
philosophers include: Saint-Simon, Comte, Mach and the Logical Positivists.

l^Gertrud Lenzer, editor, Au guste Comte and Positivism (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1975), pg. 325.
l^Horkheimer and Adorno, pg. 16.
.

in
a Rational Society pg. 86: "(There is a) promise, familiar
theme,
This
riatine
fallen
of
"resurrection
the
of
Jewish and Protestant mysticism,
philosophy via
well-known for having penetrated into Schelling's (and Baader's)
the central
constitutes
Swabian Pietism, returns in Marx's Paris Ma nuscripts, today

2®From Habermas, Toward

,

.
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thought of Bloch's philosophy, and. In reflected forms, also directs the more secret
hopes of Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor W. Adorno. It is also present
in Marcuse's thought...".
21 Habermas argues this in 'Technology and Science as
'Ideologv". in Toward a Rationnl
Society pp. 81-122 (see C. F. Alford, pg. 5-6).
22Although there is much contention among proponents of critical theory about the
,

Habermas' constructive theory (see C. F. Alford), his critique of positivism
recognized as a central reconstruction of modem epistemology.

validity of

23Robert J. Ackermann, Philosophy of Karl Popper (PKP) (Amherst: University
Massachusetts Press, 1976).
24Bakker, pg. 54.
.

^^Ackermann, PKP
26Ackermann. PKP

.

pg. 6.

.

pg. 10.

is

of

2’7Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso. 1989), pg. 64.
28Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy. Ethics, and Economic Methodology.
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985).
.

29shrader-Frechette, pg. 68.
^^Shrader- Frechette pg. 82.
^1 Marcus Raskin and Herbert Bernstein,
,

Littlefield.

New Ways

of

Knowing (Totowa:
.

Rowman &

1987).

^^Robert Ackermann. Data. Instruments, and Theory

(PIT)

.

(Princeton:

Princeton

Unlyersity Press, 1985).

Raskin and Bernstein, pg. 52.
3^1 use the term scientism to refer to an unhealthy optimism that endless scientific and
mechanical progress is necessarily and positiyely related to affirmatiye moral
deyelopment.
35comte from Lenzer, pg. 75.
36comte from Lenzer, pg. 305.
3^Lenzer, pg. 325.

38jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and

Human Interest

(KHI) (Boston:
.

Beacon

Press,

1971). pg. 72.

39Habermas, KHI
'^^^nzer, pg.

pg. 73.

.

xiy.

Lenzer, pg. xx.

42Habermas,
43Habermas,
44Habermas,
^^Habermas,
43Habermas,
^^Habermas,

KHI
KHI
KHI
KHI
KHI
KHI

.

pg. 74.

.

pg. 77,

.

pg. 80.

.

pg. 81.

.

pg. 85.

.

pg. 89.

48Held, pg. 165.
49Held. pg. 158.
30Held. pg. 158.
3lHeld, pg. 157.

32Habermas. KHI pg. 67.
33Habermas, KHI pg. 67.
34Habermas, KHI pg. 68.
35Habermas. KHI pg. 69.
36Robert Paul Wolff. Kant's Theory
.

.

.

.

of Mental Activity (Gloucester:
.

pg. 320.

37wolff. pg. 321.
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Peter Smith. 1973),

58wolff, pp. 319-320.
^^Wolff, pg. 321.
pg. 322.

SlRobert C. Solomon. In the

maMng

this claim.

Spirit of Hegel. (Oxford:

Habermas suggests

Oxford University Press. 1983).
pg.

that even

German

Idealism (thinking

be underminmg the positivist elements of enlightenment thinking)
contributes
the predominant positivist spirit of modem society.
®^Solomon. pg. 90.
to

itself

to

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. (London: Oxford at the Clarendon
Press
1970). pg. 5.

®^Miller. pg. 8.

S^MiUer pg. 9.
^^Habermas. KHl pg. 16.
®®Habermas. KHI pg. 9.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 9.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 10.
Habermas. KHI pg. 7.
^^Solomon. pg. 14.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 21.
^"^Habermas. KHI pg. 24.
^^Hegel from Habermas. KHI
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 26.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 26.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 33.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 34.
®^abermas. KHI pg. 40.
® ^Habermas. KHI
pg. 42.
^^Habermas. KHI pg. 47.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

pg. 25.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

83Alford discusses the Implications of Habermas' critique of science in chapter nine of
Science and the Revenge of Nature
.

®"^Habermas. KHI pg. 62.
®^Lenzer, pg. xU.
®®Lenzer, pg. xliii.
®^Lenzer, pg. xxvlii.
.

®®Lenzer, pg. xlviii.
^^Lenzer, pg. xlix.
^Obeiss acknowledges that the distinction between science and technology is artificial.
He takes for granted the historical inseparability of science and technology, but he
considers them separately in order to understand the mastery of nature in regards to
each.
^^Leiss, pp. 122-3.

The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1970), Husserl was essentially concerned to explain how science had lost significance
.

everyday life.
make a similar point in chapter one arguing, from Leiss, that Bacon's confidence in
religion to bridge the gap between technical advance and its moral implications masks
the domination Ideology of the mastery of nature.

for

9^1

9‘^Lelss, pg. 139.

9^Leiss, pg. 141.
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®®Leiss. pg. 146.
^^Leiss. pg. 156.
9®Leiss, pg. 155.

^^Ackermann, PIT

,

pg. 86.

34th Annual
Int^ISon^‘sc1enc”corrfef^^^^^ Fairbanks,
AK. September 1982
lOl'Ri^^^^.
.

.

.

,

away

humans on

equal footing
^ with the

ethical responsibility
^O^Leiss. pp. 167-168.

rP^Fnfw
^

1

19

°^,^^ture to one that places
achieve a higher level of

CHAPTER

III

THE IDEOLOGY OF NATURE
Let us

the

title

now

consider the ecophilosophical vision as captured by

of ecophilosopher Alan Drengson's

Environ mental Crisis: From Technocrat

to

new book, Bevond
Planetary Person ^ which

illuminates the paradigmatic effort energizing ecophilosophy.

Ecophilosophers argue that the emergence of an "ecological
consciousness"
sustainable

(a

planetary vision) will assure us a happy and

To analyze

life.

merit of ecophilosophy
forth.

their proposal in order to determine the

is justified

by

which they

this utopian vision

set

Ecophilosophers argue that the inherent limitations of Western

thinking are running headlong into the restraints of nature, forcing
the emergence of this

new awareness.

ecophilosophers believe that

if

In essence, this

we adopt

this

means

that

dawning new concept

nature ("ecological"^ nature), the glaring errors of

be overcome because natural and social order

modem

of

society will

will reflect the

egalitarian principles inherent to ecological thinking
(interrelationship, diversity,

dynamic equilibrium)

Accordingly,

.

ecophilosophers assume that these ecological concepts, emerging in

human

consciousness, are capable of guiding the restoration of

individual,

community and planetary health and happiness.

While their attempt

to

work out

this

comes from a deep and admirable concern

new philosophy

for the status of natural

things (also called "free nature"^) as well as

general theory

is

inadequate

for

human

two reasons:

welfare, their

since

philosophically positivistic (essentially scientistic in
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of nature

it is

its

character);

t±ierefore.

acts ideologically to obscure current power
imbalances.

it

Because both of these charges are directed

which ecophilosophers
(scientism

and

at the very tendencies

believe themselves to have overcome

social injustice),

it

has been necessary

to reconstruct

the history of the "idea of nature" (chapters one and
two) to prepare
for this critique of ecophilosophy.

meaning

more

historically Justified

of the domination of nature in place

it

is

possible to examine

closely the concept of nature operating in ecophilosophy
to

reveal
it

With the

its

epistemological status and ideological repercussions.

At last

can be shown that since ecophilosophers use philosophical

assumptions about nature derived from the very
claim to attack, their theory

modern
I

fails to

tradition

which they

inspire a radical critique of the

age.

began by considering the impact

of the

modern concept

nature on society and suggested that the cunning nature of
times

is

modem

the continued domination and exploitation by some people

over others
science.

of

masked by

The advent

of

faith in the

emancipatory capacity of modern

modern science

radically transforms

philosophy by positing a new view of nature (mind constructs nature),
effectively replacing animistic theories,

science.

moral

and equating knowledge with

Although ecophilosophers locate the environmental and

crisis in

suggestion that

modem

scientists'

mechanistic view of nature, this

we can unambiguously know

'nature'

demonstrates that

ecophilosophers are as vulnerable to the persuasive influence of this

modem

preoccupation (the absorption of the philosophy of nature by

the philosophy of science).

suggestion that a

It

new concept

follows that the ecophilosophical
of nature
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can replace the old view and

rectify the

modern

condition, proffered in the absence of a critique
of

scientific rationality, fails to

modern

circumvent the domination ideology

of the

age.

Their agenda mimics the ideological result of the Baconian
to

"dominate nature":

(or liberation) of

modern

the inextricable bond between the domination

nature and the domination of

men and women.

Since

society deludes itself into believing that the incredible

and technological enterprise

scientific

living conditions

has

itself

that has radically transformed

been mastered, we believe that we are

ourselves equally transformed by the process
vital

call

when

instead the most

elements of our psyche are repressed and our rage

ourselves.

is

vented upon

At the same time that the exercise of dominion through

technological advance does not insure parallel moral progress, the loss
of large-scale religious constraints deprives

modem

society of

Ecophilosophers claim that individuals can restore

direction.

restraint with personal ecosophies (individual adaptations of the

more

general ecophilosophical world-view), believing that in order to

transcend the Baconian domination ideology each individual must
distance

him

or herself from the Baconian concept of nature.

Yet this

proposal reveals that ecophilosophers misunderstand the subtle
of

enlightenment thinking:

redefining nature will not free us from the

regressive potential of the enlightenment, rather

the misappropriation of knowledge
I

of

effect

we must overcome

itself.

have suggested that ecophilosophers characterize the problems

modem

society as emanating from a paradigmatic desire to

dominate nature

for

two reasons: they beUeve that since the sixteenth

century proponents of a mechanistic philosophy of nature have
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utilized

political

concepts to justify a dominant relationship of

humans

over

the rest of nature and secondly, they believe that such a relationship

immoral because
valuable.

They

of their

own

conviction that nature

believe that nature,

when

is

is

inherently

reinterpreted with a

new

ontology, reveals itself to be deserving of the moral consideration
traditionally reserved for

human

interactions.

Reflecting this theoretical approach, an eco-thinker such as

Andrew McLaughlin^ takes as

his point of departure a juxtaposition of

natural images as the foundation of a practical and ethical relationship

between humans and nature. He contrasts an ecological image,
"an ecological image takes the individual entity as nested
within its environment, and takes the relations which a
part has with its environment as essential in constituting

what
to

it is,"®

an instrumental and mechanical view which he

attributes to Bacon,

Descartes and the development of modern scientific thinking.

McLaughlin wants
of nature

to

convince us that as

humans we

construct images

from "an interested point of view". The view of nature as an

instrument, devoid of intrinsic meaning has dominated, according to

McLaughlin, because of "the increased power
collective ability to

interests

we bring

McLaughlin

he

to

in

our

it""^.

insists that the profoundly negative result of this
is

that any form of manipulation of nature

Yet despite the resulting environmental and ethical

glibly overlooks the equally

wrought by

has yielded

transform the world in accordance with the

mechanistic view of nature
acceptable.

it

modem

is

crisis,

profound material transformation

science and technology.

Since

unequal distribution of the benefits derived from
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it is

the profoundly

this transformation

that indicates that the "domination of nature" has

come

to serve

an

ideological function, protecting the interests of particular groups.

My

critique targets the ecophilosophical concept of nature as the essential

element of an examination of the ecophilosophical commentary on the

modern

age.

Since

1

am

characterizing ecophilosophy as a general trend

rather than a specific

effort,

reconstructing an ecophilosophical

concept of nature involves abstracting from a variety of sources. In a
fashion similar to Habermas' suggestion that we can trace in the
of positivism" a restricted concept of rationality,
'spirit of

ecophilosophy'

concept of nature.
nature allows

my

result,

me

we

1

"spirit

propose that in the

find a pre-critical (and unsatisfactory)

Focusing on this ecophilosophical concept of

to reconstruct the field in a

evaluation of ecophilosophy

is first

coherent fashion. As a
a synthesis of the roots

of eco-thinking (what do ecophilosophers believe about nature)

and

secondly an analysis of the concept of nature which emerges from this
synthesis (my construction of the ecophilosophical concept of nature).

Although the history of ecophilosophical thought has been variously
reconstructed by several historians®, these histories themselves are
tainted

by an ambiguous concept

reconstruction just that more

A The

My

of nature,

making the task

of

difficult.

Spirit of Ecophilosophy

survey of ecophilosophical thought begins with the

presumption that ecophilosophy lacks the character of a debate on

which a clear and precise order has already been imposed. Although
the newness of the area along with the wide diversity of
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spok6spersons contxibut6S

to the failure of ecophilosophers to

establish this coherent, orderly shape on their

explained,

1

more

believe a

critical

explanation

field,

as

lies in

1

have

the implicit

assumptions made about two key ecophilosophical concepts: the
"domination of nature" (see chapter one) and "nature"
the former has

come

to serve

an

ideological function,

itself.

it is

Although

the fate of

the latter than determines the critical success of the effort to liberate

humankind (and
structure to the

nature).
field

order to complete

What

is

After

my

initial

by reconstructing

my

it

overview,

around

I

will

impute some

this latter

concept in

critique of ecophilosophy.

the overarching goal of an ecophilosophy? Although a

characterization of ecophilosophy requires the synthesis of wide-

ranging texts, ecophilosophers agree by and large that the ecologist

Aldo Leopold stands as the modern prophet of this kind of thinking^

because of his

influential manuscript,

A Sand

Countv Almanac

Richard

.

Sylvan, in his critique of deep ecology^®, refers to Leopold as sacred
text,

as does philosopher John Passmore:

"The ecology Aldo Leopold, writing in the nineteen-forties,
was one of the first to suggest that the West now stands in
need of a 'new ethic' - an ethic of conservation."
Since Leopold

is

trained as a scientist not as a philosopher, he does

not argue his case as an ecophilosopher might; rather, he makes bold
claims about the tarnished relationship between
of nature, believing that nature

human

interest.

scientific^2

Yet, as

a

the rest

has been wrongfully dominated by

scientist,

Leopold solidifies the quasi-

language that ecophilosophers use

and he characterizes the

humans and

to discuss social theory

anti-utilitarian intent of eco-thinkers.

125

Leopold that

It is

first

argues that since the destruction of

natural things (contrary to survival)
ethical restraint (natural things

the result of the absence of an

is

have no inherent value according

the current social order), an ethical response
inevitable

if

we

evolutionarily

is

are to survive.

Leopold suggests that

community

instinct in the making"

possibly a kind of

to

"(e)thics are

evolving to

include wider and wider realms of humanity eventually broadening to

include

all

of nature (the roots of the ecophilosopher’s paradigmatic

As we

"ecological consciousness").

on nature

is

multiply, our absolute

dependency

increasingly critical; in response our ethical relationships

evolve in a parallel fashion to insure the appropriate survival behavior.

The

sort of ecological ethic that results

freedom of action in the struggle

is

one that motivates a

for existence, recognizing

limit

on

nature as

inherently valuable.

Why

attribute inherent value to nature?

and undeveloped, ecophilosophy

of this ethical appropriation is bold
is,

in essence,

this

an attempt

to

Since Leopold’s account

ground Leopold's

vision, to

respond

to

nagging question by providing a new view of nature that impels an

ethical response.

Beyond Leopold, ecophilosophers

believe that the

imperative environmental consciousness replaces rational self-interest

not only with a

a

new concept

new

sort of ethical restraint regarding nature, but with

of humanity.

As Richard Sylvan

of ethics replaces both the notion of

humans

only)

human

and human supremacy

needs are of highest

explains, this concept

apartheid (value applies to

(in ethical

situations

human

priority).

According to Leopold's "land

homocentric view of the world

ethic",

humans

evolve from a

to that of biotic citizen
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by

shifting the

burden of decision making from the arena
obligation.

of

Vital to the Leopoldian analysis

constructing an image of nature

humans can respond

(a

new

human

utility to

planetary

the belief that only by

is

philosophy of nature) to which

with appropriate feelings and desires

is

this

ethical transformation possible.

"No important change in ethics was ever accomplished
without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis,
loyalties, affections, and convictions. The proof that
conservation has not yet touched these foundations of
conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have
not yet heard of it."^^

Borrowing from his training as an

ecologist,

he images the human-

nature relationship as a biotic pyramid. By placing

humans

at the top

dependent upon the rest of the

of this fragile pinnacle, utterly

pyramid, he hopes to evoke feelings of both contingency and
connection.

This delicate tension between a

scientific appraisal of

nature and the means to inspire the appropriation of
principles

by each

individual as a

commitment

element of ecophilosophical thinking)
vision

and

is essentially

is

scientific

of love (an importaint

basic to the ecophilosophical

resolved by widening ethical boundaries to

include nature.

Ecophilosophers applaud the growing trend to confront science
with ethical accountability and to lay over
of ecology:

everything

is

interconnected.

all scientific activity

the

'fact'

Believing that ecology has

had impact on the common person unlike other

sciences, eco-

thinkers are in a long line of believers beginning perhaps in the

eighteenth century

who

embrace the principles
view.

reflect

a general trend in ecophilosophy to

of ecology while berating the scientific world

The general trend

is to

give to ecology
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an epistemologically.

"quasi- transcendental status"

new form

contains a

delineating a

suggesting that ecological knowledge

of rationality (ecological rationality^'^).

new and

essential

way we can know

By

the world beyond

the scientific and technological rationality that appears to dominate

our world view, ecophilosophers believe themselves to have provided
the grounds for a 'new science' motivated by other than a technical
interest over nature,

While

Baconian

I

am

but by a desire

for unity

with nature.

suggesting that ecophilosophy remains rooted in the

tradition, eco-thinkers trace their revitalized concept of

nature to a discontinuous, pre-modem holism^®. They argue that this
ancient concept of nature has been recently resuscitated exemplified
(as

in

one historian suggests) by naturalist and writer Gilbert White

1789 made a quasi- scientific

perspective.

effort to

who

argue an ecological

According to an ecophilosophical account, this

renaissance of holistic thinking has characteristically
conventional thought.

It is

mn

contrary to

suggested that even White's rudimentary

concept of nature as the great economist (nature converting the
activity of

one organism

scientific literature

a

to the support of another)

vital 'ecological' vision.

utilitarian, believing that the goal of scientific

human

life,

ushers into the

Although White
study

is to

is clearly

support

his protectionist views of nature (written in the safety of

pastoral England) carry a romantic flavor, setting the

mood

for the

anti-utilitarian bent of ecophilosophy.

Although White's work

is

elementary, by the early nineteenth

century (perhaps as a response to industrialization) eco-historians
record a revival of this kind of thinking, reflecting a longing for the
pastoral lifestyle described by White in
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what comes

to

be known as the

natural history essay

Writers in the last half of this century return to

.

White’s kind of writing, this time increasing

its

impact by placing

a growing scientific context.

These

science as tool and blame

as an impediment (the restricted

it

writers, unlike White,

mechanistic view of nature) to the search

John Burroughs,

relationship with nature.

suggests that

it is

for a

it

in

both praise

more pleasing

as a prime example,

necessary to reintroduce into science a view of

nature as organismic (and

holistic) rather

than mechanistic (and

mathematical) to reclaim the original wonder of

scientific discovery.

This longing for holism most recently articulated in the
ecophilosophical concept of "ecological consciousness"

is

argued

to

reappear throughout history as a solution to the alienation and
fragmentation of

modem

The development

capitalist society.

of the "imperialist''^^ view of nature, derived

from Francis Bacon, the father of nature domination, has great
influence in the ecophilosophic tradition.

Eco-thinkers suggest that

while the extreme consequence of a' preference for mechanized nature
is

the elimination of

any transcendental

inevitable response to this

outcome

is

qualities in nature, the

the reintroduction of an

organismic ecology that restores to nature

its

ancient

'life

spirit'.

Although the development of this kind of ecological thinking dovetails
with utilitarian thinking (every element of nature

is

designed to have a

particular use), the primarily utilitarian view of ecology parallels an
anti-utilitarian

mood

that culminates in the biocentric view of

ecophilosophy.

Consider the work of Henry David Thoreau who, in the
ecophilosophical tradition, suggests that to understand nature
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we

must

listen to her:

onset, for she

is

"would

the

it

not be well

to consult

most extensive and experienced planter

Thoreau argues that since we cannot

all"2i.

land until

we

accept nature as our guide,

natural order.

it

live in

of

them

harmony with the

we must accommodate

to the

Interpreted by eco-thinkers as the desired anti-

utilitarian position (by expressing

transcend

with nature in the

with a

new nature

our alienation from nature we can

philosophy), the necessity for personal

transformation underlies ecophilosophical theory.
spiritual emptiness,

brought on (Thoreau

believes)

In response to his

by his alienation

from nature £ind his disillusionment with science, he

knowledge of nature

is

insists that real

obtained by an inward, profoundly ethical

process that produces a pure, untainted view of nature. Although

Thoreau remains sadly
ambivalence
holistic

is

scientific in his

own

estimation, his

own

the root of an ecophilosophical trend toward a more

understanding of nature both inside and outside the confines

of traditional scientific activity.

As science takes on ever increasing
ecology

is

reintroduced in a

Lyell (Principles of Geology)

new form by

who

literature in 1866, coined

scientists

such as Charles

introduce time, history and change

The word

into the scientific model.

influence, the concept of

"oecologie"22 appears in the

by Ernst Haeckel who suggests that many

branches of study can be brought together under a

single scientific

discipline to capture the relationship of living beings to the non-living

world.

The geographers

are

some

of the first to take

up

this

new

concept, linking forms of vegetation with their climatic determinants
(biomes).

For some this interest in linking branches of science

represents the return to generalities and the renaissance of the
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Gilbert White -like 'naturalist'; for others the study of auteeology
(the

physiology of organisms) complements the growing trend toward
specialization in the sciences.

These

parallel attitudes highlight the

equivocal character of the concept 'ecological' in ecophilosophical
thought.

The normative bent

modern

human

of the science of ecology develops as

ecologists begin to describe the destructive potential of
activity in stable, yet

recently systematized in a

conservation biology).
nature's processes

is

suggests to some

(in

radically

new way

new branch

of

life

While reaffirming that
potentially disastrous,

is

natural principles

dynamic natural biomes (concerns

essential to

for

human

science called

human

intervention into

and that obedienee

to

survival, this scientific analysis

the ecophilosophical tradition) the necessity of a

humans

to

view their relationship

The

to nature.

ecophilosophers are not satisfied to interpret ecological results
pragmatically since their larger goal

is

a utopian reorientation of

society along the lines of a Thoreau-like self-transformation.

Clearly

Bacon made

similar observations about

dependency upon the whims

of nature

human

which would suggest that the

only change from a Baconian analysis to a modern one

is

that

ecological research offers a fresh understanding of natural processes.

Ecophilosophers insist on a stronger claim, believing that the

emergence of a new

"ecological consciousness" transcends the

instrumentality of a Bacon. That the pragmatic shift toward the most
efficacious response to ecology (the desire to help farmers learn
to

respond to new principles of nature)

is

regarded as a shift away

from true ecological consciousness highlights the attempt by
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how

ecophilosophers to distance themselves from what they
perceive as
the devil of Baconianism:

This perception

is

human-centered,

utilitarian ethics.

recently reaffirmed in Arne Naess’ distinction

between "shallow” and "deep" ecology23 where Naess separates
the
efforts that

focus on environmental regulation from true ecological

consciousness-raising work. Although deep ecologists insist that their
principles do not oppose the practical concern of people by

redirecting the process inward,

appropriate framework of discourse for describing
and presenting deep ecology is ... one that is fundamentally
to with the nature and possibilities of the self, or, we
might say, the question of who we are. can become, and
should become in the larger scheme of things, "24

"(t)he

they paint the fundamental

modem

dilemma as a struggle between

two moral courses captured by two views
holistic

and the

of nature:

mechanistic-utilitarian.

To demonstrate that eco-thinking has very
concern for the survival of the
fervor

the organismic-

human

little

to

do with a

species, regard the

around predator defense sparked by debate

American

in the 1930's

and

culminating in the current debate over the reintroduction of wolves
into the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.

defenders and opponents appeal to
their

scientific

opposing positions, the issue appears

boundaries of a

manager

scientific debate.

to

evidence to support

transcend the

In the 1930's Aldo Leopold, a

game

himself, reconceptualizes the issue as a moral one, arguing

that since the presence of the wolf
to

Since both predator

claim that

new moral

it is

wrong

is

not essential to

to eliminate the wolf is a

perspective regarding nature.
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human

survival

proclamation for a

While his persuasive

influence

marks

the end of massive wolf and coyote extermination in

the United States, Leopold's normative ecological argument comes
to

represent a romantic regret present in the history of eco-thought.
currently being developed as ecophilosophical thinking.

Although the current proposal
is

for the reintroduction of the

argued as sound ecological management

wolf,

(biologists argue that

having been essentially eliminated from the lower

were reintroduced into

large, intact

wolf

if

the

forty-eight,

ecosystems the character of

ecosystemic health brought about by a healthy predator-prey balance

might be restored), ecosystemic health
this fiery debate.

is

an

insignificant aspect of

To eco-thinkers the controversy represents the

antagonism between nature imperialism and the desire
restore

harmony with

and

For them the wolf symbolizes the

nature.

parallel loss of wildness

to reclaim

and the growing

insatiable

human

appetite: for

others the restoration of the wolf represents the irrational elitism of

nature lovers.
It is

becomes a

most

likely

fertile field for this

writes: "All ethics rest

member

because of

of a

orientation that ecology

kind of thinking. As Aldo Leopold
single premise: that the individual is a

upon a

community

its holistic

of interdependent parts.

The emergence

of the ecological sciences impels Leopold to suggest that the

"complexity of the land organism"

is

discovery of the twentieth century".

"the outstanding scientific
Initially

Leopold grounds his

theory in intuition, using the work of Peter D. Ouspensky (1878-1947)
to

support his notion of a

living earth.

Later he switches to ecology to

develop his idea of "biotic right" the ingredient that sets his thinking
apart from the traditional conservation
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movement

in the United

By 1948, Leopold

States.

refines his land ethic from a species

perspective to the realm of ecosystemic processes into his most

widely quoted precept:
a land-use decision
integrity, stability,
is

wrong when

it

is

when

right

and beauty

it

tends to preserve the

of the biotic

community.

It

tends otherwise. "26,

This concern for systems preservation changes the character of ecoethics.

The

effort to establish the intrinsic value of

distinct concerns:

and the vision
domination.

nature reflects two

the desire by humanitarians to end animal suffering

of the ecophilosophers to free

all

of nature from

The adamant arguments by ecophilosophers

to distance

themselves from animal rights activists highlights the ecological
character of their agenda. Although even John Locke includes some

animal protection in his work because of their status as property,

committed spokespersons against animal mistreatment surface
beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
their interest in the character of

comments on the treatment

men and women

of animals; therefore

Initially it is

that spurs their

a mistake

it is

to

read into the seventeenth and eighteenth century organicists the kind
of environmental ethic

which produces ecophilosophy. Eco-thinkers

suppose themselves

be motivated by an expanded

to

which places humanity
While utilitarians

in a
like

more

self-interest

correct ethical position.

Jeremy Bentham argue

for

an end

to

cruelty toward animals, suggesting that animals useful to people

occupy a superior position (below slaves but above

some

of

to other

Bentham's contemporaries advanced a more

134

life

forms),

radical position

by attributing

rights to all animals.

community reaches
Salt argues for a

its

peak

of

an extended moral

in the nineteenth century

common bond

"What was lacking

The idea

of

humanity

in English

when Henry S

to unite all

and American

Imng

beings.

attitudes. Salt

was "a true sense of kinship" with nonhuman
The community had to be widened. "27
felt,

beings.

Since Salt suggests that the liberation of animals depends upon

human

beings rethinking their relationship to the rest of nature, he combines
the concern for animal rights and the paradigmatic ecological
rationality to

which eco-thinkers

refer.

This kind of holistic thinking

Evans

in "Ethical Relations

develops a remarkably
of Christianity "28.

animals on

full

is

between

also reflected

Man and

by Edward Payson

Beast" (1884) where he

case against "the anthropocentric character

Evans, developing the commonality of

"strictly scientific

that mistreatment of animals

humans and

grounds" carefully deflates the argument
is

wrong merely because

it

degrades both

men and

the animals they mistreat, arguing instead for the intrinsic

rights of

non-human

life

forms (including inanimate objects

like rocks

and minerals). Along with Evans, John Howard Moore (1862-1916)

makes

significant contribution to the idea of ethical extension, arguing

that "earth

life is

a single process... every part related and akin to every

other part. "29
Leopold's term "thinking like a mountain"30 finally culminates
this ecological imaging.

In his essay

by that name from the Sand

County Almanac Leopold suggests that only the mountain has
.

long enough to listen objectively to the howl of the wolf.
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lived

Leopold

hopes that humans would somehow obtain sueh a mountain
perspective.

"One who could listen objectively to that howl (wolf), who
visualize the wolf in relation to the total life process
of the
ecosystem through time, not as it might affect one's own
immediate interests (is) thinking ecologically, like a
mountain. "31

This vision of humankind transcending

its

limited ego-centered

perspective to obtain an almost god-like view, reverberating

throughout the ecophilosophical

literature, represents Leopold's

enduring contribution. The suggestion that obedience
utilization of, nature offers a

more

to,

most

rather than

life-affirming existence betrays a

disturbing dilemma in ecophilosophy which

I

take

up

below.

Despite Leopold's vision, since traditional moral philosophy
professes

little

concern

for the

human

relationship with nature, only

very recently does the intensity of environmental concern coupled

with a dissatisfaction with philosophy

new

field:

delineate

itself result in

the creation of a

environmental philosophy32. As philosophers begin to
it,

environmental philosophy comes to have several

meanings, although the heart of ecophilosophy revolves around the
reinterpretation

and magnification

of the

work

of several philosophers

(Spinoza, Whitehead, Heidegger), transforming environmental

philosophy from

its original

ethical focus to ontological concerns.

For the ecophilosopher, ecology's holism matches other
philosophical and theological inquiry:

Alfred North Whitehead's

(1861-1947) argument that the identity and purpose of every object in
the universe arises from

its

relationship to everything else

Schweitzer's suggestion that the taking of
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life

and Albert

should only happen

when

absolutely necessary and only with a compassionate
sense of

These theories are evidenced as heralding the

responsibility.

profundity of the ecophilosophical approach.

a mystical holism,
biotic

Although Schweitzer's

coincides with the eco-thinkers’ concept of a

it

community: every being has a place

in the ecosystem.

Interdependence, as a description of nature and a basis

determining

human

is

conduct toward nature,

for

rises with the growing

interest in ecology.

These developments spring from
character of an environmental ethic.
possible

and should

of nature?
is

the

it

While the

common

be

disagreements over the

initial

Is

an environmental

utilitarian or derived

belief that

we ought

from the

ethic

intrinsic value

to protect the natural

world

element of any kind of eco-thinking, philosophers

begin to elucidate this growing body of work by differentiating primary

from secondary environmental ethics^^. Primary environmental ethics
(that

which derives the obligation

the needs

and

to protect the natural world

interests of nature alone)

comes

to

from

dominate

ecophilosophical work in contrast to secondary environmental ethics

developed from a commitment to the welfare of the

community. Such a
personal gain
other

when

members

theories

'pollution ethic' requires
it

human

beings to sacrifice

interferes with the health, pleasure or survival of

of society.

Accordingly, either utilitarian or egalitarian

can serve as a rational foundation

protection.

human

Utilitarian pollution ethicists

for

environmental

would argue that prescribing

environmental health arises from a sense of duty to protect future
generations while egailitarian pollution ethicists would insist that

human

all

beings deserve equal protection from environmental hazards.
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Ecophilosophers. rejecting the adequacy of any pollution
ethic

argue that an appropriate ethical inquiry leads us to
conclude that

nonhuman

since

entities

ought

be

to

free to attain their

own

good,

we

are forced to adopt a biocentric world view (the
recognition that

natural enUties have value other than in service to humankind)
in

order to obtain a correct relation to the natural world.

In 1964,

lawyer Clarence Morris publishes an essay arguing for the legal rights

but

of nature,

it is

Christopher Stone^^

1972 personifies nature

in

to

an unprecedented extent by arguing that the

of

expansion

movement

to include nature.

legal

system

is

capable

Eco-advocates within the women's

are instrumental in redirecting environmental thinking

along broader lines by suggesting that

"(t)he

hatred of

women and

the

hatred of nature are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing."35

These ecofeminists^s argue that while women have
viewed

'closer' to

women's

feminist perspective.

book

In her

Dodson Gray argues that

and

since a

women

the Green Nigger?. Elizabeth
of

life

(reflecting

interconnected rather than linear

are in a better position to understand nature

because of their tendency
network of relationships.

Why

can now benefit from a

new understanding

must be systematic and

hierarchical,

been

nature than men, permitting the subversion of

interests, the ecological perspective

the earth)

traditionally

de-emphasize the individual

to

Similarly, Carolyn

self in

a

Merchant^® argues that

since the reconceptualization of reality as a machine rather than a
living

organism sanctions the domination

new conception can put an end

whose

both nature and women, a

to oppression.

Appearing alongside the work
the deep eeologists®®

of

of the ecofeminists is the

roots are Norwegian.
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work

In 1941, Peter

of

Zapffe outlines a nonanthropocentric theory of human-environment
relations

which

in

1974 Sigmund Kvaloy coins 'ecophilosophy'.

Arne Naess who suggests the term 'deep

It is

ecology' to define the rise of

ecology which entails philosophical and religious principles,

undermining traditional ways
of

deep ecology

is

of understanding nature.

While the core

a belief in ecological egalitarianism, biocentrism and

anti- anthropocentrism (the right of every

organism

to function

normally in the ecosystem), the foundation of such belief

is

the

inherent value of nature. Thinking in terms of processes and systems,

deep ecologists distinguish themselves from animal

liberationists,

arguing that since some organisms because of their undesirable nature
require enlightened self-interest to be preserved,

accept a

The deep

new sense
ecologists

of Self as the basis of

and animal

an

we

are required to

ecological perspective.

liberationists continue a heated

debate.'^o

Deep

ecologists

and ecofeminists

are involved in a separate

debate as to the character of the ethic proposed by each. Although

they concur that the treatment of nature

is

ultimately at stake,

ecofeminists argue that the deep ecological agenda retains

fundamental domination structures. Ecofeminists

commitment
ecologists.

to ecological

humanism

As Ynestra King

belief that their

distinguishes

them from deep

explains:

of entrenched
society,
concentrating exclusively on self-realization and cultural
transformation, taking the side of nature over culture...

Deep ecology ignores the structures
economic and political power within

Although ecofeminists recognize the implicit ideological consequences
of the

deep ecologist's position, the debate
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is

currently unresolvable

because both theories are implicitly grounded

in a positivist

nature. Although not the focus of this project,

my

concept of

re-examination of

the concept of nature in the ecophilosophical context

is

useful to

resolving this debate. ^2

The implication
least as important as

of

any biocentric thinking

any

of its parts.

James

is

that the whole

is at

Lovelock’s Gaia

hypothesis, according to which he reconceptualizes the earth as a

being whose rights are primary to any lesser being^s

living

the most

is

well-developed attempt to scientifically support this kind of thinking.

Some have charged

that such thinking

is

"environmental fascism",

resembling a totalitarian government where the good of the

community outweighs the good

of

any

individual.

Ecophilosophers

argue that an environmental ethic pushes traditional
past

its

conceptual

limits, calling into question the legitimacy of the

rights of the individual
to

upon which

liberal thinking is based.

have reinterpreted the individual, the

matrix that creates and sustains

Murray
social

and

philosophy

liberal

Self, in

It

claims

terms of a biophysical

life.

Bookchin'^'^ (as early as 1952)

is

the

political implications of ecophilosophy,

environmental theory sympathetic to
since the domination of nature by

champion

advocating a radical

critical theory.

man

of the

He argues that

stems from the very real

domination of humans by other humans, the obsession with hierarchy

and power has

justified gross injustice.

Bookchin regrets the faddish

nature of environmentalism and deep ecology, arguing
confrontation with the

probably the

first to

constitutes a major

mechanism

a direct

of domination in society.

argue that "the science of ecology

anomaly

for

itself

for Galilean science'"^^ since the
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He

is

generalizing character of science opposes the
specificity and

uniqueness of each ecosystem. Even Bookchin’s

political solution that

"an anarchist community would approximate a (normal)
ecosystem;

would be
political

it

balanced and harmonious"46 while addressing the

diversified,

nature of ecophilosophy

apolitical character of the

fails to

adequately locate the

philosophy of nature underlying eco-

p

thinking.

To transcend our current
argue that
scientific

we need

approach

either a

ethical dead-end, ecophilosophers

new

science or

together, that

all

we need

by quantifying ecology we

regrettably remove nature from the ethical realm.
rationality is inherently motivated

by technical

Yet

and by that

to

it

the ecological vision that

absorb

its

it

if

scientific

cognitive interests

(Habermas), the dilemma faced by nature ethicists
science and with

to reject the

is

whether

to reject

supports or to accept

it

instrumental nature. Ecological rationality

which ecophilosophers argue transcends the instrumentalism

of

scientific rationality is not free of its scientific roots as long as eco-

thinkers continue the historic appeal to ground their theory in
'ecological' nature.

"(Ecophilosophy) is the utilization of basic concepts from
the science of ecology - such as complexity, diversity, and
symbiosis - to clarify the place of our species within nature
through the process of working out a total view. "47

Since the belief that
(nature

it is

is intrinsically

right to protect

valuable)

is

and wrong

to

abuse nature

both compelled and confirmed by an

appropriate appreciation of the ecological character of nature,

ecophilosophers are haunted by the scientistic character of their
theory.
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B.

The Ecophi losophical Concept

The character

of Natnrp

of ecophilosophy (portrayed above) springs from
a

shared belief in the wrongful domination and misapprehension
of
nature and coalesces around the attempt

to recUfy the situation

by

redefining nature.

Yet this characterization of ecophilosophy leaves

many unanswered

questions, the

are

life

most confounding; how and by whom

and death decisions made according

indicated,

I

this glaring

an eco-ethic? As

to

1

have

believe that the absence of a critical analysis of nature fuels

gap

in ecophilosophical rhetoric.

Although the literature

is filled

with attempts to redefine and protect nature, the discourse

needed

to place the

dialogue

is rare.

concept of nature in a larger philosophical

As a

"the liberation of nature"

meaningful context.

concepts

result,

and the

Likewise

domination of nature",

"redefinition of nature" lack a

it is

ecophilosophical arguments for a

like "the

impossible to follow the

new

science (ecology) without a

supporting critique of the overwhelming arguments
instrumental character of scientific nature.

I

am

for the

hard pressed to

justify the general ecophilosophical claims despite their intentions

since the entire ecophilosophical enterprise

is

weakened by an

incoherent explanation of nature.
Therefore,

if

we narrow

the ecophilosophical agenda by asking,

"what do ecophilosophers mean by

'nature'?",

a reconstructed

ecophilosophy emerges lodged in the philosophical tradition where
the character of such knowledge plays a pivotal role.

Since

ecophilosophers believe that they have radicalized philosophy with a

new concept

of nature (econature"^®),
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an analysis

of this concept should

support their contention.

Although their are

(at least)

three different

philosophies of nature that could underlie the ecophilosophical claims

about nature, the kinds of requirements that ecophilosophers want

make about

the revolutionary character of ecology

philosophical position in particular.

nature to ecophilosophy,

my

wed them

to

to

one

Attributing this philosophy of

assessment turns on an expanded

critique of this view.

Ecophilosophers could argue that nature
"we" define

it

to

be (nature

is

is entirely fictitious).

merely whatever
According to this

view scientists/technicians merely choose a model of nature that

works and

want

political theoreticians select

to see the

world so that natural philosophy

to larger philosophical

to

one that supports the way they

and

political

is

crafted according

agendas. This analysis would tend

support the ecophilosophical contention that sixteenth and

seventeenth thinkers supplant the holistic view of nature with a

mechanistic one in order to promote technological expansion.
this

Yet

concept of nature goes against the tendency in ecophilosophy

to

advance the ecological view as indicative of the true character of
nature.

On
style)

the other hand, ecophilosophers could argue

that nature

is

identical to consciousness.

vision of the evolution of

human

the project of nature would

Hegelian

Matching a Leopoldian

consciousness, according to this view,

encompass the

"grand tapestry of meaning".

(in

project of

humankind

in a

Ecological consciousness becomes the

next expression of nature in a ever expanding project of Self

understanding. Although some ecophilosophers express the inevitably
of a

dawning consciousness

in this evolutionary way, the universal

143

fascination that ecophilosophers have with the character and

treatment of nature

itself (apart

from

human

activity)

supersedes this

concept of nature.

Rather we can better understand the framework within which
ecophilosophers work

from

human

character

is

if

we

define nature as having a truth separate

consciousness.

knowable

knowledge that nature

On

this perception, nature’s ultimate

(ecologically)
is

and

knowledge

this

(the

fundamentally a pattern of integrated and

interdependent relationships) acts as a kind of "self-knowledge",

new

stimulating

patterns of being. According to this universal

characterization, since nature does not change,
ability to recognize its (our)

we must change

genuine character by following

in our

its dictates.

Ecophilosophers would argue that their ecological rationality
transcends scientific rationality, serving
scientific

to repair the

gap between our

knowledge and our moral behavior. Yet their philosophy

nature, as

I

have characterized

ecophilosophy.

Other

it,

places a limit

scientifically inspired

on the scope

of

of

work such as that

of

Herbert Spencer, intending to unify knowledge, foreshadows the
ecophilosophical effort and exemplifies the influential character of the
belief that scientific theory
fields.

Spencer's picture of

the long process of
social

life

human

can be reworked and applied

human

history

is

to unrelated

a utopian one. Capturing

'adaptation' to the requisites of perfect

(Leopold?), Spencer describes the elimination of

all

structures of domination in the final form of adaptation: altruism.

Spencer biologizes the modern

faith in

human

progress with his belief

in the uniformity of natural processes, "the necessity of adaptation is

proved by

its

universal occurrence in nature"'^^, by drawing upon
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Charles Lyell s Principl es of Geology and his

own Larmarkian

evolution (Spencer predates Darwin and holds a

views of

more ancient view

of

the inheritance of acquired traits) to substantiate his philosophical
views.

Although Spencer emphatically

Habermasian sense
argues

for

this era

which he

traditional religion

work the

a philosophical positivist because he

is

a universal foundation

when

calls his

in

rejects the labepo. there is a

for ethics derived

from science. In

no longer commands authority, he

"secularization" of ethics.

Comte and Spencer the appeal of science was that it
had authority, that it could and did compel assent, which
was just where existing systems of ethics failed. As
science was the knowledge of nature, an authoritative
analysis of the moral realm was only possible if its subject
matter were shown to be pairt of nature; and this was
Spencer's fundamental assertion about society.
"...for

Although Spencer's

'essential principle of

life'

pivots

on

his

teleological concept of adaptation,
"(p)rogress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity.
Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature;
all of a piece with the development of the embryo or the
unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have
undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law
underl 5dng the whole organic creation; and provided the
human race continues, and the constitution of things
remains the same, those modifications must end in
completeness, "^2

the ecophilosopher's vision of an emerging ecological consciousness
carries with

it

the

same

flavor of inevitability implicit in

any discussion

of natural processes.

Ecophilosopher Arne Naess^^

what he

calls "ecologism"54,

is

well

aware of the dangers of

arguing carefully that ecophilosophy

although inspired by ecology

is

not derived from
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it.

He

distinguishes

ecophilosophy from what he calls Spencer’s scientism as well as
other
attempts to systematize scientific principles by arguing that these
attempts

fail to

address the inadequate ontology of a

appraisal of nature

the whole Earth

(

is

scientific

not the Earth plus

its

maps").

Ecophilosophy, Naess contends, transcends such attempts because

it

appeals to a "broader" and more "profound" concept of nature
(Spinoza’s concept as
available

an example) rather than the limited concepts

from natural science. Distancing ecophilosophy from

ecologism, Naess explains that ecophilosophers work with
"ecologically defined

thought models’’^^. these models, serving

heuristic rather than ontological functions, are never comparable to
larger philosophical theories of knowledge.

These larger philosophical systems

to

which Naess alludes are

of

particular interest because although Naess acknowledges the faulty

nature of any attempt to derive a normative principle from a
fact, his larger

concept of nature

is

imbedded

scientific

in ecological principles.

To argue that normative statements are philosophically

prior to

and

not derived from a network of supporting non-normative statements

which he

calls h}q)otheses (since these normative

presuppose a

'total view’),

he must

with an ecological perspective.

first

which we want
to

know nature

to

to

any

other.

corroborate Spinozian ’nature’

This process resembles Hegel's

critique of the "epistemological circle":

knowledge prior

knowledge does not permit

In order to

know we must assume

know. For ecophilosophy

as seamless

judgments

this

we must presume

Hegel abandons the problems of
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"first

means

that

that in order

the holism of nature.

philosophy" phenomenologically

(experience

is

knowledge), but by doing so he abandons

philosophy (choosing knowledge without

Naess

that

we

critical that

it is

critique).

rejects as uninformative the idealists'

qualities of nature are projections of

critical

human

argument that

all

consciousness, arguing

"try to get the qualities

back

into nature"^®.

Naess believes that he can turn an Hegelian idealism on

its

head and

yet not retreat into positivism (retain the knowledge of nature outside

Although Naess acknowledges that

scientific rationality).

to describe the "thing-in-itself (nature

have

failed,

nature

which

is

attempts

beyond human apprehension)

he argues that "relations" obtain an objective

"that

is

all

quality:

in relationship to".

"We

arrive, not at the things themselves, but at networks
or fields of relations in which things participate and from
which they cannot be isolated.

Naess believes that this concept of nature transcends any single
natural science description of nature since

it

transcends constantly

changing renditions of nature, representing instead "descriptions of
certain conditions of interdependence
all

the

cultures"^®.

way we

...

universal (and)

is

typically

speak about nature since the identity principle
qualities (the fact that a

cold or hot) apprehended as genuine qualities of nature, the

fact that

something

is

both hot and cold

rather perception within a relational
relation

to

Understanding nature relationally radically transforms

cannot be violated. Not only are secondary
thing

common

and cold

in

another since

relational statements.
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all

is

field.

not a contradiction but

A

thing can be

warm

in

statements about nature are

one

Naess prefers
lends

itself to

this reconstructed concept of nature

reconceptualizing

from the total view.

all

more.

People are relational junctions within the total

which define the junction expand

The

self

grows toward the

character of nature

themselves

is

it

aspects of nature as inseparable

view, participating in a process of identification in
"relations

because

’Self."^^

comprise more and

Since the concrete

the mystique of things in

is in its relations,

removed.

to

which the

Not only does

it

make no sense

to

speak of

the projection of sense qualities (secondary and tertiary qualities), the

primary qualities (geometric-mechanical

reduced to the

qualities) are

characteristics of abstract structures, having nothing to do with reality.

We

do not project qualities onto nature; the qualities

are themselves nature.

(the relations)

Ontologically, according to Naess’

reconstruction, ecophilosophers believe themselves to have overcome
the mechanistic descriptions of nature that they believe have since the

modem

period removed nature from the everyday activity of

human

beings by restoring nature in the form of relationships.

This solution curiously resembles the Hegelian one.

overcomes Kant's ambivalence by claiming that the objects
experience are the things themselves.

view that objects are

in

some sense

"in" or

dependent on
Absolute knowledge

proceed with the phenomenological experience, but because

absolute,

it

does not need

reflection of the mind.

what

our

of consciousness, idealism

consciousness) becomes the obvious preference.
is to

of

Since for Hegel, objects of

knowledge must be wholly within the realm
(the

Hegel

to

be justified by the phenomenological

it is

self-

Hegel's theory of knowledge presupposes just

his theory calls into question;
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the possibility of absolute

knowledge.
reflection,

Hegel, by reinterpreting the "epistemologieal circle"
gains

but by proposing

it

as an

all

inclusive process, he sacrifices

critique.

Habermas
Kantian

know

error,

believes that, although Hegel correctly locates the

"What

is

demanded

is still

recommended

thus the following; we should

we

the cognitive faculty before

method"

is

know"^o, this "problematic

for methodological investigations.

Hegel's reconception of epistemology does not rectify the

philosopher's dilemma.

Since not

problematic, the philosopher

is

all

principles can be taken as

forced to

assume

the frame of

reference of a particular investigation as true for the course of the
investigation.

Although the repetition

guarantee that
of the first

all

of this process is

presumed

to

presuppositions will come into question, the choice

frame of reference and the sequence of the additional

remain arbitrary. By abandoning the
loses rational

critical

philosophy, epistemology

autonomy.

Since for the ecophilosopher conventional scientific rationality
destroys gestalt®^ experience by isolating phenomena, the possibility
that ecology might introduce holism into science represents for

ecophilosophers evidence of revolutionary thinking.

Naess suggests that philosophically the terms
distinguish themselves only

if

tom away from

While our spontaneous experience of

'fact'

Ecophilosopher

and

'value'

the gestalt of holism.

reality is

more

or less

comprehensive since experience captures the gestalt of

hang
is

"all

things

together", the philosophical import of this relational knowledge

the possibility of absolute knowledge (Naess argues that relations

transcend culture and

history).

Yet to conclude that nature
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is

Naess must presume a relaUonal mind

relational

eharacter of nature).

(the relational

Although Naess believes he has overcome the

subject-object split by absorbing both in the relation,
he has
Hegel, a space for critique

The

relation.

which

inevitability of

the philosophy of nature

Spencer-like agenda?

becomes just one more

a positivist philosophy

undeniably

is

Does Naess succeed

itself

lost, like

is

insured

when

pre-critical.

in distancing ecophilosophy from a

Compelled by a similar vision

holism, Spencer explains in his

and

of integration

First Principles 62 that the

relationship between science and philosophy reflects the fact that

while philosophers desire knowledge of the highest generality,
science

is

merely the

sum

of

knowledge formed of

their individual

contributions, lacking the knowledge constituted by the fusion of

these contributions into a whole.

more or

less separated,

all

Science consists of truths existing

and does not encompass these truths as

entirely integrated.

"But when, having been severally reduced to a simple
mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and a
law of social action, they are contemplated together as
corollaries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind
of knowledge that constitutes Philosophy proper."®^

Spencer believes that the widest generalizations of science

comprehend and consolidate the narrow
division.

In the

same way,

generalizations of

its

own

the generalizations of philosophy

comprehend and consolidate the widest

generalizations of science.

While Spencer also believes that the

relativity of

our thought

debars us from knowing or conceiving Absolute Being, he argues that
this very relativitv of

our thought necessitates the vague consciousness
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of Absolute Being.

The connectedness

of our

thought implies the

Absolute.®'^

"The reduction of the generalizations that have been set
forth to a completely integrated state exemplifies once
more the process of Evolution, and strengthens still
further the general fabric of conclusions.

Spencer believes that we

may be

certain, a priori

law which holds of every change and by unifying
the basis of Philosophy.

,

that there

all

changes

must be a
it

must be

Like Naess, Spencer argues for a quality that

transcends traditional concepts of nature, arguing that
interconnection underlies phenomena.
that the process of Evolution

Unknown and
underlies

all

is

Thus, Spencer's argument

the fundamental principle of the

the most general principle of the

human

Known which

consciousness (subjective) and

all

(object) parallels the ecophilosophical effort to rebuild

of nature

an ecological

ontology in the wake of the Kantian "epistemological turn".

C.
1

critical

The Idea

of Nature Reconsidered

have intentionally reorganized ecophilosophy around a prephilosophy of nature in order

consequences of

to

this kind of framework.

examine the ideological
This

way

of analyzing

ecophilosophy prioritizes the epistemological debate in which
believe the field

is

embedded. Although

larger implications of this debate

on the

1

1

consider in chapter four the

potentiality of a

rationality, the point here is to substantiate

my

new

scientific

characterization of

ecophilosophy and to underscore the negative implications that

While the intent of ecophilosophy

is to

move from

ethics to

ontology and back (Naess), this ontological emphasis shifts the
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result.

attention of ecophilosophers

the problem of knowledge

away from a more primary concern

itself.

This philosophical disposition

divulges the positivist proclivity of

from the arena of

human

concerned with the

politics.

for

its

advocates by removing nature

Although ecophilosophers are

implementation of ecophilosophy, they

political

avoid deeply unresolved issues by underlying their political
discussions

with a universal concept of nature. The

'total view'

predisposes

ecophilosophers to believe that the possibility of knowledge of nature
is

non-problematic and that with the correct view the appropriate

social

and

political

agenda immediately

follows.

Take as a current and relevant example the AIDS

From

virus.

the perspective of a universal, ecological framework, the survival of the
virus

is

worthy of consideration since

in the larger planetary

the virus might serve a valuable purpose (population control,

system
Yet

etc.).

the political reality of carrying out a policy based on this "fact"

is

overwhelmingly racist and class-based. The ecophilosophical agenda
(as

I

have characterized

concretely positive

it)

manner

is

impotent

since

it

to

respond

has sacrificed

to this

dilemma

its critical

in a

stance to

a larger evaluation scheme (the good of the planet).
If

ecophilosophy

this confusion?

An

is

so obviously ineffectual,

what

are the roots of

explanation of ecophilosophical thinking

essentially the product of three historians®^

is

whose work serves the

ecophilosophical community's need to explain what Nash calls "one of
the most remarkable ideas of our time: the belief that ethical standing

does not begin and end with

human

beings"®^.

It is

possible in these

histories to substantiate the pre-critical philosophy of nature that

have attributed

to ecophilosophical theory.

152

I

Although these histories

reflect disparate influences,

they serve to affirm the ecophilosopher's

universal concept of nature.

dominations of

women and

(Merchant argues that the parallel
nature match the loss of a more

feminine /holistic concept of nature while Worster traces the idea in
the context of the development of the science of ecology and

Nash

situates environmental ethics in the liberal tradition of inherent
rights).

Nowhere

in ecophilosophical literature (Leiss excluded) does a

suggestive philosophical discussion of the political implications of an

acceptable concept of nature occur, yet from these three histories

can abstract the trends that underlie
nature

’econature’.

is pre-critical (the possibility of

problematic),

its

character

knowledge

ecophilosopher's

call to liberate

nature

nature bears the same relationship

is

to all

Ecophilosophical
is

non-

idea of nature determines

is idealistic (our

our social interactions) and from these two

we

follows that the

it

counterideological since

men and women.

Paralleling

the histories written by early positivists the histories of ecophilosophy
reinforce its belief in

itself.

Historical analysis reflects the idealism

ecophilosophical theory:
externality

and

in

our Idea of nature transcends nature's

materiality.

nature from mind,

embedded

Although Naess,

in

tries to materialize this Idea

qualities are not the product of

human

an attempt

to

remove

by arguing that natural

perception but the result of the

relational character of nature, his effort merely reflects the ambiguity

of econature.

It is

reveal nature as

it

a goal of ecophilosophers
really

is)

in order to

nature

model our behavior on

yet, unlike the early positivists, eco-thinkers
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to instaurate

it

such as Naess are

(to

and

fully

aware of the impact of

modem

such knowledge. Although the

epistemology on the tenuous nature of
fate of ecophilosophy turns

on

resolving this tension, on adequately addressing the problem of

knowledge

(since ecophilosophers insist that the reconceptualization

of nature is vital to their theory), ecophilosophers circumvent the

issue by focusing on the revolutionary quality of a

new

(unproblematic)

image of nature.

Much

of the confusion revolves

a 'paradigm'®®.

around the use

of the concept of

Ecophilosophers argue that since paradigms or world

views determine historical epoches, a particular view of nature

determines the culture's social interactions as well as
with the rest of nature. Carolyn Merchant's analysis
that not only have ideas of nature dominated
idealistic quality meike

concept of nature.

it

human

its

interactions

reflects this belief

actions,

but their

possible to revolutionize society with a

Merchant argues, tracking concepts

new

of nature from

primitive holism to mechanicism, that since the mechanistic image of

nature (closely bound to science and patriarchy) has
original social vision, the roots of

pre-modem images

change must

of the earth as

a

lie

failed to elicit its

in reconstructed

living organism.

This vision

unabashedly stated by ecophilosopher Alan Drengson.

"We believe that constmcting an environmental ethic in
the absence of getting at the deeper stmctures of modem
Western consciousness will not penetrate to the roots of
our current problems." "We undertake to do this by
comparing and contrasting what we call the technocratic
mind-set with the pernetarian (persons in networks of
planetary relationships) approach. The first is shallow in
its ecological understanding, the latter is characterized by
deep and deepening insight into the diversity of ecological
values that characterize our world and Nature as It is in
Itself."®®
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is

While

for

Merchant the

failure of this mechanistic

reflected in the flagrant

domination of

image of nature

women and

is

destructive

manipulation of nature, she makes the deeper, ecophilosophical

argument that our Ideas about nature take on both a normative and
paradigmatic character, directing
quality of these ideas.

human

Merchant argues,

behavior.

is to

The deterministic

be found in an historical

analysis of our attitudes toward nature.

How

does the evidence hold up? Merchant's reconstruction

from the perspective of people's attitudes toward nature reveals that
into the sixteenth century, the root
self,

society

and the cosmos

is

metaphor binding together the

that of an organism.

Renaissance view was that all things were
permeated by life, there being no adequate method by
which to designate the inanimate from the animate. It was
difficult to differentiate between living and nonliving
things, because of the resemblance in structures.
"In general, the

Merchant suggests that

this Idea of nature limits

what

is

acceptable

Renaissance behavior as evidenced in the sixteenth century debates
about mining; the restraining force of beneficent mother Earth
restricts

access to precious metals.

"The earth does not conceal and remove from our eyes
those things which are useful and necessary to mankind,
but, on the contrary, like a beneficent and kindly mother
she yields in large abundance from her bounty and brings
into the light of day the herbs, vegetables, grains, and
fruits, and trees. The minerals, on the other hand, she
buries far beneath in the depth of the ground, therefore
they should not be sought.

Merchant believes that

this perception reveals the normative force of

the image of nature as a nurturing mother under whose influence
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men

and women

of the

pre-modern age carried out

their interactions with

nature.

Merchant characterizes the core concepts

mechanism and

same normative

Since paradigmatic shifts occur
(as

modem

world,

the domination of nature paradigmatically by arguing

that these images carry the

framework

of the

when

force as

stress is put

pre-modern ones.

on the old

ecophilosophers characterize paradigm change), the

locus of stress in this case. Merchant argues,

is

and technology and the resulting commercial

revolution.

the advance of science

Moral

restraint affiliated with the Renaissance image of the female earth is

overcome by greed and

is

vindicated by a

new framework

reconceptualization of nature), reversing constraints.

(Bacon's

Finally she

suggests that the growing dissatisfaction from dominated

women and

the increasing concern for the destruction of nature can act as the

present counterforce against this mechanistic view, heralding a

new

view of nature ('econature').

Where do our changing

ideas of nature

come from? Merchant's

analysis of the transition from holism to mechanicism reveals that she
believes herself privy to
of history.

an

ecological perspective,

an earth's eye view

Consider again her analysis of industrialization; since the

premodem peasant ecosystem

carried a source of instability (the

hierarchical structure of landlord domination), this, combined with

population pressure and technological innovation, results in significant

impacts on resources by different interest groups and changes in the

whole ecosystem.
exactions

ward

off

means

Population growth exacerbated by landlord
that eventually there

is

not enough land per person to

famine in a poor harvest year, resulting in the growth of
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cities

and a bourgeois

class of entrepreneurs

who

of strong national states, undercutting the
nobility.

The emerging

-with

power

of regional landlord

capitalist society bases itself

exploitation of natural resources

nature

help fund the development

condoned by a

on the

utilitarian

dramatic effects on social events and

human

view of

welfare.

Although Merchant correctly characterizes the influence of
capitalist structures

on

social relations, her preoccupation with natural

images betrays her underlying idealism. Merchant argues that

mechanism by eliminating from
value, purpose,

the description of nature concepts of

harmony, quality and form which are central

older organic description of nature (replacing
efficient

to the

them with material and

causes, matter and force) becomes the

vital principle for

Things rather than relations are conceptualized

restructuring society.

as ultimate reality. Francis Bacon: "By art and the hand of man, nature

can then be forced out of her natural
In this way,

state

and squeezed and molded.

human knowledge and human power meet

Merchant argues that

this Idea of nature, serving as a

mankind's manipulative

activities

enlightened Idea of holism.

as one."

foil

for

can be undermined with an

However, her analysis directly contradicts

the historically ideological function of the 'mastery of nature' to

the continued domination of

undisputed respect

By arguing

some men and women because

of

an

for nature.

that nature imperialism

is

the Baconian heritage,

ecophilosophers are led to believe that the liberation of nature

merely the repudiation of the Baconian enthusiasm

positivist

is

for its

manipulation. Yet the ideological power of Bacon s position

found in the

mask

is to

be

elements of his concept of nature (since nature
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has the same relationship

to all

men and women,

everyone

will profit

from increased knowledge and technological manipulation).

Clearly

everyone has not. The revolutionary capacity of a critique of Bacon
to

be found not by supplanting his

reexamining the

way a

'view' of

is

nature with another, but by

universal concept of nature threatens continued

unequal distributions of power.

To characterize the ecophilosophical and
reconstruction (as characterized by Merchant);

historical

the

inherit a world view (the sanctity of nature) from

pre-modems

which emerges

sanctions on various activities (the sacred character of mother earth).
Since the idea of nature functions normatively, moderns distinguish

themselves

when

they break with this paradigmatic holism, replacing

sanctions against the manipulation of nature by wanton enthusiasm for
"probing the secrets of nature".
desires of this shift in a

new

In doing so, they

tme

the

ontology of nature (nature as machine).

Since the driving force behind this shift

dominate and a

mask

is

a patriarchal need to

modern

capitalist drive to exploit, the fruits of the

paradigm are the domination of women and the destmction

of nature,

producing incessant greed and unhappiness. The dawning new
paradigm, "sustainable technology practices, wholeness of

communities and gentle
restoration

life

and recreation

styles"^^^

of a

self,

healthy

depends upon the conscious

new image

of nature that

normatively to constrain once again the kinds of

may

activities

function

which

dominate and coerce.

The epistemological status
troubling.

of these historical images

is

Clearly the pre-modern sanctions on particular uses of

nature issues from a sanctified fear of disturbing natural processes.
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It

is

against unrealistic superstition that sixteenth century thinkers

begin to reconceptualize the relationship between

drudgery of work. As
although the
expresses

human

itself

critical theorists

human

Horkheimer and Adorno argue,

desire to separate from nature

most

clearly in

Enlightenment

undisputable positive goal of liberating the
dialectically related to the

thinking to dominate

all

is

an old one,

rhetoric.

human

overwhelming tendency

spheres of

and the

life

The

condition
for

it

is

instrumental

life.

While ecophilosophers believe that the

possibility that

we can

reconceptualize ourselves as 'reabsorbed' into nature radically shifts

all

philosophical thinking, their suggestion merely circumvents without

responding to
observing that

tlie

it

tyranny of knowledge.

is

It

prevents them from

the success (not failure) of the

modem

science and

technology which underlies the reconceptualization of econature since
it is

the material comfort of late moderns coupled with the increasing

potential for widespread satisfaction of need that has allowed the

wealthier to 'risk

all'

vision has a not so

in a not so

new utopian

new component

This not so

vision.

new

(the ideology of nature) that

continues to jeopardize the autonomy of the less powerful as

it

gains

influence.

Before

I

conclude with an analysis of the insidious character of

such an ideology

of nature in order to better understand the

paradigmatic idealism of ecophilosophy, Donald Worster's analysis of
the connections between the science of ecology and econature
highlights the ecophilosopher's epistemological bind.
tradition,

Worster records

reflects social

and

how

In a

Kuhnian

the use of metaphor in science73

historical events.
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Since science

is

not sealed tight

against the influence of culture, despite
science

is

not invulnerable to radical social

correctly'^4 ^hat since science is

moral perception,
fabric of

its

thought

claims to neutrality,
shifts.

He argues

always involved in matters of value and

scientific facts are

interwoven with the general

(the goal of his inquiry).

Worster argues that although

ecology does not have an easy identification with any particular moral

philosophy (an ecophilosophy), radically shifting in
affiliations

by

and

ecologists,

of the

goals, true "ecological consciousness" although inspired

comes

modern

its historical

to

have a tenuous relationship with the advocates

science of ecology.

Worster argues that the longing

for

holism found in

ecophilosophical thought reappears throughout the history of ecology,
reflecting

an on-going tension between empiricist and romanticist

elements

who both

positions.

claim ecological evidence to support their

The stunning

fact of the history of ecological

the appeal of holism leads

many

to

impute

to ecology

thought

to sort

through the delicate relationship between

that has plagued ethical thought.
ecological results

and

utilize

How

that

a normative

character unlike any other science.^® For the ecophilosopher

having

is

fact

means

it

and value

does a thinker both embrace

those principles to create a new vision of

nature ethics?

D.

An

The various ways

Ecophilosophical Response

that ecophilosophers have wrestled with this

question determines the variations as well as the controversies in
ecophilosophical theory.

Clearly ecophilosophers would reject

my

characterization of the philosophy of nature that underlies their
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broader claims. They would argue that ecological
in a

new

conceptualization of nature, transcends

rationality, evident

all

epistemological categories (including positivism).

Holmes Rolston77 suggests that an environmental
ecologically

formed because

that guide each

the earth.

human

it

old

Ecophilosopher
ethic is in principle

serves as the basis of the moral values

generation in exercising

its

stewardship over

While the boundary between science and ethics

is

precise

if

the two categories are accepted as distinctly descriptive and
prescriptive, Rolston argues that

Following Aldo Leopold:
integrity, stability

when

it

A

thing

and beauty

tends otherwise.

eco- ethics that bridges the gap.

it is

is

right

when

of the biotic

You ought

it

tends to preserve the

community.

It is

wrong

to recycle, for recycling preserves

the ecosystem, and you ought to preserve the integrity of the

ecosystem because the integrity of the ecosystem has value.
Rolston argues that evaluative principles and descriptive ones

simultaneously emerge in ecological thought, so that while the
ecologist 'discovers' stability

because we are inclined

and

diversity, these principles are located

to search with a (natural) disposition to value

them.

"What is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage
and mutual transformation of ecologies description and
evaluation is that here an "ought" is not so much derived
from an "is" as discovered simultaneously with it. "78

The mood

of ecological ethics is to dissolve the

humans and

boundary between

the world in order to expand one's Self into the system,

collapsing the distinction between self interest and ecological

consciousness.

Enlightened

human

interest is

as anthropocentric because the world
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is

no longer recognizable

radically recast, partly

tJirough

new

realization of fact (interdependence, environmental

fitness, hydrologic cycles,

population rhythms, and feedback loops)

and partly through the ecophilosophical transformation
concepts.

Ecology represents the occasion

of these

for recreating the world.

Rolston;

"The perils of transposing from a new science to a new
world view, patent in the history of scientific thought, are
surpassed only by the perils of omitting to do so. Granted
that we yet lack a clear account of the logic by which we
get our values, it seems undeniable that we shape them in
significant measure in accord with our notion of the kind
of universe that we live in. Science has in centuries before
us upset those values by reappraising the character of the
universe. One has but to name Copernicus and Newton, in
addition to our observation that we have lately lived in the
shadow of Darwin. The ecological revolution may be of a
similar order; it is undeniable at work reilluminating the
world. There would be something magnificent about an
evolution of consciousness that circumscribed the
whole.

Rolston's suggestion that Barry

"nature

knows

Commoner's

third

law of ecology,

best" captures the effort of ecophilosophy highlights

the curiously normative character of this science.
If

nature knows best, Rolston contemplates what

to "follow nature".

He suggests

nature in an "absolute" sense

conduct

is

is

it

would mean

that while the notion of following
unsatisfactory (meaning that

all

human

natural inasmuch as the laws of nature operate on us; we

cannot help but follow nature), following nature in an
sense means that

humans do

"artifactual"

things for reasons, thus distinguishing

themselves from a nature that runs automatically. Yet following nature
in this "relative"

may be

way means human

designed more closely in

162

acts,

line

although always deliberate,

with nature and thus be more

"natural" so that

unnatural

it is

human

possible to distinguish between natural

With

acts.

this distinction

it is

and

possible to follow

nature in a "homeostatic" sense, recognizing that some actions
help
retain stability in the ecosystem

element emerges only from

human

"imitative" ethical sense is to

can look
to

make

to nature as
its

and others do
interest.

among our

values one

the moral

Still,

Following nature in an

argue that nature

more than a realm

not.

to

itself is

of facts,

goals, guiding

moral and we

we can

follow nature

our conduct by these

values. This leads us to follow nature in a "tutorial" sense in order to

share the gestalt of a larger moral virtue of natural attunement. This
the "ecological consciousness" about which ecophilosophy

is

is

concerned.
Yet Rolston’s analysis does not undercut the ambivalent lure of
ecology which underscores the pre-critical status of ecophilosophy.

He must assume that which he wishes

to

demonstrate, the universal

character of nature. Although the potentially disastrous consequences
of

human

intervention into nature's processes in the absence of

knowledge

ecological

making,

to

a radically
scientists

use

is

having profound impact on world-wide policy-

this data to

support the contention that we are ripe

new view of nature confounds

the issue.

would argue that the only change

is

a

While

for

many

new understanding

of

natural processes brought about through advancing scientific research,

ecophilosophers

make

the claim that the emergence of the

"ecological consciousness" paradigmatically replaces the

instrumentality of a Bacon. Yet Bacon himself

made

observations about the tenuous relationship between

development and our knowledge of nature.
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similar

human

new

Although the "Age
it

brings with

it

a new

of Ecology"

human

surrounds us. the suggestion that

consciousness underscores the

assumption that human consciousness

is

the result of a series of

paradigmatic shifts thereby demonstrating that ecophilosophers

assume that which they want

to believe.

Although ecophilosophers

back away from the suggestion that nature
the implication

is

offers

any kind

of absolute,

that in the absence of God, the return to nature

be our only choice. While they support the

our

effort to recreate

relationship to the earth, they are ambivalent about the process.
is

science that points us to a

because not only

is

new view

of nature,

If it

we must be wary

science by nature always shifting ground,

character has contributed to the immediate

may

its

crisis.

This reflects a general trend in ecophilosophy to embrace the
principles of ecology while berating the scientific world view.

suggested, the general tendency

is to

As

an

give to ecology

epistemologically quasi-transcendental status, to suggest that a

form of rationality

is

emerging

1

(ecological rationality)

new

which can

determine a new way by which we can know the world. Although
ecological rationality is offered as a 'new science' motivated

something other than a technical interest over nature,
transcend

its scientific

roots until a

new philosophy

Knowledge

upon

its

and

its

accepted

of nature remains problematic, trapped in

epistemological circle.
technical

does not

of nature sorts out

the ambivalence created by the use of 'ecology' out of
context.

it

by

an

Ecophilosophers refuse to lodge nature in the

cognitive character of science

results to verify that

and yet are dependent

which they assume
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to

be

true.

As Roderick Nash suggests, although the
appears

to

liberation of nature

merely extend the growing expansion of rights

to

an

increasingly inclusive community, the result of expanding rights to

nature turns traditional liberal thinking on
analysis the status of

human

life is

its

suspect

humans). The expansion of the community
all of

nature muddles

all

abandon the attempt

In the

of these eco-groups (the

final

owls =

of ethical agents to include

most

intelligible the

radical cases eco-

altogether, perceiving themselves as

soldiers in the defense of free-nature.®^

some

(trees = spotted

previous attempts to render

process of ethical decision-making.
activists

head since in the

The almost

fascist doctrine of

needs of natural systems shadow that

of

the individual) highlights the reactionary dilemma facing an

ecophilosophical ethic (nature ideology).

Although the radical fringe

are essentially dismissed as misunderstanding the efforts of the eco-

movement, the problem

is

central to ecophilosophy

and derives from

the universal character of the ecophilosophy of nature.

The interpenetration
ecophilosophy.
a

new

As

I

of knowledge

and morality plagues

suggested, although ecophilosophers believe that

construct of nature

will

fit

both our growing

scientific

understanding of natural processes and our growing need
sensitivity,

due

to

an

for global

insufficient analysis of nature, a positivist

proclivity informs their philosophy.

1

examine below the kind

of

confused thinking that results when nature takes on an ideological
function, obscuring the real conditions of society

dominant power

relations.
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and

stabilizing

E.

The

The Ideology

Nature

of

fate of the Native peoples of the circumpolar arctic is

any fourth world

particularly suggestive (as

culture) of the

inadequacies of an ecophilosophical policy rooted in an ideological
nature philosophy. This

is

not to suggest that the kinds of solutions

being worked out between Native peoples and others necessarily
reflect the pitfalls

1

am

describing.

only wish to suggest that an

1

ideological nature theory tends to retain current power structures

despite

its

reworked rhetoric due

to its underlying contention that

nature bears the same relationship to
vehicle for global unity

and

all

people. Although devised as a

identification,

1

believe holism

(biocentrism) acts to fortify entrenched barriers between interest

groups.

me

Let

begin with a short, personal narrative.

Based

in the

Brooks Range on one

wild terrain

left in

the United States, the arctic tundra of Alaska, in

of the largest tracts of truly

the northernmost mountains in North America, our study site

sheep

lick

scientific

to

two hours from our camp. Our goal

is to

is

a Dahl

use a short term

research project along with intensive 'classroom' instruction

expose a group of college students

to

Alaskan natural history,

resource management and environmental issues.

hour observation post near the sheep

We

establish a 24-

lick to record the activity

pattern of the sheep as they use the lick to enrich their diets with salt

and mineral
the arctic

rich rock.

summer

silence that

The sun barely

night;

dips below the horizon during

we must approach

matches the desolation

As our group huddles around

the lick with the

of the arctic.

spotting scopes one

2:00 am), watching and dutifully recording the
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same

dusk (about

activity of the sheep.

almost simultaneously we become aware of being watched. Searching
the horizon,

1

spot a lone wolf, not

sighting of a wolf

and yet

its

produces an almost universal

fifty

it

It is

not our

first

ghostly presence and mild curiosity

on the group.

effect

overwhelming sense of intimacy with

and then, as

meters away.

We

feel

an

this animal, a kind of kinship,

strides silently out of sight, a feeling of gratitude for the

privilege of being in the creature’s presence.

experience at various times since then
feelings so easily aroused

I

Reflecting on the

have come

to believe that the

by these natural encounters

curious combination of compassion and desire in

admire the vulnerability and 'otherness' of the

my

disclose a

psyche. While

wolf, at the

I

same time

I

crave to transcend the boundary that keeps us apart.

On

our return from our observation post we spot two caribou

carcasses shot out of season and
drying rack.

We

hung

to dry

on a hand-fashioned

we

speculate that they are the cache of two Inupiat

had met doing work

in the

same

area.

Climbing up

to their caribou-

hide tent situated on a shelf above the tundra, they invite us to join

them

for tea.

their

animal skins and

In the course of a short conversation surrounded

CB

radios,

I

am

by

aware of the distinct possibility

that they do not share our feelings about nature.

My inclination

to

impress upon them the ecological consequences of uncontrolled

hunting pressure wanes in the wake of

because

my

theirs, the

experience of nature

is

gap between myself and

my dawning

realization that

inextricably interwoven with

my new

friends

is

more daunting

then that between myself and the wolf. What bearing could
experience of nature have on these people?
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my

This incident

is

even more disturbing on a larger scale, as

evidenced by the growing pressure on Nabve peoples

use of nature. Called subsistence by non-Nabves,
nature

is

defend their

use

this traditional

of

being called into question by both those who desire the same

sort of special permit access to

on the

to

game resources and

fight for the protection of wildlife.

subsistence

is

and a

lifestyle

carry

Yet Natives contend that

not simply an issue of access

continuation of a

who

those

to

a resource,

it is

the

culture.

"The culture and the life of my native people are the
subsistence way of life. It goes hand in hand with our own
culture, our own language, and all our activities."®^

Some non-Natives argue
the cash

that Native lifestyles are rapidly changing as

economy spreads, improving access

to efficient

forms of

technology to capture game and widening the possibilities
easier

life

an

on the harsh tundra. Natives contend that wage

employment remains low
the

for

community

is

used

in

to

most

villages

and money that comes

into

improve the success of the hunt which

benefits everyone in the community.

Since Native peoples have neither aboriginal rights

to utilize the

land (they are subject to outside regulation by state and federal
organizations) or political power. Native

nature

is

non-existent.

understand the

autonomy over

their

use of

This contrasts sharply with non-Natives

political realities of

who

land use accessible only through

various political channels. Traditionally internal 'regulation' of the
utilization of nature in Native cultures

the utilization of nature

is

works

for the simple

a cultural rather than

reason that

political event.

begins when children first accompany their parents in
search of wild foods, and learn that their is always a
"It
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way to do things and an elder's story to provide
meaning. Myths and tales tell of the origins of land,
plants, animals and people and of the necessary
relationships among them that must be honored and

practical

observed.
Yet this peaceful, relatively apolitical existence
rights are reassessed

Natives are 'given'

is

uprooted

by outside governmental decree.

title

when

land

In 1971, Alaska

to forty-four million acres of land (about one-

tenth of Alaska), but rather than leaving land use in the hands of tribal

governments,

ANSCA

(Alaska Native Settlements Claims Act) requires

that Native corporations be established to administer and hold

the lands.

As expected, the corporations

dwindles and the use of nature

is

title to

flounder. Native sovereignty

increasingly politicized.

Feeling the

victim of this kind of cultural invasion. Native peoples network to set

up

their

own circumpolar

organizations to try to meet on equal footing

the entrenched power structures of the

The

'first- world'.

particularly insidious character of this confrontation

in essence inspired

my

analysis of eco-thinking

is

the rhetoric around

the 'conflict' between Native peoples and environmentalists.
is

the ecophilosophical

apolitical

dogma

and transcends

beliefs of Native

that suggests that nature

cultural boundaries.

The

which

At issue

itself is

religion,

values and

groups are repeatedly used as evidence of a more

harmonious view

of nature. J. Baird Callicott paints a particularly

romantic view of these people:
"I

have claimed that the typical traditional American

Indian attitude was to to regard all features of the
environment as enspirited. These entities possessed a
consciousness, reason, and volition, no less intense and
complete than a human being's. One blood flows through
all; one spirit has divided itself and enlivened all things
with a consciousness that is essentially the same."®^

169

Callicott argues that the 'world view' of the

the

new view

of nature suggested to

we can use as

American Indian matches

us by ecological concepts which

the necessary conceptual framework for embracing a

biocentric perspective.
In contrast, ecophilosopher

Tom

ReganS4 argues that

Western thinkers the Native American's relationship

to

for

nature

will

always be ambiguous. No matter what the historical fact since we have
already defined the nature of the problem,
ask:

Does

it

mean

we

will

always be able to

that Natives viewed nature as inherently valuable or

was nature simply a storehouse

The character

of resources?

of this

debate highlights the underlying ecophilosophical stance that since
views of nature can be evaluated, an absolute perspective

is

obtainable.

This uncompromising ecological perspective places people such as the
Native Alaskans in an uncomfortable position. Either they

must

acknowledge their pantheistic roots and behave accordingly or they
are patronized by

The

real

an

attitude of distrust.

enemy, the

political

they stand to lose whatever

and economic

is left of their

realities

shrinking autonomy are

covered over by this powerful, large-scale eco-rhetoric.
particularly the

media takes on the character

domination because of

its

by which

of

Most

an instrument

of

persuasive nature, the access to which

is

so

dependent upon wealth and power. Although acknowledged as the
primary tool of manipulation used by developers and
advertisers, eco-thinkers
first- world

fail to

capitalist

analyze the manipulative effects of the

countries' environmental campaigns.

The situation

of aboriginal peoples illuminates the inherent

danger in a philosophy of nature which claims
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itself privy to

a universal

ethical position.

Failing to understand the impact of the 'problem
of

knowledge' on the

political

character of philosophical positions, the

ontology of nature adhered to by ecophilosophers
identical to that of

is

essentially

Bacon and other sixteenth century

To

thinkers.

present the dilemma of domination ideology as the conflict of two

views of nature

miss the fact that universality

is to

traditional ethical discourse

has

failed.

The

ecophilosophers’ nature philosophy hides

plight of fourth world cultures
integrity

and the use

the reason that

political neutrality of

oppressive content.

its

Since the theory lacks any contextual clout,

is

it

cannot respond

to the

where the bond between cultural

of nature is inseparable.

In the absence of a

undistorted communication between Natives and their oppressors,

I

agree with 'Phomas Berger that in this unfolding struggle, "Alaska's

subsistence peoples occupy the moral high ground"®^.

As
project

I

have already acknowledged, while the impetus

comes from

my own

Alaskan experience, the philosophical

inspiration derives from a suggestion
implicit in

any caU

for this

by William Leiss that the

to the liberation of nature is that rather

becoming a rational concept,

it

risk

than

remains a counterideology. As Leiss

points out, since the ruling ideology (the domination of nature)

is

a

visible indicator of far-ranging social contradictions,

comprehended and
transcended, the ideology itself comes under increasing
attack from counterideologies; and most importantly of all,
"...(i)f

this contradiction is not

genuinely progressive aspects may be engulfed in the
hatred aroused by the negative conditions with which it

its

becomes

associated."®®

Although the mastery of nature
great

human

task that benefits

is

formulated in universal terms as the

all,
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in fact

it

becomes

less a grand

universal enterprise than a

means

of upholding the interests of

partieular ruling groups. This failure,

1

have argued,

is

implieit in the

universal status of nature (the absorption of the philosophy of nature
into the philosophy of seienee).

Talk of the liberation of nature

when

expressed as merely a displeasure with the prevailing behavior and

thought patterns in the absence of a critique of nature ideology
counterideological

is

as Leiss points out in the case of fascist dogma,

or,

a dangerous weapon against rationalism

(the

means

to evaluate

a

Since the mere substitution of ideas

political agenda).

(counterideology)

purely abstract, the result cannot of

is

itself

improve

social relations.

Historically the idea of the mastery of nature instigated

upon outmoded
and

have argued,

1

its

and philosophical dogmas. As

Leiss explains

lasting positive aspect (as formulated by Bacon)

break the tyrannical hold of despair over the consciousness

is "to

human
men

scientific

an attack

and

technical possibilities

to

of

encourage the conviction that

could fundamentally alter the material conditions of existence.

Its

negative dimension (so well disguised in Bacon's

its

exclusive focus on

modem

New

science and technology as the

designated instruments for the mastery of nature and

mask

Atlantis) is

its ability to

the connection between their development on the one hand,

and the persistence

of social conflict

and

political

domination on the

other.

Ecophilosophers argue that the idea of the domination of nature
is

the result

of;

(1)

modem

philosophy's epistemological support for

viewing scientific thought as the basis for the

nature (positivism),

(2)

modern

human

mastery over

science's fundamentally
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instrumentalist conceptual structure and thus a priori technological
character,

and

(3)

capitalist society's greed.

Yet none of these views

adequately portrays the historical function of mastery over nature
as a
crucial ideology in

modem

society.

The flaw

in the ecophilosophical

formulation of the concept of the mastery of nature
it

is

that

it

presents

as a static image rather than an intensely dynamic historical process.

Clearly the Baconian rendition

makes sense only

in a religious context.

Since neither reason or religion are capable of preventing the search
for

power over nature from becoming

account

for the

nature.

The

change

self-destructive, they do not

in the subject as the subject actively

illusion fostered is that the activity

mastery of nature

an enlightened

is

pursued

is itself

commands

through which the

"mastered" (under the control of

social interest).

"The idea of the mastery of nature must be reinterpreted
such a way that its principal focus is ethical or moral
development rather than scientific and technological

in

innovation.

This transition from domination to liberation more correctly concerns
the gradual understanding and self-disciplining of

human

nature

rather than the reconceptualization of external nature.
Liberation of nature

is

liberation of

Leiss that the liberation of science

positivism

is

human

nature.

I

agree with

and technology from the

thrall of

a task that primarily involves the reconstmction of social

institutions.

"The present secular context requires a very different
interpretation, namely, one in which mastery of nature is
understood as an advanced stage in human consciousness

wherein intelligence is able to regulate its relationship to
nature (internal and external) in such a way as to minimize
the self-destructive aspects of
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human

desires."®^

While

much
and

analytic

of nature ethics are either romantic

uninteresting, the general problem motivating theories

such as deep ecology and ecofeminism
decide

what

to

do with our

scientific

Hannah Arendt

suggests in The

question of the

first

think about what

we

We

in Biophilia^h

provocative.

How

do we

Condition Qo this

a political

is

be answered by professional

need a

are doing".

is

and technological know-how? As

Human

order, not to

scientists or politicians.

dilemma

and vacuous or

political

theory that allows us

E.O. Wilson described this

As human beings we are drawn

to

human

both nature

and machine. Since our machines tame nature and deprive
control,

we come

to regret the loss of

untamed nature. A

"to

it

of

vision of

how

ecophilosophy might positively respond to these larger questions

completes this project.

^Alan Drengson. Beyond Environmental Crisis; From Technocrat to Planetary Person,
(New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
^The use of the term ecology is an important aspect of any examination of the work of
ecophUosophers. On the outset, it would appear that 'ecology' is used equivocally by
ecophilosophers. An examination of the way in which ecophilosophers make use of the
concept is a sub-theme of this chapter. Ame Naess describes the situation this way:
"The expression 'ecology' is infused with many meanings. (By it I mean) the
interdisciplinary scientific study of the living conditions of organisms in interaction
with each other and with the surroundings, organic as well as inorganic." "...the aspect
of the science of ecology that is most important is the fact that it is concerned first of all
with relationships between entities as an essential component of what these entities
are in themselves." "This approach can have application in many fields of inquiry hence the growing influence of the subject of ecology outside its original biological
domain." 'This (the approach of ecology that 'all thmgs hang together') has application
to and overlaps with the problems in philosophy: the placement of humanity in nature,
and the search for new kinds of explanation of this through the use of systems emd
relational perspectives." "The study of these problems common to ecology and
philosophy shall be called ecophilosophy." from Ame Naess, Ecology commun ity and
lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pg. 36.
^A term introduced in ecophdosophical literature (see Ame Naess, Ecology, community
and lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)) to describe nature that is
free of human domination. The precise character of 'free nature' is the focus of this
,

.

.

chapter.

McCloskey in Ecological Ethics and Politics (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield,
1983) on page 25 makes a case for the conservative nature of eco-thinking: "Although
the ecological crisis movement advances radical proposals regarding resource use.

^H.

J.
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population control, pollution, and protection of the environment,
it is essentially
conservative in the sense of seeking to sustain the status
quo." He compares his
analysis to Karl Marx's condemnation of Malthus. Marx;
'The hatred of the English
working class against Malthus - 'the mounteband parson' as
Cobbett rudely calls him-is
therefore entirely justified. The people were right in sensing
instinctively that thev
were confronted not with a man of science but a bought advocate
a pleader on behalf of
their enemies a shameless sycophant of the ruling
classes"(from Marx and F.n^pl*; nn
^
Malthus ed. RL. Meek. (New York: New York International.
1954K
^see Andrew McLaughlin, "Images and Ethics of Nature". Environmental F.thie«i 7
.

’

(1985).

^McLaughlin, pg. 311.
^McLaughlin, pg. 299.
®These eco-historles include: Carolyn Merchant. The Death of Nature (New York:
Harper & Row, 1980), Donald Worster, Nature's Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1977) and Roderick F. Nash, The Rghts of Nature: A History of Environmental
Ethics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
^For an overview of 'ecophilosophical' literature see Donald E. Davis. Ecoohilosophy:
A_Field Guide to the Literature which lists relevant authors and includes a list of both
environmental and ecophilosophical periodicals, journals and newsletters.
l^see Rchard Sylvan. "A Critiaue of Deep Ecology". Fiadical Philosonhv. 40 and 4
.

.

i

(1985).
^

^John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature (1974), pg. 3.
is my term to describe the character of ecophilosophical thinking: the use
.

^^This

concepts to Inspire a social agenda.
^^Aldo, Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York; Ballantine Books. 1966),

of

scientific

.

^
^

pg. 239.

"^Sylvan, pg. 5.

^Leopold, pg. 246.
borrow this term from Habermas.

^^This is my term which
ecophilosophy.

I

use

to Indicate the epistemological character of

1®A particularly complete analysis of this disposition is found In Carolyn Merchant's
Death of Nature
^^Donald Worster traces eco- thinking to Gilbert White (The Natural History of
Selbome (1788) New York, 1899), suggesting that he is one of the first to express what is
now come to be known as "ecological consciousness".
.

.

2CHvorster. pg. 29.

21 Worster, pg. 71.

22”The Greek word oikos, meaning house, is the root of both "economics" and "ecology".
Over time the significance shifted from the house itself to what it contained: a living
community, the household. Economics, the older of the two concepts, concerns the
study of how the community manages its time, labor and material resources. Ernst
Haeckel, the German Darwinian, coined the term "oecologie" in 1866." (from Nash, pg.
55)

Naess. "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A
Inquiry 16; pp. 95-100.
24Ame Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle (ECL) (Cambridge: Cambridge

23Ame

Summary"

.

University Press, 1989), pg. 19.

25Nash, pg. 58.
26Nash, pg. 71.
27Nash, pg. 28.
28rhis is a common theme is ecophilosophical literature fully developed by Lynn
White. Jr. who in 1967 wrote a scathing attack on the ChrisUan attitude toward nature:
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"The Historical Fioots of our Ecological Crisis". Science 10 (March.
1967). Vol. 155, pp
1203“ 1207.

^%fash, pg. 54.

3^Susan

bl inking Like a Mountain: Aldo Leopold and the Evnlution of an
Wolve s a nd Forests (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Flader.

^974)^
^ ^Flader,

.

pg. 2.

^^Environmental philosophy

is

a broader compilation of philosophical

including ecophilosophy.

^^see Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Ethics

.

(Pacific Grove:

work
The Boxwood

Press, 1981).

Should Trees Have Standing?. (Los Altos: William Kaufman, Inc. 1972) Earth
and other Ethics (New York: Harper & Row. 1987).
^^nestra King, Nash. pg. 144.
^®Ecofeminist literature is broad. See the following: Susan Griffin, Woman and
Nature (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Carol3m Merchant. The Death of Nature (New
York: Harper & Row, 1980); Patricia J. Mills, Woman. Nature, and Psvche (New Haven;
Yale University Press, 1987); Judith Plant, editor. Healing the Wounds: The Promise of
Ecofeminism (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1989); Ynestra King
"Ecofeminlsm; On the Necessity of History and Mystery", Woman of Power 9(Spring
1988), pp. 42-44; Val Plumwood, "Ecofeminism; An Overview and Discussion of
Positions and Arguments", Australian Journal of Philosophy Supplement to 64(June
1986), pp. 120-137; Val Plumwood, "Women. Humanity and Nature", Radical
Philosophy 48(Spring 1988), pp. 16-24; Rosemary Ruether, "Women, Ecology and the
Domination of Nature", The Ecumenist 14(Nov.-Dec. 1975), pp. 1-5; Charlene Spretnak.
"Ecofeminism: Our Roots and Flowering", Women of Power 9(Spring 1988). pp. 6-10;
Karen Warren, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections". Environmental Ethics
9(Sprlng 1987), pp. 3-20; Karen Warren, 'The Power and Promise of Ecological
Feminism". Environmental Ethics 12(Spring 1990), pp. 125-146.
^^'Fhere is a growing body of work that supports the contention that the female way of
knowing the world is in marked contrast to the traditional male view; Carol Gilligan,
In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) is a good example.
^®see Merchant. The Death of Nature (New York; Harper & Row, 1980).
^^Deep ecology literatuie is vast. It includes the following; by Bill Devall: Simple in
Means. Rich in Ends (Salt Lake City; Gibbs-Smith Publisher, 1988); with George
Sessions, Deep Ecology (Salt Lake City: Gibbs-Smith Publisher, 1985), "The Deep
Ecology Movement". Natural Resources Journal 20(April 1980), pp. 299-322; Alan
Drengson, Bevond Environmental Crisis: From Technocrat to Planetary Person (New
York: Peter Lang, 1989); Warwick Fox. "Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?",
The Ecolog ist. 14(1984), pp. 194-204; L. E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World (Australian
National University, 1987); by Ame Naess: Ecology, community and lifestyle
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989); "A Defense of the Deep Ecology
Movement", Environmental Ethics 6(Fall 1984), pp. 265-270;"The Shallow and the
Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary", Inquiry 16(1973). pp. 95-100;
George Sessions. "Shallow and Deep Ecology; A Review of the Philosophical Literature",
from Ecological Consciousness editors, R. C. Schultz and J. D. Hughes (University Press
of America. 1981); Michael Tobias, editor. Deep Ecology (San Diego. Avant Books,
1984) plus articles in Trumpeter (Journal of Ecosophy), LlghtStar Press. Victoria. B.C.

^"^see

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

right activists, argues that extending rights to
'them' (animals) is offensive since by doing so we categorize 'them' as inferior creatures.
Instead we need to respect everything in nature as having its own integrity and
grandeur. The animal rights activists argue that eco-activists practice 'speciesism',
prejudicing species over Individuals. In response, Rodman charges them with
'senUentism'. J. Baird CalUcott declares that the animal liberation movement is not
even allied with environmental ethics, arguing that the land ethic is holistic and has as

40john Rodman, against the animal
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an objective the community as a whole. Holmes Rolston distinguishes
'duties to soecies'
and duties to ecosystems', believing that the rights of the whole
outweigh the rights of
any individual. Paul Taylor, arguing for a life-centered moraUty.
suggests that killing
a human is no more a moral wrong than crushing an insect or
uprooting a plant
Respecting nature means according to all beings an opportunity
for them to fuimi their
various potentials. See also. L. Westra. "Ecology and Animals;
Is There a Joint Ethic of
Respect".

1 l(Fall 1989). pp. 215-230.
^lynestra King. The Nation (December 12, 1987).

p. 730.
"^^See the following: J. Beihl, "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology:
Unresolvable Debate"
Green Perspectives. P.O. Box 1 1 1. Burlington. VT 05402; J. Cheney. "Eco-Feminism
and
Deep Ecology". Environmental Ethics 9(Summer 1987), pp. 1 15-145; W. Fox, 'The
Deep
Ecology - Ecofeminism Debate and its Parallels", Environmental Ethies i {(Spring
1989), pp. 5-25; M. Kheel, 'The Liberation of Nature; A Circular Affair", Environmental
Ethics, 7(Summer 1985), pp. 135-149; A. K. SaUeh, "Deeper than Deep Ecology"
Environme ntal Ethics 6(Winter 1984), pp. 339-345; M. Zimmerman. "Feminism. Deep
Ecology, and Environmental Ethics". Environmental Ethics 9(Spring 1987),
pp. 21-44.
^^James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia (New York: Norton. 1988).
.

.

.

.

.

'^^see Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal: Black
of Freedom (Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982).
.

Rose Books, 1980), The Ecology

.

"^^Joel

55n.

Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas", Telos, 40(Summer 1979), pg.

^®Nash, pg. 164.
47Naess. ECL, pg. 3.
^^This is my term to describe the new vision of nature suggested by ecophilosophers.
D. Y. Peel, editor, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1972), pg. xxi..
.

^^Peel, pg.
^^Peel, pg.

xxiii.

xxiii.

^^Peel. pg. 13 (from Spencer's Social Statics)

.

^^Ame

Naess' analysis of ecophUosophy in Ecology, community and lifestyle is the
most comprehensive in the deep ecology literature.
^'^Naess, ECL pg. 39 he defines 'ecologism' as the danger of seeing ecology as the
ultimate science.
.

^^Naess, ECL, pg. 40.
Naess, ECL, pg. 54.

^^Naess, ECL, pg. 49.
^®Naess, ECL, pg. 50.
^^Naess,

ECL

.

pg. 56.

®%Iabermas, KHI

.

pg. 7.

in the context of a known whole. Naess uses the example
of hearing the first notes of a sonata. The experience of the first notes will be different
if the hearer is familiar with the whole.

^^An experience

is different if

^^Herbert Spencer, First Principles (New York; P.F. Collier and Son, 1951), pg. 109.
.

^Spencer,
^Spencer,

pg. 110.
pg. 135.

^^Spencer, pg. 453.

^see

footnote 7.

®^Nash, pg. xi.
Although ecophilosophers pay their homage to Thomas Kuhn as the 'father' of
paradigmatic thinking, they have clearly taken the metaphor way beyond Kuhn's use of
While Kuhn uses it to describe the conservative nature of the scientific community,
it.
ecophilosophers use it to describe major historical shifts. Alan Drengson suggests
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otherwise: "...nothing critical turns on our blanket use of
the word "paradigm" From
Kuhn we take primarily the insight that it is possible to shift our
basic way of
perceiving and experiencing the world through a restructuring
of basic paradigms Here
then, shifting paradigms can be the result of a conscious
effort to alter our stmidpoint
as well as through the less intentional processes of conversion."
(Bevond
Environmental Crisis pg. 46) 1 beUeve that ecophilosophers have
yet to adequately
delend the far-reaching character of their use of this concept.
'

,

^^Drengson. pg. xl.
^^Merchant. pp. 27-28.
Georg Agricola (1494-1555) wrote the first "modem" treatise on minine
from
Merchant, pg. 34.
^^Drengson. pg. 1.
^^worster takes no pains to clarify what he means by science. He intermingles the
results of rigorous scientific activity with the
naturalists.

more philosophical speculations

of the

^^worster, pg. 12.
^^Worster places his work in the tradition of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment as an analysis of larger social trends rather than as a mere history of
one branch of science. Although he does not provide an adequate explanation of what
he believes is the regressive potential of enlightenment thinking, calling it simply the
quest for the domination of nature (his text is not philosophical), he appears to agree
with eco-thinkers that the instmmentality of nature by such people as Bacon is the
cause of modem barbarism.
^®For further discussions of the relationship between ecology and environmental
ethics see: J. B. Callicott, 'The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology". Environmental
Ethicg. 8(Winter 1986). pp. 301-316; F. B. Golley. "Deep Ek:ology: An Analysis from the
Perspective of Ecological Science". Tmmpeter 6:l(Winter 1989). pp. 24-29; D. E.
Marietta. Jr., "The Interrelationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics".
Environmental Ethics l(Fall 1979). pp. 195-207; T. McGinn. "Ecology and Ethics".
International Quarterly 14(1974), pp. 149-60.
.

.

.

^^Holmes Rolston

Philosophy Gone Wild
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986).
HI.

-

Essays in Environmental Ethics

.

^^Rolston, pg. 20.
^^Rolston, pg. 27.

®^he

actuality of eco-guerrilla action has drastically increased since the incident

on

July 10, 1985 whereby Greenpeace made headlines when its ship, the Rainbow Warrior,
is bombed at a wharf in New ^aland. A crew member is drowned and the
environmental movement is brought to the brink of violence. Greenpeace philosophy:
"Humankind is not the center of life on the planet. Ecology has taught us that the whole
Earth is part of our hody' and that we must learn to respect it as we respect ourselves.".
Although Greenpeace maintains its nonviolent stance, Paul Watson (the most famous
eco-radical) leader of his own group, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, advocates
a philosophy of violence against property. On one historic occasion his boat, the Sea
Shepherd, crashes into the whaling ship Sierra and leaves a eight-foot gash in her hold.
On another front, the Animal Liberation groups take action. Cleveland Amory's Fund
for Animals emerges in the 70's as a leading defender of wddlife. Wealthy and powerful,
Amory has wide influence protesting hunting and the use of furs. The Laboratory
Animal Welfare Act in 1966 is an initial attempt to outlaw the use of pet animals for
experimental purposes. Expansions strengthen the Act to include the research itself.
But many come to believe that the legislation is not enough and direct action becomes
more common. Beginning in March 1982 an American organized Animal Liberation
Front (a state-side version of Ronnie Lee's English group), begins breaking into
laboratories and releasing animals. While these groups concentrate on the rights of
individual animals, others eco-activists prefer to act on the basis of a more holistic
philosophy. Earth First! leads the way in translating the biocentric paradigm of Deep
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Ecology into political action. One time spokesman. Dave Foreman, argues that
environmentalism is too closely linked to anthropocentrism and utilitarianism. The
Earth Firsters determine to be as radical as necessary to achieve their ends.

Monkeywrenching

(the

symbol of destruction of property)

tacitly

becomes

their

password. Earth Firsters are blatant in their lack of concern for the impact of their
activities on human welfare, (from Roderick Nash. The Rights of Naturel
® ^Thomas Berger. Village Joumev (New York;
Hill and Wang. 1985). pg. 52.
®2joseph Meeker. 'The People Who Read the Day". WUdemess (Fall 1986). pg. 30.
Baird Calllcott. "Traditional American Indian and Traditional Western European
Attitudes Toward Nature: An Overview", from Elliot and Gare, editors. Environmental
Philosophy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983) pp 243.

.

.

244.

®"^om Regan,

All that Dwell Therein

.

(Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1982).

®^From Meeker, pg. 45. Thomas Berger was selected by the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference to head the Alaska Native Review Commission. He travelled to Native
and towns to hear testimony from Eskimos, Indians and Aleuts regarding the
success of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. His book. Village Joumev records

villages

.

his findings.

®^William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Boston: Beacon Press. 1974), pg. 169.
®^Leisspg. 177.
.

®®Lelss, pg. 193.
S^Leiss, pg. 197.

^^Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

.

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

1958), pg. 3.

91e. O. Wilson. BlophUia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).
.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE RESURRECTION OF NATURE?
Although

I

have rejected as

positivistic the

attempt by

ecophilosophers to ground their theory in a new ontology of nature,

merely arguing that ecophilosophers are 'barking up the wrong
does not compel

me

particularly inspired
into the debate

by

to redefine the eco-territory.

by ecophilosophical

critical theorists

vastness of the "ecological

crisis"

who

I

literature,

am
but

tree'

not
I

am drawn

argue that because of the

they are suspicious of any blanket

rejection of a Marcusian-like vision of radical transformation.

The

romantic and poorly-defined character of Marcuse's vision has

dampened enthusiasm
critical project, yet

for the successful

many

completion of the original

theorists are unwilling to

utopian vision of the liberation of nature.

If,

abandon

his

as Ricoeur suggests,

utopias legitimately function to shatter prevailing conditions

expose the gap between the authority's claim
beliefs in

any system

of legitimacy" ^), then

for

and the

"impassion society" (Ricoeur).

Is,

citizenry's

perhaps the work of the

utopian writer to stress existing power structures
to

("to

is

essential

if

we

are

as Habermas suggests, the

completion of Enlightenment goals (the restoration of emancipatory
reason)
or

is it

enough

to

overcome both social and environmental problems

the case, as ecophilosophers argue, that

must be transformed

in a

human

consciousness

grand "resurrection of nature"?

While traditionally dualism has characterized epistemology
(object-subject, empiricist-rationalist, ideal-material, fact-value), does

the possibility of the historical continuity of pre-human and
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human

knowledge strain these traditional conceptions?
argue that the continuity of
differences.

all

Ecophilosophers

natural things transcends any

Consider the odd quote from ecophilosopher Judith

Plant:

"Feeling the
existence-is

life

of the "other"-literally experiencing its
starting point for human

becoming the new

decision-making. "2

our

If it is

literal (life

natural things,

is it

and death) existence that we share with

possible that

we share

transcends intraspecific limitations?

all

a form of knowledge that

If it is

not a

new

vision of nature

that contains revolutionary capacities, will the mere "de-ideologization
of the

norms
The

of bourgeois society"^ offer as compelling a result?

rising constellation of events (the fact of global

environmentalism, the demise of totalitarian regimes, the growing

enthusiasm
radical

for global solutions) that

change

in

human

eschatological shift.

many

herald as indicative of a

consciousness suggests

to

Do these turnabouts merely

some an

reflect

a global media

explosion that continues to inform isolated peoples of a variety of
desires while at the

same time challenging

consequences of their actions?

Is it

new

insular regimes with the

simply the case that buried in this

global rhetoric hides the old Baconian

dream

of

mastery?

I

have

argued that ecophilosophers embody this confusion; while they believe
themselves to have launched a major critique of western rationalism,
their theory

remains within the tradition

demonstrated the dubious character of
this kind of "global thinking"

itself.

I

have

their claims, the influence of

remains muddled.
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Assuming

The revolutionary capacity

modem

utopian writers

peril of the

of

such thinking

who have stmggled

Enlightenment dream.

Since essentially every utopian

sudden transformation that

will establish

the ecophilosophical

of a

is

on the edge of a

peace and justice forever,

"new age"^

parallels closely the

utopian dreams of Enlightenment visionaries.
(Utopia)

Sir

Thomas More

even before Sir Francis Bacon (New Atlantis)

,

the tradition of

with the promise and

vision includes the conviction that the world

dream

is in

is

among

the

suggest that respect for nature can advance remarkable social

first to

progress.

"A century before Bacon. More advanced the argument that
natural philosophy was to be considered, not as a form of
evil and anti-religious "conjuring", but as something
acceptable to God, a part of religious duty, and an essential
instmment of social advance."^

While

I

have argued that the inextricable bond between the Baconian

"mastery of nature" and the ecophilosopher's

nature

call to liberate

is

the ideologized Enlightenment agenda, at stake remains the
provocative character of the ecophilosophical vision as

modem

thinking.

If

it

confronts

utopias serve to stress existing ideologies with

visions of emancipation, then the success of an ecophilosophical future

depends upon the outlook

it

inspires.

Consider the revolutionary quality of More's Utopia in contrast

to

Bacon's vision. Although the Baconian image more adequately captures
the actual character of

modem

society. More's vision (as Robert

Adam's argues) anticipates the uncontrolled enthusiasm

and technology with
Atlantis, More's

social constraint.

Foreshadowing

Utopian residents attempt
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to bring

for science

life

in

New

about social

progress by applying scientific reasoning to social problems in
order
to derive

happiness from

impute major social
nature,

Adams

ills

living "according to nature".

to the irrational actions of

Since Utopians

men

opposing

suggests that More's Utopians capture the germinal

idea of Enlightenment thinking:

the methodical use of reason to

understand natural law through observation and experiment and the
utilization of this the

knowledge

human

to benefit

society.

"Whatever was, according

to the Utopian standards,
"according to nature" must of necessity be morally sound,
since natural law was taken to represent God’s or

"nature's" will."®

Utopian ethics

(like

those of the

New

Atlantians) launch the

modem

fascination with natural law ethics; those social actions that produce

healthful pleasure are

Since

presumed

to

be "according

not clear that humankind

it is

is,

morally good, or that the power of science
while

Adams argues

need

"to

to nature".

by nature rational or

is in itself

beneficent,

and

that More and Bacon respond differently to the

prevent scientifically-produced power from over-riding man's

ability to control

it",

at stake here

is

the ultimate character of the

Enlightenment dream. Although Bacon's agenda has

failed in that

have not equably achieved both moral and material progress, does

mean

that the Enlightenment vision

Utopian alternative
conceivable, then

dangers of

inherently flawed?

If

it

the

scientific rationality is

we have added support

solutions to social
eschatological.

to the

is

we

for the

notion that our

and environmental chaos are immanent rather than

Adams

suggests that in Utopia the achievement of a

life

according to nature through self-discipline (humans are born with the
capacity for such a

life)

contrasts sharply with the
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unbounded

faith in

New

scientific rationality in

power

assumed by

is

leaders are
their

many

immune

Atlantis.

There, restraint against abusive

the implicit belief that enlightened

to coercion, that the natural

inventions

in itself beneficent

is

community

power unleashed

and that men

in

of science

are virtually incapable of wrongdoing. While Bacon’s belief that

material progress

is

permeated modern

Bacon who

somehow

positively tied to

Adams

society,

argues that

moral progress has
it is

More and not

offers great positive insight into the healthy

growth of

civilization.

More's Utopian
respects.

contrasts with

life

The Utopians

life

in

New

Atlantis in two

restrict their material production to the

austere simplicity of necessity.

use of reason leads the members of the
commonwealth to "true" pleasure and consequently to
physical and moral health when employed to produce what
"...the right

is

naturally "necessary" for man."^

Secondly, in Utopia there

is

no separation between natural philosophy

and ethics since Utopian science
result, their social relations

is

a form of practical worship. As a

dominate

their

economic ones through

the prohibition of private ownership and wealth.

main purpose

of science in

New

usable inventions that promote

Atlantis

human

is to

In stark contrast, the

bring forth endless

happiness which

Adams

argues,

"has regularly tended to generate social corruption and
disintegration’'^.

Although the

failure of the

clear, the fate of the

Baconian ideology of nature

Utopian model

a form of social control

knowledge and ethics

is

is

to institutionally

is

arguably

eschew wealth as

equally troubling since the gap between

overcome by external coercion. Yet the
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Utopian vision

is

suggestive of the possibility that in order to prevent

knowledge from overcoming

empower the community
responsibility (the good

thinking.

The Utopian

recommends that

human

since the

life)

dream

autonomy and

solution, as reworked

by Habermas,

the epistemological separation of science from

confines of scientific rationality.

In

politics to rise

on the vision

up from

Habermas' framework,

Enlightenment that

of capitalist desires

society "adopted

of

to

are already elements of Enlightenment

communicative interaction enables

rationality of the

we need only

interests,

is

of a

the
it is

not the

suspect, but rather the overlay

new

society

whereby

and distorted genuinely universal norms

capitalist

for its

own

purposes"^.

Knowledge and

A.

We

could characterize the

Human

critical

enlightenment thinking as one over the

debate over the fate of
fate of nature, since the

essential departure point in Hegel's analysis

human

Interest

is to

historicize nature (as

beings we are embedded in nature) which Marx materializes

with his concept of labor (we come to understand ourselves and nature

through our

labor).

This analysis casts doubts upon the Enlightenment

belief that in order to

understand nature and ourselves we must

achieve a superior position to the rest of nature.

most sympathetic) argue that

this pessimistic

Enlightenment (worked out by early
irreconcilable.
itself.

Habermas' resolution

Some

(including the

assessment

of the

Critical Theory) is essentially

of this tension distinguishes

Although his theory emerges from a persuasive account

corrosive influence of the positivist spirit (that erroneously
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of the

disassociates knowledge from values), he does not

abandon the

Enlightenment project altogether.
His attack on classical philosophy targets the
positivistic

self-

understanding of the sciences and traditional ontology that
characterizes knowledge free of

which can truly orient
knowledge

is

human

interest as that

action, arguing that

not grounded by legitimate

tiresomely impotent

field of

according to Habermas

knowledge

because the search

human

for

interests, ethics is a

philosophical inquiry.

The

result

is;

"a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from
dogmatic association with natural interests of life and their
irritating influence; and both (science and ontology) share
the cosmological intention of describing the universe
theoretically in its lawlike order, just as it is."^®

This analysis leads Habermas to suggest that even the historical-

hermenuetic scientists (while recognizing the embeddedness of
knowledge and

do not escape

interest)

this scientistic consciousness

exemplified by their attempt to describe a structured reality within
the horizon of a theoretical attitude (historicism)

.

Thus he

distinguishes a third form of scientific activity, conceiving of a

critical

(and rational) activity which supersedes in a "quasi-transcendental"

way

embeddedness

the

of all other scientific activity (communicative

competence).

Habermas presses

this perspective, arguing that since (at this

point) all sciences share a distorted concept of theory,

the classical connection of theory to value:

we have

the conception of theory as

a process of cultivation of the person. In Knowledge and
Interest

.

Habermas uses Husserl
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to

lost

demonstrate this

Human

loss.

Although

Husserl

is

right (in

The

Crisis of the

European Scienresl when he

criticizes the objectivist illusion of science

which conceals the

construction of facts and the interlocking of knowledge with
interests,

Husserl succumbs to another form of objectivism by trying

phenomenology a pure position outside

interests.

that traditional theory uses cosmology to direct

By

not recognizing

human

action

derives "psuedonormative power" from the concealment of
interest,

to retain for

its

and
actual

Husserl overlooks the fact that the release of knowledge from

interest for the Greeks is not to purify theory from subjectivity, but to

provide the subject with purification through theory, allowing ego

The

identity to take shape.

price of individuation (the thrust of the

Dialectic of Enlightenment) is the separation of knowledge from

human

interest.

Habermas

believes that the "suspicion of objectivism" remains

because of the ontological

illusion of

pure theory that the sciences

deceptively share with the philosophical tradition after casting off

still

its

practical content.

"As soon as these statements are understood in relation to
the prior frame of reference to which they are affixed, the
objectivist illusion dissolves and makes visible a
knowledge-constitutive interest."^

Habermas' concept
the two elements

and

interest.

of knowledge-constitutive

whose

We know

relation

still

has

to

human

interests joins

be explained:

knowledge

from everyday experience that ideas often

serve to furnish justifying motives in place of real ones; therefore,

Habermas

believes that rationalization at this level

level of collective action.

statements

is falsified

is

ideology at the

In both cases the manifest content of

by consciousness'
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unreflective

tie to interests.

despite

its illusion of

autonomy. Since

scientists

must secure

objectivity of their statements against the pressure

the

and seduction

of

particular interests, they delude themselves about the fundamental
interests to

which they owe not only

their

impetus but the conditions

of possible objectivity themselves.

Habermas

believes that the "achievements of the transcendental

subject have their basis in the natural history of the
therefore

human

interests that have

derive both from nature

human

species" ^2-

emerged in man's natural history

and from the cultural break with nature.

"What may appear as naked survival is always in its roots a
historical phenomenon. For it is subject to the criterion of
what a society intends for itself as the good life."^^

Habermas takes from

this

break with nature a theory of knowledge

that serves equally as an instrument

and as that which transcends

mere self-preservation. Reinterpreting Marx. Habermas argues that
knowledge-based interests take form

in the

and power, suggesting that knowledge and
where the development

of

autonomy and

knowledge and interest proves

been suppressed

of work, language

interest unite in a society

a non-authoritarian and universally

practiced dialogue support

historical traces of

medium

itself in

responsibility.

The unity

of

a dialectic that takes the

suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has

(Freud).

Positivism leads to the substitution of technology for enlightened
action;

thus

it

directs the utilization of scientific information from

illusory standpoint.

consequences of a

Only a critique of objectivism
positivist

will

counter the

understanding of knowledge since

includes a critique of classical ontology
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(a rejection of

an

this

the power of

renewed

theory).

We must

which theory conceals: the

reveal that

connection of knowledge to interest.

Since

epistemology (the movement from doubt
that the

move

knowledge
reflect

on

is

impossible because doubt

(forcing

it).

to

one

to start

it is

who

Hegel

destroys

knowledge) by arguing
already a form of

is

with knowledge and then critique or

Habermas suggests a return

the error and potential of epistemology.

Kant

to

to

determine both

For Hegel, the process of

continued clarification culminates in absolute knowledge or

self-

knowledge.

(with self-

In contrast,

knowledge) and from

it

Kant begins with the a

mind

priori

produces knowledge of the world.

Habermas

believes that Hegel's critique of Kant fails because he loses the

distinction between theory (science)

and practice

drops the Kantian distinction between
It is

its

Marx who

man and

(morality)

when he

nature.

reestablishes this distinction

when he argues

mediation through labor. Marx argues that since we come

nature through sensuous

human

practice (not merely

by

to

for

know

thinking),

labor stands between the objective and subjective forms of nature and
constitutes the motor of change in society.

For Hegel,

all activity is of

Habermas

the mind.

For Marx,

reflectivity

from Hegel and retains the material description

all activity is

natural sciences from
It is

this reflective

that directs the
that

Marx

Marx could have done

to

conflict),

of the

and

labor.

of thought, free of external domination,

an emancipated

better

society.

had he included

Habermas

component

creates a space for his theory.

critical rationality serves as the reflective
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By claiming

reflection as the

internal element of self-understanding (the essential

ending social

retrieves

in order to synthesize reflection

component

movement

in nature.

component

of

for

Since

knowledge

and protects the dominaUon
domination of

human

of nature from its ideological impact (the

nature), self-reflection brings together

knowledge and interest

in the

form of a universal pragmatics

(communicative competence).

Although Habermas' framework places language over operational
thought, his critics suggest that this structure lacks independent

backing since
is

it is

merely derivative from his assertion that rationality

both operational and

his

argument

is

linguistic.

They

believe that the character of

vulnerable to empirical criticism since he has not

demonstrated that an "unsurpassable instrumental relation
rooted in our species

endowments and

is

open

to

all

is

nor

sciences

According to Habermas' theory,

since science is instrumental, communicative ethics
of value interaction

nature

therefore inevitable"

has he developed a philosophy of science that rules out
that are not constitutively technical.

to

is

the only realm

humankind: "good-for-nature"

is

derived

from "good-for-man".

While Habermas contends that since the world

knowable

to

humans

is

made

along two lines of "species interest" (the

technical-cognitive interest in the control of nature and the practicalcognitive interest in communication), that these two forms of

knowledge are not subject

to historical change,

he acknowledges that

his quasi-transcendental grounding:

"provides us with plausible, if not completely compelling,
foundations for our knowledge. And while this type of
theorizing may not offer the satisfaction held out by first
philosophy, it does nonetheless avoid the despair of
skepticism.
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Habermas conceives

his project as a "research program"; therefore
he

does not pretend that he has produced ultimate results, only
outlines

and guideposts. Yet as he has developed

his "three tiered research

program" ^6, he has tenaciously defended his
dualistic rationality;

"What raises us out

original vision of a

of nature is the only thing

whose nature we can know: language. Through

autonomy and

its

structure,

responsibility are posited for us."^^

Habermas

believes that his critics^® confuse epistemological

and

ethical issues:

"Because the only "theoretically fruitful attitude" toward
nature is one bounded by the technical cognitive interest

means

neither that other noncognitive (e.g., aesthetic)
attitudes are impossible nor that man must run roughshod
over nature."

The character

of social "truth" is yet to be determined.

Clearly

discourse (Habermas' vehicle of critique) has the capacity to justify

such ecophilosophical values as compassion

human

desire.

The truth status

(even as he acknowledges).

the context of a
too

narrow
I

new

of

for

nature by redefining

Habermas' position

is

dependent

The more compelling question

eco-vision) is

to

ask

(in

whether the Habermasian vision

is

to inspire environmental goals.

have rejected the ideological schemes of ecophilosophy and

used the Habermasian framework
ecophilosophy.

Despite

communicative theory,

launch an immanent critique of

of the criticisms directed at Habermas'

many

most part

for the

framework as instructive since
quasi-transcendental solution

to

I

am

when

I

accept his dualistic

sympathetic with Habermas'
faced with the alternatives

(naturalism, relativism or the outright rejection of philosophy's role as
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tli 0

§uardi3ji of rationality

).

This means that

accept the

I

conservative nature of his analysis (that the elements of
emancipation
are

immanent) and

distinct

from the rest

critical stress

dualistic quality

its

of nature).

on his vision

eco-vision to assert

Concurrently

offers

an opportunity

The Problem

As might be expected, because
Habermas' resolution has

Some

I

believe that the
for a reconstructed

itself.

B.

quarters.

(humans are epistemologically

of Nature

of its persuasive content,

stirred disagreement

from a variety of other

dismiss his view categorically, arguing that his

persistent belief that the fundamental problems of

epistemological

is

an

illusion of

modem

philosophy.

modem

society are

Habermas;

"...Richard Rorty has undertaken the most ambitious
project: he wants to destroy the tradition of the philosophy
of consciousness, from its Cartesian beginnings, with the
aim of showing the pointlessness of the entire discussion
of the foundations and limits of knowledge.

Lyotard, in line with Rorty's position, argues that the failed

modern

agenda

itself

is

an appeal

evident in any science that attempts to legitimize
to

a "metadiscourse", advocating a postmodern view that

distinguishes itself by
Rejecting

with

its

"incredulity toward metanarratives"2i.

modern epistemology as a

feeble attempt at building

adequate representation of the world

(given that

we have no

an

access to

the world-in-itself), Lyotard argues (as characterized by Benhabib) that
"the episteme of representation allows only one option, namely, a

recognition of the irreconcilability and incommensurability of language
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games, and the acceptance that only
of validity

local

and context-specific

criteria

can be formulated"22.

Lyotard rejects both instrumental or

critical

reason as an

alternative to the decline of the failing episteme of representation;

therefore the "polytheism of values" with which he

either

is left

prevents the kind of critique that he wants to level or his philosophy
subverts

its

polytheist character

and

privileges

one domain of

knowledge over others. Benhabib argues that his position

is clearly

the latter since he privileges "a discontinuous, fractured, and
destabilizing epistemology, said to characterize

and natural

self-

modern mathematics

science"^^.

Despite

apparent

its

failure, admittedly the challenge that

thinkers such as Lyotard and Rorty present to critical theorists

immense

is

a non-foundationalist justification for their claims).

(to find

Avoiding the epistemological bind of Lyotard, a thinker such as Hans

Gadamer argues

persuasively that Habermas

we can overcome our

historically

perspective from which to
(other

than

to

constitution).

embedded

comment on

fails to

demonstrate that

condition:

we

lack any

the character of knowledge

say that we are inextricably bound by our historical

However, the conservative character of a language

games analysis
critical theorists

(its

political indifference) forces

us back

to the claim

such as Habermas that a communicative, discursive

and that

will serve

moral autonomy.

concept of reason

is

defensible,

Habermas claims

to

have surmounted both the extremes of pure

historicism

by

it

and pure transcendentalism by arguing

for his "quasi-

transcendental" posture, suggesting that our epistemology derives
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from nature as well as our break from nature
character of reason

is

two-fold rather than monistic).

Yet Habermas' solution troubles even those
reconceptualization

my

relevant to

is

compelling.

attempt

to

ecophilosophical vision.
iri

Critique.

emancipatory

(the

Two

who

agree that his

versions of this criticism are

determine the legitimacy of the

First, the critique leveled

Norm and Utopia

by Seyla Benhabib

holds Habermas accountable for the

,

universality in the normative agenda of Critical Theory.

She attacks

the change agency of the Hegelian heritage, suggesting that

its

"philosophy of the subject"^^ undermines the normative constructs of
Critical Theory.

Immanent

to the social critique of

Critical Theorists is the Hegelian notion that social

result of a collective singularity.

idealism and replaces

an image

it

change

is

the

Although Marx overturns Hegel's

with the "work model of

of a collective, individual effort

subsumes. Benhabib argues that the
is

both Marx and the

which

critical

activity",

Critical

success of

he retains

Theory

modem

society

contingent on our willingness to replace this model with a "more

inter subjectively oriented

and

and

pluralistic conception of self, society,

politics"25

This critique by Benhabib against Habermas' philosophy of the
subject

is

particularly useful in our attempt to judge the legitimacy of

the ecophilosophical vision and serves to distinguish between the two

dominant streams

of this kind of thinking.

mode, Joel Whitebook suggests that

in

In a seemingly different

Habermas' attempt

to

overcome

the limitations of Critical Theory, he betrays the original vision:
"(w)hile providing a superior theoretical grounding for
Critical Theory, Habermas' transcendentalism necessarily
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precludes any reconciliation with nature. Theoretical
rigor is obtained at the expense of the original
utopian
ideal. "26

Whitebook’s critique, that Habermas loses the autonomy of nature
by

adamantly arguing that knowledge
restates

what

I

believe to be the

of nature is exclusively technical,

predominant concern

ecophilosophical writers (but which they

fail

to articulate clearly).

Whitebook, although Habermas has "undoubtedly

most glaring

of

rectified

theoretical defects of his predecessors, he

markedly altered the

spirit of their project"27.

suggests that since the critical project

Habermas' project merely evidences

is

some

For

of the

has also

in contrast,

Benhabib

from the beginning flawed,

this difficulty.

Arguably Habermas could be right about the emancipatory
capacity of rationality and merely wrong about the details (Benhabib)
or

he could be

(as

some

critics suggest) co-opted

retain a philosophically imposing position.
is

For

by his own desire

many

to

serious critics,

the fate of nature that stresses Habermas' vision. Originally

it

it is

against Herbert Marcuse's contention2S (since science and technology
are historically relative activities, a change in the economic

new body

organization of society could bring about a
technology), that

Habermas29 presses

technological achievement

know

it

own

fundamental

to

and

conviction that

human

existence as

we

and cannot be surpassed.

Habermas
voice)

is

his

of science

successfully transforms Critical Theory (gives

by redefining the character

Marx's framework
intersubjectivity

is

of rationality.

incomplete, he opens

a

Recognizing that

up a new realm

by acclaiming the emancipatory character

Yet he maintains that our knowledge of external nature
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it

is

of
of language.

instrumental, offending those
solution to the

who

see the resurrection of nature as a

modern predicament. Although

demonstrates that emancipation

advancement, he

fails to

is

some) he

(for

not overrun by technological

go far enough (according to Benhabib), leaving

the plurality of individuals and cultures embedded in a collective vision
of

humankind.

hinges upon
is it

its

1

believe that the fate of the ecophilosophical vision

relevance to this controversy.

legitimate to ask;

what

is (or

Only

in

such a context

even should be) the relationship

between men, women and nature?
Superficially, the critiques leveled

by Benhabib and Whitebook

resemble the complaints of ecophilosophers. Assuming that

Habermas’ position takes on the character

of the "established view",

the kinds of criticism leveled at Habermas by Benhabib and Whitebook

resemble the concerns of both the deep ecologists and ecofeminists
(in

the midst of a serious debate themselves) over the character of an

ecophilosophical vision.

I

have used the substance of these Habermas

criticisms to guide our evaluation of the ecophilosophical vision, as

Benhabib and Whitebook capture two

pivotal issues in the eco-debate;

the fate of nature and the fate of the individual.

Others have done the work of demonstrating the theoretically
satisfying nature of

Theory.

Habermas’ theory

Yet Whitebook and others

in contrast to early Critical

reflect

(couched in a practical concern over the

a kind of ’romantic regret’

fate of the earth) that

Habermas’ preoccupation with reason cuts

off

a philosophical

consideration of a reconciliation with nature. As conceptualized by

both these

critics

and ecophilosophers themselves,

philosophically and practically)

is
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at stake (both

the "relationship between

humans

and nature" since the technical /cogniUve approach
our growing need

critical debate) parallels

the ecophilosophical

claim that in order to "save nature and save ourselves",

must forsake

nature impedes

harmony. Their concern (although issuing

to live in

from the context of the

to

their technical orientation to nature.

human

The important

distinction is that opponents in the critical theory debate

the start that the ideology of nature
critics characterize as)

The
of

is

assume from

as suspicious as (what these

Habermas' reductionist

position.

constitutive status of technical-cognitive interest

concern for these

critics for

beings

is

a source

the simple reason that Habermas'

framework appears too narrow. C. Fred Alford argues that the
fundamental problem with Habermas' dualistic concept
that by restricting the

domain

nature, he prevents growth
solution,

of

human knowledge

of rationality is

with regard to

and change. While endorsing Habermas'

Whitebook suggests that perhaps

"the scope and depth of the social and ecological crisis are
so great that nothing short of an epochal transformation on
the scale of world views will be commensurate with

them. "30

Thomas McCarthy

believes that a divided rationality evokes a

fragmented world, asking Habermas:

"how can we put our fragmented

world back together again?"3 1

Habermas attempts

to

support

(in

his well-developed

framework) a theory of communicative action that encompasses the
different

dimensions of rationality that are opened up by a

modem

understanding of the world. These are essentially three: the
cognitive-instrumental knowledge of objective nature, the moralpractical

knowledge produced

in social interaction
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and the

aesthetic-

practical

knowledge of

McCarthy

is

self

and world. Troubling a

critic

such as

the "norm-conformative atUtude toward the objective

world" contained in Habermas' framework that prevents
"a philosophy
of nature that could

compete with the

McCarthy suggests that such a

rival

modem

philosophy

sciences of nature"32.
is

not only possible

(consider Kant's early attempt in the Critique of Judgmentl but would,
"provide a view of our place in nature that could
relativize the objectivating

According

view of nature

to

complement and

be dominated"^^.

to ecophilosophers, exemplified

by Habermas

Henning Ottmann^^, environmental problems are provoked by
framework.
strictly

this

However, both Alford and Whitebook acknowledge that a

instrumental orientation toward nature does not necessitate an

environmental

Habermas himself argues

crisis.

less rigid in respect to mediations

my

critic

critics

that

"my conception

is

between reason and nature''^^ than

suppose.

we can indeed adopt a performative attitude to
external nature, enter into communicative relations with
it, have aesthetic experience and feelings analogous to
morality with respect to it, there is for this domain of
reality only one theoretically fruitful attitude, namely the
objectivating attitude of the natural-scientific,
"...while

experimenting observer... "^6

Habermas argues that

if

we attempt

to gain access to "nature-in-itself

either theoretically or ethically, problems assert themselves that lead

us back into the metaphysics

of a re-enchanted world.

Yet despite the

reassurance, a concern lingers that Habermas' vision limits the
relationship between

humans and

nature.

The debate between Habermas and Marcuse

reflects the

disjuncture in Critical Theory over the fate of nature.
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Alford develops

McCart±iy’s concern that after analyzing the philosophy of science
of

both Marcuse and Habermas, and although the critique of instrumental
reason (science)
differ

is

central to the

work

of both,

considerably in their analyses of science.

possibility of a

new

Habermas and Marcuse
Marcuse suggests the

science that embraces the "friendly and helpful

qualities in nature overlooked

by the domineering

attitude toward

nature"37 while Habermas argues that the basic technical and cognitive
structure of science

is

given by "the objective character of

human

labor"38.

"Science and labor are part of the same struggle to wrest
human existence from a nature that is all too sparse. "39

At stake, according to Alford

is

that while Marcuse's discussion of

science lags far behind contemporary analyses of science and tends to

"romanticize nature", Habermas' categorization of knowledge tends to
"freeze the limits of

human

knowledge""^® and block

considering the relationship between
Alford believes that

humans and

"hegemony

Marcuse suggests, a new

Habermas (compelled

of

nature.

Habermas prematurely dismisses Marcuse as

making the same argument as Adorno who
aesthetics to avoid the

new ways

clearly places his

of conceptual thought".

rationality is not impossible then

to preserve rationality to

If,

hope

in

as

perhaps

prevent

dehumanization) has not sufficiently explored the sorts of social and

economic changes that might make an "aesthetic science" possible.
Prior to

modern

science categories of knowledge appear more loosely

delineated, so perhaps

it is

not necessary that a

relationship be quasi-religious

and
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mystical.

new nature-humanity

The most
might be

like

clearly articulated vision of

(if

other than instrumental)

Marcuse describes

it

in "Nature

and

radical transformation of society

man and

Marcuse suggests that the
a

new

is

given

by Marcuse. As

a "new relationship between

original vision of Critical Theory,

historical character of nature

sensibility that reclaims, as critical, a primary

experience of nature (nature

character of this sensibility
appreciation for nature.

and the ambiguity

relationship

Revolution’’^!, the possibility of

is tied to

Canying out the

nature".

what that

"for its

lies

Most

own

sake").

makes way

and elementary

In the subversive

the transformative character of a
critical theorists

for

new

agree that the power

of Marcuse’s vision is that while

he seeks man’s

reconciliation with nature, he also clings to science (and technology)

as the essential route to absolute freedom through the abolition of
labor (the tension of the monistic vision).

In this way,

by believing that

science can offer material comfort and not restrict the evolution of

man’s new relationship

to nature,

he stands in the tradition of the

great utopian writers such as More and Bacon.

Ecophilosophers argue

that their recent resuscitation of such ideas resolves these ambiguities

by providing a concrete vision

of a

"new science":

the revolutionary

character of the science of ecology (Murray Bookchin

Marcuse). Yet
political

1

is

referred to

by

have shown how the fascination with ecology has

repercussions that resemble the old Baconian vision.

Marcuse’s attempt to overcome the irrationality of a science that

"overwhelms the natural rationality of the world, substituting

for

it

one

that responds to the narrower instrumental rationality of

humankind'"^^
abstraction of

is

based on his

modem

belief that the logical

and mathematical

science arose in a particular historical setting
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which can be overturned with a new view

my

of this vision (as explained in

the focus of this project.
is

that he expects

of nature.

less

vulnerability

reconstruction of ecophilosophy)

One appealing aspect

much

The

of

is

Habermas' position

from science than a deeent material

existence, theoretically preventing the intrusion of science into
other

areas of existence which are essentially linguistic and not technical:
since language

is

not

"fully explicable

instrumental action"43,

means

alone provides a

it

men and women.

between

by science nor reducible

to

for reconeiliation

Since he rejects the instrumentality of

science as insufficient to the greater task of restoring social relations,

he places the burden of change on

human

relationships, overcoming

the ambiguity in Marcuse's position.

Clearly

avenues

Habermas and Marcuse

to "the

vision with a

good

new

offer

two theoretically opposing

Marcuse augments the

life":

rationality that guides a

life

original monistic

of happiness

and ease

while Habermas, in order to preserve an arena of higher values,

separates from nature a realm of language that can "light

darkness" by speaking
politics is for

values since

unnecessary.

to the

Marcuse a

new

life

scientific

Habermas

meaning

which

is

of

human

human

existence.

Scientific

no longer bothered by higher

reason eventually renders Reason

protects the realm of "higher values"

itself

which he

considers the essential realm of humanity by separating politics out of
natural science.
I

suggest that ecophilosophy shares Marcuse's belief that

"(t)he

discovery of the liberating forces of nature and their vital role in the

construction of a free society becomes a

new

force in social change"'^'^.

While Marcuse offers a "convergence thesis" which projects the
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merger of technology and art
suggest the joining of
perception

nature

(for

itself

(or

human and

work and

play),

ecophilosophers

natural purposes. Both argue that

Marcuse, sensual perception) must be guided by

and not by human ambition.

new science is a special category of knowledge, one
that comes closest to expressing the goal of reconciliation
with nature. It responds to nature, in the hope that by so
doing nature will reveal a softer and more pleasant aspect
to humanity."^^
"The

Yet Marcuse (as Alford suggests) never resolves this
his other

paramount

new

science with

absolute freedom from nature. Alford

goal:

suggests that Marcuse's "new science"

in effect, the scientific

is,

and

technological potential for overcoming nature so that the world

becomes an "expression
with nature

is total

of

human

erotic powers"'^®:

absorption of nature into

Since science

is

the vehicle to satisfy

human

reconciliation

purposes.

human wants

(as believed

by Bacon and More and argued by Habermas), Marcuse substitutes
traditional 'wants’ with

what he considers

pleasure" (so long denied to

"the genuine satisfaction of

most humans by elaborate

makes

rationalization)

In this way, science

which science,

for the first time,

never loses

instrumental character (the satisfaction of wants) since

it is

its

the character of desire

distinction

that

is

transformed.

The

between Habermas and ecophilosophers (who

Marcuse's vision)

is

explanatory:

transformation of desire?

work toward the
the very

itself

possible.

total

If,

how do we

dilemma which they seek

nature) overtakes them.

Instead,
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human purpose
to

parallel

inspire this

as ecophilosophers suggest,

absorption of

critical

humans

into nature, then

overcome (the domination of

autonomy demands that humans

distinguish themselves from nature to bear the brunt of responsibility
for the quality of all life (as

1

will elucidate later, the precise character

of this distinction characterizes the

Habermas seeks

"to

more

critical debate).

prevent social relations from becoming

like

our relations with the natural world"^'^ (my emphasis). Since he

wishes

to

and the

maintain and strengthen the delineation between humanity

rest of nature, his two-fold cognitive interest theory

accomplishes this goal by attributing
role.

By arguing

a constitutive

way

that the objects of experience establish the

which objects can be known,

Habermas substantiates

Habermas argues

to these interests

in conjunction with

human

in

nature,

his "quasi-transcendental" argument. Although

that any other orientation toward nature (that

is

not

instrumental) does not produce knowledge, he admits that other

experiences with nature whether aesthetic or regressive demonstrate
that

much

of nature

remains unknown.

"Interests constitute all we may know about the world, but
they do not constitute the world itself. Yet, it is precisely
because interests do not constitute the world itself that
the world must remain unknowable." "...we can only truly
know what we have made: language."'^®

Habermas does not

rule out other "experiences in nature", arguing

instead that they are not fruitful (technologically speaking).

Although the status of

this qualification is the focus of

reconstructed eco-vision (see below), important

to

my

Habermas' critique

of the Marcusian-like vision is his rejection of the attempt

by

modem

sociologists of science (or ecophilosophers) to limit science's

perspective (he firmly believes in the capacities of science to continue
to

improve the quality of

life).

Rather,
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it is

the scope of science that

concerns Habermas; he believes that

it

realm of linguistic interaction which

lies

must not be unleashed on the
outside science.

As a

result,

he protects his theoretical framework from the dangers of a monistic
vision.

Does Habermas'

ways that humans

dualistic

framework encompass the variety

interact with

each other and nature? Although

suggest below that serious adjustments must be

framework

to

be

politically 'correct',

1

made

to

of
1

Habermas’

resist Alford’s suggestion that

there are categories of experience which seem to transcend both

technical

and communicative

interests.

Using the example of medical

anthropology, Alford proposes that Habermas' claim that only a
technical approach to nature can produce "theoretically fruitful

knowledge" prejudices the healing powers of the medical profession
over the diagnostic efficacy of something like a

Yet this kind of information as
exerts pressure

on the

field to

it

Navaho hand trembler.

confronts the scientific

open the narrow confines

community
of scientific

explanation.

Although science

itself

may undergo

unifying theories replace old models,

it is

that this 'new nature', like those before

it,

a radical shift as

new

not inconsistent to argue

remains in the context of

our technical /cognitive approach to nature. Examples such as these

from medical anthropology (much

like

Merchants examples of pre-

Renaissance sanctions on the use of nature) are unconvincing evidence
that cultures characterize themselves by their radically different

approaches to nature; the goal of even
nature to their

own

benefit,

whether

purposes.
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'primitive' cultures is to utilize

for religious or material

I

my own

position

reconstruction and critique of the broad

ecophilosophical claim that a "new science"

framework

an ecological world view^o

of

Habermas and
fails to satisfy

his critics.

I

revealed in the

in this

debate between

have already suggested that ecophilosophy

the very basic criteria of Critical Theory. Although

Marcuse himself never worked out the
to

is

theoretical details of his vision,

judge the ecophilosophical 'new science' according

vision of Critical Theory

means

that

it

would have

to

to the original

be non-regressive

in two distinct ways:
it would have to avoid slipping back into prerational, e.g., mythical, forms of thought. Second, it could
not regress behind the present level of technical
proficiency or else one of the conditions of a satisfactory
solution, the material prerequisites for a new society, no

"First,

longer would obtain.

Ecophilosophy
its

is

suspiciously both anti-rational and anti-technical in

attempt to overcome the alleged domination of nature. Even

Adorno and Horkheimer are skeptical about the

possibility of satisfying

these criteria in the face of the inherently dialectical character of

enlightenment thinking. The appealing feature of Habermas' response
is

that he rejects the

"while there

is

main

thesis of early Critical Theory, arguing that

an intimate connection between the domination

of

external and internal nature, the two processes do not follow the
logic."^^

To overcome

this limitation,

Habermas introduces

same

his

"dualistic framework", suggesting that the "logic of instrumental

rationality governs the domination of external nature, the logic of

communicative

rationality governs that of internal nature"^^.

Since reification of nature

is

the goal in the

first

case and

pathology in the second case, and although the dread 'manipulation of
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nature’

not ruled out in Habermas' framework, the possibility

is

emancipation of the

self is reintroduced.

for

Yet moral progress and

technological advance are not mutually exclusive as originally

conceived by Horkheimer and Adorno; thus Whitebook suggests
that

Habermas

fails to

critique of

modern

society for

Habermas

meet the

criteria of those

society requires a

transfiguration, of the

autonomous

modem

dream with

life’,

the transformation of rationality

"an emancipated

and not the

Habermas has

emancipated community

his

of

he eliminates the apparent need

for

itself.

believe that the ultimate impact of these debates over the "fate

of nature" is to side-track

nature

Since

project"^^^

believe that a radical

individuals that direct the scientific enterprise in order to

reach our envisioned 'good

I

vision:

consists in the completion,

the enlightenment

fortified

new

who

is

a more

critical issue.

Since the fate of

already being largely determined by our current normative

frameworks, our most productive work

is to

understand and

fully

develop our present potentialities rather than looking for fundamental
shifts

and transformations. The most provocative stmggle along these

lines is that of the feminist critics

who, with their focus on women’s

experience, stress our traditional concepts of

suggest that although social theorists have

humans from
result

is

that

human

t}q)ically

action.

They

distinguished

nature as a collective singularity (humankind), the net

we

privilege

a very select group of individuals

characterize our collectivity.

to

Ecophilosophy, although essentially

concerned with the "liberation of nature",

is

involved in

its

own

internal debate over the eharaeter of the relationship between

and nature. This debate (between deep
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ecologists

humans

and ecofeminists)

is

didactic for the simple reason that while
limits of

a universal ethic,

legitimation of language

is

it

it

reinforces the practical

suggests the possibility that the

subject to normative constraints. This

suggestion exposes Habermas' critical framework to the question:

what

is

the legitimacy of a universal pragmatics?

C. Ecophilosophy Reconsidered

The

distinction

between humans and nature

science) is not only theoretically compelling,

component

of

any

arguably an essential

it is

social or environmental solution since

potentiality of technical rationality (when held in

emancipated humankind) that
'good

life'.

between science and
absorption of

all

knowledge by

reflection as obtained

and

hope

political integrity.

only

of the

artificial distinction

positivist vision of the

scientific rationality, the

we might not

the

check by

autonomy

through communicative interaction

external) suggests the

renewed

an

proffers

maintained by a

politics

it is

offers all of nature the only

Although modern society

and

(politics

live

of

(internal

comfortably but with

Not only does an emancipated view of

language offer direction for our

scientific

developments,

it

overcomes

the monistic character of a nature philosophy that epistemologically

eschews diversity despite
nature.

It

its

celebrated grounding in the diversity of

augments the perpetuation

of the diversity of individual

and

cultural 'linguistic histories' articulated in the commonality of

communicative interaction

(if

reinterpreted along the lines that

Benhabib suggests).

Any current

ecophilosophical vision

is

on a

collision course with

a conceptual framework that privileges a technical orientation
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to

Suppose that

nature.

nature

is

technical;

constitutively our only possible orientation to

we could conclude

that since environmental

problems are neither caused nor solved by epochal transformations
our views of nature, we must look elsewhere

by answering the

for resolution.

original ecophilosophical question

in

Yet even

if

(humans are

inherently disposed (not historically) to manipulate nature)

we

are

able to deal adequately with environmental problems, our success

is

immaterial since our solution collides with a basic ecophilosophical

premise that the

'collective self

ecophilosophical crisis

is

who we

our relationship to nature
then

inferiority,

it is

it is

one that necessitates

the opportunity to be other than
If

we know

as

clear

why

is

inadequate.

human

The

transformation;

are.

ultimately incidental to our moral

ecophilosophers ground their theory in

a radical personal transformation, in this case inspired by a vision of
nature.

come

instead

If

are satisfied to utilize our technical knowledge to

into balance with nature,

criteria of

a

(the fate of

new

it is

is

we

I

the ecophilosophical

inextricably tied to the fate of

same dilemma

human

all

realms of the

nature),

on any relationship

theoretically impossible to carry

mastery without contaminating

Although

fail to satisfy

Critical theorists argue the

world.

nature

believing that
of

we

human

psyche.

have dismissed as "unfruitful" this ecophilosophical

conceptualization of our

modem

dilemma, using the debates around

the Habermasian framework, Benhabib's critique of

Habermas

further

devastates the dubious status of this eco-vision while retrieving

most important

asset.

its

Although she agrees with Habermas that we

must replace Marx's "work model

of activity" (since

it fails

adequately the dynamics of social change) and replace
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it

to capture

with a

work/linguistic one. simultaneously she rejects Habermas'
"philosophy
of the subject" (which

helpful

when

determine
effort

its

he retains from

Her framework

assessing the utopian content of ecophilosophy
legitimacy) since

two distinct visions;

biocentric thinkers)
ecologists

Hegel).

(of

deep ecologists and

vision of solidarity (initiated

distinct flavor

(to

separate out from the general

the holistic vision

and the

and given a

we must

is

by ecofeminists). In

by

social

line

with

Benhabib's critique of Critical Theory, the pivotal element that
distinguishes ecofeminism from deep ecology

is

the philosophy of

action implicit in each that privileges either collective singularity or
plurality (as that

which motivates

social change).

At stake then

(for

legitimacy) is the convergence of ecophilosophy with a satisfactory

philosophy of action.

Consider Ricoeur's

"circle of

symbolic action":

ideologies

and

utopias are essential to each other in the work of transforming society:
therefore, their interdependence implies that while utopias stress

ingrained power structures, the identity forming aspect of ideology
sets the boundaries for a successful utopian vision. This dialectical

interpretation of a utopian vision fortifies
holistic eco-vision

rescues nature from

its

my

suggestion that the

instrumental fate without

providing a provocative analysis of our political condition; thus

value to social theory

is

negative as

it

its

net

preserves the current,

unsatisfactory separation between science and politics.

Since social

ecology stresses existing conditions while preserving a redeeming
political

focus as a utopian vision,

rightly serves as the focus of

any

ecophilosophy.
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it

succeeds over deep ecology and

theoretical revisions in

Although Habermas' position

teeters

on the edge

transcendentalism (mirroring Kant's cognitive

redeeming feature

is

that

it

faculties), its

funnels theoretical efforts into the

area of psychodynamics (or personal narratives). But

without giving up the possibility of critique
hermenuetics)

.

Particularly suggestive

Habermas makes about our

condition:

which we have made". Citing

humans and

of

is

(the

it

fruitful

does this

dilemma

of

the pivotal claim that

"we can truly

this as evidence of the

know

only that

gap between

the rest of nature and indicative of the epistemological

character of language,
insight that labor

is

Habermas

revitalizes

that which mediates

Marx's revolutionary

men (women) and

nature.

wanted to achieve something qualitatively new:
mastery by the whole of society of society's mastery over
nature. This mastery would certainly still depend on the
functions of instrumental reason. But since it would
'finalize' these functions, and subject them to truly human
aims, the mastery of society would undertake its own selfcorrection; society's mastery over nature would thereby be
freed from the curse of being simultaneous a mastery over
men, and thus perpetuating the reign of blind natur^
"...Marx

history.

Marx reconceptualizes the

interpenetration of nature and society (as

it

takes place in nature) as the total reality comprising both moments.

The particularly

fruitful

ecophilosophical debate

enough
called

to exclude

aspect of Marx's concept of nature to the
is its dialectical quality:

"(It is)

'dogmatic

from the theoretical construction anything Marx

mysticism or ideology; at the same time

undogmatically and broad-mindedly enough

to

(it is)

conceived

prevent nature

itself

from receiving a metaphysical consecration or indeed ossifying into a
final ontological principle.

"56
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As Schmidt points

out, Marx's attack is broad.

notion of "nature in-itself in the absence of
(Spinoza);

he

criticizes the attribution

human

He

any

rejects

mediation

by German idealism that

consciousness can obtain an independent character; and he rejects
the Hegelian synthesis of subject and object calling
transversed".

it

"metaphysically

Marx:

"Once the essentiality of man and of nature, man as a
natural being and nature as a human reality, has become
evident in practice, and sensuously, the quest for an alien
being, a being above nature and man (a quest which is an
avowal of the inessentiality of nature and man) becomes
impossible in practice.

Marx

offers

a view of nature that challenges the Baconian image of

immediately accessible nature by conceptualizing the interpenetration
of nature

and

society.

Marx knows

that although

it is

absolutely

impossible to transcend the laws of nature, the form in which these

laws express themselves changes under varying historical conditions.
("History creates knowledge through

human

practice."^®).

Humans

change nature and by doing so change themselves.

The
implicit

intrigue of Marx's position

(to this

consequence of his suggestion that

discussion)

all

is

the

human change

is

a

necessarily tied to the utilization of nature:

self-realization is

reflection of a self-created world (by acting

on nature we overcome

alienation).

For this reason Marx attacks so vehemently the core of

capitalism;

the inherent commoditization of labor that determines

human

alienation ("The laborer

external to the worker

is

alienated from

and does not belong

work because

it

is

to his essential being. "®^).

Furthermore, the alien power over one who loses control over his
labor

is

man

himself (the capacity to deny someone the possibility of
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authentic

work

is

to deprive

Marx hopes

emancipation).

them

of the possibility of personal

that since

but distinguishes himself as a

human

man

is

not only a natural being.

natural being (one that can

consciously use the laws of nature to his advantage), a unified science
of nature

and

of

man would

reform both society and nature.

Since the fate of Marx's vision depends upon transcending
capitalism through the successes of this science, the apparent

conquest by capitalism and the intrusive character of science have
paled the

initial

enthusiasm

reconceptualizes Marx's

for Marx's analysis.

initial insight,

Habermas

arguing for reform through

linguistic emancipation, recognizing the transformative

dialogue.

(Since

language as a

we may know

human

that which

creation inspires a

Habermas' universal framework by

Benhabib envisions a

we

power

create, the

of

autonomy

of

new vision.) Reforming

distilling its

most

divisive element,

plurality of language that:

"...proceeds from the assumption that there is no single
spot in the social structure that privileges those who
occupy it with a vision of the social totality.

Benhabib believes

that, correctly formulated,

communicative ethics

"can mediate between the standpoint of the "generalized" and the
"concrete" other(s)

connectedness."®^

by synthesizing

justice with care,

autonomy with

This re-conceptualization of Habermas' vision

serves to separate even more closely the elements of the broad ecovision;

it is

ecofeminism that distinguishes

itself

from

social ecology as

the instructive view.

The debate around Lawrence Kohlberg's universal
and Carol

ethical

model

Gilligan's contextual ethic demonstrates the break between
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Habermas' vision and that of many feminists. Universalist moral
theories are (as

Benhabib describes)

the universal claim
specific

group

is built

(often white,

"substitutionalist",

meaning that

from the results of the experiences

male

adults).

The

ideal of

of a

autonomy which

dominates universal moral reasoning (such as that of Kohlberg),

Benhabib argues,
male

ego".

is

the image of the "disembedded and disembodied

Since this vision dominates moral philosophy, the

domestic and intimate sphere

an

ahistorical,

qualifies

it

(of

most women's

lives) is relegated to

unchanging and immutable events category which never

as moral discourse.

Benhabib's relational-interactive theory of identity which

assumes

that, "every act of self-reference expresses simultaneously the

uniqueness and difference of the

among

self as well as the

selves"®^ opposes the nonrelational theory of the self

tradition of social contract theories)

which denies that the

has any bearing on moral judgment. Since these
both

commonality

women and men's

lives are

(in

the

'personal'

"private" aspects of

denied access to the domain of moral

discourse, not only does the character of such discourse remain

stunted, but as a result of the dominance of this traditional theory

(Kohlberg and Rawls), the oppression of

by the exclusion

of a

women

major component of our

(and men) continues

lives

from moral

consideration.

Benhabib's analysis conforms with the ecofeminist ethical

ideal,

suggesting that the potential autonomy of language (distinct from
technical
vision.

and

cognitive productivity), underlies the feminist eco-

This marriage (between Habermas' analysis®^ and feminist

discernment)

fortifies

the ecofeminist contention that a contextualist
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etilic

correctly distinguishes their theory from biocentrism.

question remains;

how does an

from other feminist work?

Yet the

ecofeminist vision distinguish

Why

does

it

concern

itself

itself

with the

"fate of

nature" at all? Certainly the utopian potentiality of personal narrative
if

shown

to

be epistemologically other than and equally

material productivity,

is

enough

fruitful as

to redirect social theory along the

lines that inspire the ecofeminist ethics despite the fate that this

new

ecofeminist vision would not be grounded in nature but in an

emancipated

linguistic relationship.

Yet clearly ecofeminists distinguish their theory. Warren argues

from the perspective of four dominant feminist trends
traditional Marxist, the radical
rightly the central

theme

of

and the

socialist) that

any feminist

ecofeminists) the oppression of

oppression of nature, feminism
take the connection seriously.

women
(if it

theory.

is

is to

(the liberal, the

ecofeminism

is

Since (according to

inseparable from the

redeem women)

is

forced to

Although she rejects traditional Marxist

feminist theory as gender-blind (the failure to take seriously gender as

a constitutive category of social

reality),

she dismisses even the radical

feminists for their preoccupation with the separation between nature

and culture that she

believes retains

an

essentially flawed

dominant "conceptual framework": that women are
She notes that the work

of theorists

theme

of the

closer to nature.

such as Gilligan (and Kathryn

P.

Addelson) have undermined the "patriarchal conceptual framework"
with a

new

interpretation of

women's moral thinking,

feminist theory and bolstering the

work

crippling liberal

of ecofeminism.

Yet Warren

argues that this growing awareness of the distinct character of

women's experience, best interpreted by the work
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of "socialist

feminists" (feminists that

come through

the critical tradition) "does

not explicitly address the systematic oppression of nature,
give

an account

of one the four interlocking pillars

structure of patriarchy rests

-

it

fails to

upon with the

sexism, racism, classism, and

naturism"®^.

As

1

have suggested, ecofeminists, such as Warren

the spirit of ecophilosophy

never adequately define their notion

itself)

of "the systematic oppression of nature" or (as

the "domination of nature". Although this

ecophilosophy,

undermines

it is

particularly

with

(in line

is

damaging

I

have characterized

a serious flaw in

of

all

to ecofeminists since

it

The

their attempt to articulate a valid contextual ethic.

universal character of

what

it)

elucidate as the ecophilosophical

1

interpretation of the domination of nature categorically opposes the

ecofeminist vision of an ethic that maintains difference and takes
narrative seriously.

Since

have argued that ecofeminist must

I

examine what they mean by
profit

from the insights

'nature'

of (what

and

Warren

its

'oppression', they

re-

can

labels) the socialist feminists

that stand in the tradition of a Marxist analysis of nature. The

reinterpretation of

Marx

to include

a symbolic element of production

redeems the reductionist character of

Augmented by a Marxist

ecofeminist characterization of the

to

Yet the ecofeminist rhetoric

an underlying motivation. What

insight offer anything

new

to

Marxism.

analysis of nature, ecofeminism might

collapse into feminist critical theory.
clearly expresses

traditional

human

inspires the

condition?

Does

their

a feminist critique? Although they claim

be inspired by a theoretical gap in feminist theory, the more

seductive component of ecofeminism
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is its

intuition about the

transformative character of nature.

Ecofeminists, one might say, are

nature lovers by experience and feminists by theory. Again Karen

Warren:
"...many feminists and environmental ethicists have begun
to take narrative seriously. Narrative provides a way to
express a variety of ethical attitudes, such as the difference
in attitudes toward a rock when one is "making it to the
top" and when one thinks of oneself as "friends with" or
"caring about" the rock one climbs. Narrative also gives
voice to a felt sensitivity often lacking in traditional
analytical ethical discourse, e.g. of seeing oneself "in
relationship with" the non-human environment."®^

Are these experiences of any theoretical import? What
character of these kinds of narratives?

What could

it

is

the

mean

possibly

to

"befriend" a rock?

Although
babble, a

more

it is

easy for

many

to dismiss this talk as privatized

intriguing suggestion

is

that since nature inspires such

internal dialogue, the conversations themselves capture

an

unarticulated awareness of the dialogical character of nature
(nature seeking to

know

itself).

itself

Although Gilligan (and others) have

explored the character of women's "moral experience", the character
of

women’s "nature experience" has been, up

mysticism or idiosyncratic behavior. As

I

to

now, relegated

to

have suggested, Habermas

relegates nature to the category of technical

and

cognitive enterprise,

seemingly rejecting a concept of nature in the context of subjectivity:

human

beings in dialogue with nature. The potentiality of this arena of

rationality takes

us back

to

Habermas' framework and

our discussion of the narrow character

to

of

McCarthy's suggestion that such an

expanded understanding of nature might "have consequences
sense of obligation to nature and for the norms governing our
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for

our

interaction with nature that

we regard

as justifiable"®®. Yet McCarthy

(and others) pose their quarrel with Habermas in the context
of his
^rifv^^'sal

framework. What

the fate of this knowledge

is

if

understood

as constitutive of the kind of social arrangement that feminist desire?

Ecofeminism characterizes the human experience as

unified:

all

systems of oppression (classism, racism, sexism, naturism) are
interconnected:

we must heed our

place as "co-members of an

ecological community"; a feminist vision reawakens universal,

underplayed values

Yet

(care, friendship).

(of interest to this analysis)

these themes are cast alongside equally vigorous claims that portray
the

human

we must

condition as essentially "intersubjective";

the "logic of domination" with the diversity of

human

experience; our

"ecological condition" is fundamentally about the relationship

the diversity in nature and
risk

an "ecofeminist view"

its

long-term health and

replace

viability;

in favor of a diversity of voices.

between

we must

While the

paradoxical character of these claims has undermined the validity of

ecofeminism,

it

captures the dialectical quality of our distinctly

human

experience (when more clearly articulated).

Although

it is

beyond the scope

of this project to

pursue in any

great detail, the theoretically meaningful character of this vision,
superficially at least,
vision.

I

I

believe

it

supports and refines the Habermasian

have already stated that

indicate that

1

(in

my

anyway) support

inquiries into ecofeminism do not

its

fundamental premise

"domination of nature" embodies the domination of
justifying patriarchal society) since

1

women

(that the

thereby

have already rejected the

ecophilosophical understanding of the "domination of nature as
essentially pre-critical.

Furthermore,
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I

make no claims about

the

fundamental character

of patriarchy.

by Habermas that the epistemological domination

offered

rationality (not its character)
valid

Rather, the critical insight

form of thinking

has prevented legitimating an equally

(the dialogical character of nature), theoretically

blocking an independent insight into a meaningful world,

augmented by a

of scientific

critical

is

potentially

appraisal of the relational character of

women

(and men) to nature.

This suggestion that ecofeminism captures the dialectics of
duality also addresses the problem of duality in Habermas' concept of

reason by suggesting that while a resolution of the epistemological

problem of the character of knowledge

is

energy spent exploring a dual rationality
is

hard

for

some

to

unlikely (in the near future),

is

advantageous. Although

it

imagine that communicative interaction could ever

be as productive and world-changing as science and technology, or
that the two worlds could exist side-by-side without competition and

dualism creates a tension of

rivalry (since typically

rarely a world of this

and

this),

this or that

the appeal of this vision

and

is its ability to

more adequate capture present human experience. Nearly every

human

being confronts two

realities:

that of the 'expert'

and that

of

the 'personal' (or that of the profane and that of the sacred); thus the
possibility that theory

former

is

might empower the

later

without abolishing the

encouraging.

Language, as Luce Irigaray has pointed out, when characterized
as universal,
therefore

is

suspect because of

its historically

we may conclude from her

female voice

is

both

political

determined

state;

analysis that the absence of the

and epistemological

(the restriction of

that voice to the realm of the personal due to the valorization of the
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public /private
interactions).

split,

narrowing the framework of legitimate rational

Since the fluidity of language allows

it

view or experience, the work of feminists (such as
out a language that

is

capture any

to

Irigaray) to

work

"adequate for the body, sex and the imagination

woman"^'^ complements the ecofeminists' intuition that the

of the

unique epistemological status of women's experiences

in

nature

as

is

constitutive of our existence as is our acknowledged dependence

upon

nature (as that which determines our survival). While our comfort

is

determined by our technical utilization and harmonization with nature,
our happiness

is

fixed

by the intersubjective dialogue that occurs

between humans and the rest of nature. The work
epistemology

is to

underdeveloped.

unearth
It is

human

of feminist

potentialities yet unappreciated

in this service that

and

an ecofeminist project could

be of value, articulating the dialogical character of "nature experience".

The experience

of

women

is particularly valid

since

traditionally defined themselves using the criteria of a

competence.

women have

communicative

(The responsibility for relationship success, so

contingent upon one's ability to communicate, has traditionally been
placed on women.)
to

The explorations that many women embark upon
conflicts (in light of the

understand and resolve their relationship

limited skills offered by a technological society) have been
entail alternative

forms of competence (and

knowledge (without the outlet given
is

of

insight).

to other

The

shown

to

fate of this

forms of creative insight)

utmost importance. Although such knowledge does not begin

encompass the vastness
goal),

it

of

communicative competence

offers insight into the character of
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to

(the ultimate

such knowledge.

The ambiguous conclusion

is t±iat it is

possible to recognize

universal truths in the context of personal narratives despite the

contextual foundation of such knowledge. As Gilligan (and others)

have shown, the character of these "universal truths"
testimony to contextuality.

Since the test of insight

is their

is

changed action

(analogous to the scientific hypothesis), rational explanations can be

made

for

the interaction between dialogical insight and behavior

despite this kind of evidence which, lacking independent verification,
is

qualitatively different from scientific evidence.

Freud made

particularly helpful inroads into understanding this kind of rationality

by describing the

delicate interplay

between patient and analyst. The

internalization of the process resembles this alternative

knowing (side-stepping the bias

of Freud’s view of

way

of

women).

Feminists are restructuring the character of knowledge from a
variety of vantage points.®®

my

Despite

rejection of the initial

ecofeminist analysis, the epistemological impact of their eco-vision
justifies

an autonomous realm

"nature experience").

of investigation (the narrative quality of

Ecofeminists can distinguish themselves (from

other ecophilosophical and feminist
ecofeminist vision

is

from experiences in

to

activity)

by arguing that a new

be grounded in personal narratives derivative

'nature'.®^

By

attacking the split between the

generalized and the concrete other, they position themselves within
feminist critique, but distinguish themselves by their belief that

experiences in nature (so far undervalued by our preoccupation with
scientific rationality) contribute to the healing of society.

examine more closely the character

Let us

of ecofeminism to reveal the

particularly suggestive point of departure within the theory.
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D. Ecofeminism and Nature

The explanatory goal
historical,

of ecofeminism

is to

render explicit the

symbolic and theoretical connections between the

(assumed) domination of

women and

domination of nature. Warren

outlines the patriarchal, conceptual framework that sanctions such

oppression;

"Women are identified with nature and the realm of the
physical; men are identified with "human" and the realm of
the mental. Whatever is identified with nature and the
realm of the physical is inferior to ("below") whatever is
identified with "human" and the realm of the mental (or,
conversely, the latter is thought of as superior to ("above")
the former). Thus, women are inferior to ("below") men
(or, conversely, men are superior to ("above") women).
For
any A and B, if A is superior to B, then A is justified in
subordinating B. Thus, men are justified in subordinating

women

(and nature)."”^®

Warren concludes that since sexism
(as described above),

feminism

intimately linked to "naturism"

is

(fundamentally) a

is

movement

to

end

naturism.

Ecofeminists like Warren
that
for

is

make an

of particular importance to

my

additional unsupported claim

reconstruction.

The argument

a contextual ethic distinguishes the ecofeminists from biocentered

demonstrate

thinkers like the deep ecologists, yet ecofeminists

fail to

that this ethic necessarily follows from

overcome their

if

one

is to

primary concern that the domination of nature

domination of women. Although

I

is

linked to the

have already considered the

problems circumscribing the concept of the "domination of nature

which ecofeminism
ideology,

is

vulnerable (the "domination of nature

is

a social

encompassing both men and women), the emancipatory
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to

potential of

an

makes a

individualism,

and maintains
attention.
ethic,

Warren

ethic (which, as

describes, "denies abstract

central place for relational values, presupposes

difference,

Not only does

and takes
is

narrative seriously")

is

worthy

of

supersede the deep ecologist’s biocentric

but in the context of ecofeminism

it

hints at the resolution of

the tension between a postmodern "language games" theory and the

quasi-transcendentalism of Habermas' communicative competence.

To make

this

argument requires extensive work,

given the skimpy analysis by ecofeminists.
chapter,

but

I

can

I

can not commit myself
offer

Habermasian

to

the power of narrative.

As

I

In the scope of this last

working out a completed version,

some suggestive images.

vision (Benhabib)

particularly

Critical to

both the

and the ecofeminist

have suggested,

vision (Warren)

this insight is also

is

an

element of Gilligan's work to produce an alternative ethical model
(consistent with those of others

feminist epistemologies).

characterizes

much

who

are interested in alternative

This fascination with narrative also

of "postmodern" philosophy (Rorty, the

deconstructionists, Michael Foucault and the

epistemological status of narrative
reject epistemological

is

like).

Yet since the

suspect, these theorists prefer to

concerns completely, supposing

to

have

overturned attempts such as those of Habermas to redeem the modern
belief in rationality.

Much
it is

of this controversy turns

on the status of the

'self

.

Since

the character of the self that determines the character of

knowledge (without a

clearly articulated 'self, there is

no problem

of

knowledge), some have rejected the concept of the self entirely (they

have deconstructed the

self).

Although Habermas preserves the
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self as

the critical element of a collective agency of acUon,
the universality of

Habermas' theory appears

to

supersede

exemplified by a Freudian account).

its

Is it

emphasis on narrative

(as

possible to reject the

Hegelian concept of a collective singularity of selves
(Benhabib) in
order to preserve the integrity of a personal narrative and
maintain
the quasi-transcendental character of communicative interaction?

While the quasi-transcendental position assumes the two-fold
character of nature

(it

is

nature that constrains the output of

scientific

inquiry and. in a different way, determines the linguistic possibilities
for social integration),

it is

the dialectical character of each of these

forms of nature (unity contains

plurality) that reintegrates

a seemingly

fragmented nature.
It

it is

would seem that no matter what

the character of our activity,

always in the context of the "other": seientists struggle against

experimental results, politicians against voting results,

women

against their

own

'selves'.

For this reason, feminist

essentially concerned over the character

the

men and

and

critics are

fate of the "other" since

dominant philosophical frameworks dismiss some

activities (in

particular traditional female activities) as not representative of the

universal
other".

human

attempt to come

to

terms with the "generalized

In line with this analysis, great effort is being placed

on

validating alternative perspectives as equally engaged in the creative

attempt to understand the world, augmented by the feminist position
that the presence of a clear distinction between "the world" and

world" drives the machinery of oppression.

Benhabib

(in

"my

the context

of her analysis of Gilligan's critique of moral discourse) assesses these

universalizing strategies:
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I am not suggesting that such
conceptions of the good
(those of the dominant moral theorists) either can or
should he universalized ... our affective-emotional
constitution, as well as our concrete history as moral
agents, ought to be considered accessible to moral

life

communication, reflection and transformation. Inner
nature, no less than the public sphere of justice, has a
historical dimension.

In it are intertwined the history of
the self and the history of the collective. To condemn it to
silence is, as Gilligan has suggested, not to hear that other
voice in moral theory."'^i

Reflecting this concern is a growing body of

women's experiences and modes

work that validates

of thinking.

In a larger context, the importance of

such work

is its

the structure of social relations and the emancipation from

and women from

impact on

all

men

destructive, oppressive relationships (including

those that are cultural, racial, sexual and/or gender-based). In this
context,

we can

reinterpret the ecofeminist critique as paralleling that

described above by Benhabib. Although we have privileged our
scientific enterprise

as indicative of the emancipatory character of

nature, providing us the tools
crisis", (since

we need

such information

lies

to

overcome our "ecological

outside the realm of political

discourse),

we

lack the perspective from which to evaluate our

condition.

An

ecofeminist critique suggests that

new realm

of intercourse

(women (and

we need

to validate a

men's) dialogical relationships

with nature), as equally compelling evidence by which to gage our
political future.

The feminist character

of this critique is its rejection of the

"nonrelational theory of the self, claiming instead (as so aptly

characterized by Benhabib) that

"(e) very

act of self-reference

expresses simultaneously the uniqueness and difference of the
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self

as

well as the

commonality among

This

selves"72.

"ecological perspective or consciousness" since

means

of

many

to unity

unified

how we

what we want from nature and how we justify our

can move toward a

is

no

each unique (and

historically formed) relationship to nature determines

nature,

that there

see

actions.

We

collective voice only in the context of the diversity

voices; thus our negotiating process

must move from

diversity

and back again. To deny that separateness rules a successfully
outcome

is to

variety of experience
Gilligan's attack

relegate as unimportant or uninteresting a

and knowledge

(linguistically determined).

Like

on Kohlberg's universal moral theory, the ecofeminists

correctly target deep ecology for its universal character.

ecofeminists themselves

must now

relinquish their

own

Yet
universal

characterization of the domination of nature and focus attention on the

concrete ethical transformations that occur in nature as experienced

by women.

Why women?

Are

women

closer to nature?

from making such a claim because of

its

Although

1

refrain

ambiguous reputation,

it

seems empirically true that women are more comfortable with the
individuality of their experiences in nature as opposed to the

more

universal rhetoric of nature lovers such as Thoreau and Leopold.
Clearly nature, as experienced by

women,

is

absent in large part from

typical historical accounts of nature ethics (see

Ecofeminists (such as Merchant and

Griffin)

Worster and Nash).

attempt to amend this

record by reconceptualizing the history of nature as potentially

redeemed by a renewed interest

in organicism (historically associated

with a female perspective). Although conceived as an assault on
scientific rationality, the pre-critical character of these anal}^es
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denies t±iem the persuasive quality of a narrative investigation

grounded

in a reformed Marxist

What can we

commentary on nature.

women's experiences

learn from

Although this remains largely undetermined'^^^ ^

is

in nature?

possible to provide

a bare sketch of this kind of insight by turning to the narratives
themselves.

Typically, ecophilosophers (also interested in nature

experiences) read these narratives from a universal standpoint,

arguing that they record the ecological character of nature (nature per
se)

rather than understanding

that denies
raising

any

them as elements

privileged perspective.

movement

of a political dialogue

Instead, (as

any consciousness-

will attest) individual experience is the

backbone

of

genuine empowerment only in a process that privileges friendship and

As Benhabib

solidarity.

explains:

"The community of needs and solidarity is created in the
interstices of society by those new social movements,
which on the one hand fight to extend the universalist
promise of objective spirit-justice and entitlements -and on
the other seek to combine the logic of justice with that of
friendship.

Although from an objectivating standpoint we do not learn anything
about nature from narrative, this
only

if

we

fact disenfranchises

such insights

require a universal perspective from which to judge

personal experience.

With what

attitude, then,

perspective of the individual

do we read these narratives? From the

woman's

(or

man's) experience, taking

narrative seriously reinforces (for each individual)
validity.

From

its integrity

and

the prospect of theorists working out a feminist analysis

that serves the important function of critique, these narratives

other
corroborate their theoretical conjecture that only by hearing
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voices, "do

ourselves

we have

and

a hope of moving

of our fellow

others"75.

And

movement

itself,

finally,

humans

to

a more integrated vision of

as generalized as well as "concrete"

from the perspective

of the environmental

these narratives record the diversity of voices within

the framework of an identifiably collective, political

As suggestive

of the validity of

effort.

such a research

project, let

us

consider, in the light of these various perspectives, two examples of
this

kind of narrative. First the narratives themselves;

from Karen Warren's journal®

(active

spokeswoman

an excerpt

for ecofeminism):

"August 16, 1983. Northfield, Minnesota. 1 just finished a
paper on environmental ethics about rights of nonhumans.
I am not pleased with it.
I don't seem to have the
language, the tools, to say what 1 want to say and still have
the paper count as philosophy.

August

18, 1983. Tofte, Minnesota. Two days later. Today
was my first experience rock climbing.
chose a
somewhat private spot for my first climb. 1 tackled "the
I

chimney" with athletic determination, focusing my energy
on "making it to the top". By mid-way I was exhausted and
anxious. I couldn't see what to do next, I made a move and
fell.
There I was, dangling mid-air above the rocky ground
below. Once I knew I was safe, that the belay rope had
held me, I began to tremble, with fear, with relief. With
renewed determination, I finished the climb to the top.
19, 1983. Tofte, Minnesota. My second day of
climbing, a different spot. This time I rappelled down
about 200 feet from the top of the Palisades to just a few
feet above the water level of Lake Superior. I could see no

August

one--not

my

belayer, not the other climbers,

no one.

I

unhooked slowly from the rappel rope and took a deep
cleansing breath. I looked all around me-really looked—
and listened. I heard a cacophony of voices— birds, trickles
of water on the rock before me, waves lapping against the
rocks below. I closed my eyes and began to feel the rock
with my hands-the cracks and crannies, the raised lichen
and mosses, the almost imperceptible nubs that might
provide a resting place for my fingers and toes when I
began to climb. At that moment I was bathed in serenity.
inaudible, child1 began to talk to the rock in an almost
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way, as if the rock were my friend. I felt an
overwhelming sense of gratitude for what it offered me-a
chance to know myself differently, to appreciate
unforeseen miracles like the tiny flowers growing in the
even tinier cracks in the rock's surface, and to come to
know a sense of being in relationship with the natural
environment. It felt as if the rock and 1 were silent

like

conversational partners in a long-standing /riendship. 1
realized then that 1 had come to care about this cliff which
was so different from me, so unmovable and invincible,

independent and seemingly indifferent to my presence.
to be with the rock as I climbed-not to conquer it,
control it, or forcefully impose my will on it, but simply to
work respectfully with it. And as I climbed, that is what 1
felt.
I felt myself caring for this rock and
feeling thankful
for the opportunity to know it— and myself— in this way."
I

wanted

*

(Warren's

italics

)

Next the reflections of Alaskan woman, Vernita

spokeswoman

for the plight of the Native

Zilys'^'^

Alaskan

(active

culture);

concept of perspectives came to me one day as I
stooped under a hot sun to seek out yet another handful of
elusive blueberries, at a little spot some 13 miles up the
coast from my home village of Unalakleet. With me was
Jean Maxwell, a woman with whom 1 have enjoyed many
conversations about the lifestyle 1 have come to reappreciate... As we gathered berries in the stillness that is
Egavik, my mind began its usual meandering about the
work we were striving to complete, about Egavik itself; 1
thought how, after a week spent cushioned in Egavik's
peace, even Unalakleet's relatively small volume of noise
jarred my ears. 1 thought how Egavik must resemble the
way things were before my ancestors' lives were changed
forever by that first airplane, by that first missionary, by
that first recognition of an alien tongue ...1 thought of the
maps I had seen distributed with the Environmental
Impact Statements for Norton Sound and other areas, and
suddenly, 1 heard a jet making its milkrun over the pole
'way overhead, and 1 slowly began to feel invisible, like an
impersonal dot on the huge map that is required to do
justice to the vastness that is Alaska. 1 looked down at the
berries I had just picked, Egavik blueberries, dusty-looking
and dark, and then 1 looked around at the tundra, the
willows that lined the slough, the gravelly point of land
with our tents sitting on it, and beyond that to the far-off
ripples on the shiny surface of Norton Sound. I looked
again at the berry bushes that surrounded us, and ^.t a
single berry in my hand, and 1 thought in amazement, "It's
"(The)

228

purely a matter of perspectives, isn't it?"... When I look at a
map of Alaska, my eyes go automatically to the
northwestern coast, and they search until they find
Unalakleet, and after that day in Egavik, they go up an inch
or so, and find almost the exact spot where 1 stood with
that blueberry in my hand,"

Although
about,

it is

clear from the outset

often

it is

assumed that

they have no constitutive value.

what Vemita and Karen

are writing

their experiences are so privatized that

What

is

the merit of transformative

experience in nature?

Consider
point of view.

first

the value of these narratives from the individual

Typically, experiences

such as these are dismissed as

theoretically uninteresting at best (at worst, as sentimentality), forcing

both Karen and Vemita into the uncomfortable position of having
reinterpret their insights into language that

This shift disenfranchises their
to

accepted patterns.

fits

initial intuition

to

since

it is

not possible

capture precisely, in a different voice, their original understanding.

Vemita characterizes her dilemma

this way:

recognize the value of my own perspective. But it is not
enough for only me to see Alaska's map in terms of
blueberry bushes, silver salmon for supper, clean air,
familial togetherness, and the dangers that confront my
"1

way
The

of

life."

fact that

Vemita's insight has no

any philosophical
(or voice),

significance)

political significance (or

undermines

disempowering their attempts

their personal experience

to redirect political results

or philosophical theory (since only a select perspective is
legitimate).

We

lose the authenticity of both

experience, or as

Habermas

characterizes

Karen's

it,

deemed

Karen and Vemita's

we

lose the tmthfulness

contained in their experience; clearly the price to pay for narrowing
the constraints of political or philosophical discourse
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is

too great.

By

reconceptualizing social interaction as an integrated vision

driven by a diversity of insights, Benhabib (and others) gain
the

complementary insight

by these two experiences. The

offered

seemingly apolitical experience of Karen that she then uses

to

motivate her philosophical agenda complements the original insight by

Vemita that without a

she risks the

voice,

life

of her people.

In

more

general terms, in an integrated vision of social change, an apparently
frivolous, individual experience

potential of impacting

not rejected but validated) has the

(if

and empowering the oppressed. Certainly

differences in perspective result from the "different narrative histories
in

which selves are embedded"'^®

own

historical narratives), yet

theory that

we

(our identities are constituted

it is

vital

by our

from the perspective of social

"think their unity" rather than dismissing the vision of

a unified perspective as impossible or undermining unity entirely by
a coherent view

trivializing

others).

(or

Individual narrative

What

is

by

privileging

is grist for

one perspective over the

the social theorist's mill.

the message for eco-theory? The risk

abnegate the community of solidarity and friendship
natural rights. Vemita's political plight
universal eco-vision.

is

too great to

to a vision of

apt to be railroaded by any

is

Ecofeminists are poised at the edge of an

immensely productive project that could conceptualize as
untapped
in

insight:

of yet

the possibility of recording individual experiences

nature that together articulate a renewed eco-vision. To assume

that

it is

the task of the social theorist (the ecophilosopher) to solidify

individual experiences without risking any

is to

assume the

transcendental position appropriated by Habermas.

Linguistic

competence, as with technical insight, assumes traces of
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quasi-

objectivity.

that

we may

obtain a kind of certainty through particular instances of

investigation.

Only by

this claim

may we

insist

on any

eco-vision.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although

whether or not

Habermas

and

my

original

in these concluding

endorsement

remarks

have irredeemably abandoned his methodology.

I

is

is

common

to

solved in instrumental rationality, but that in the

political sphere, diverse interests

communicative

of

consider

I

believes that interest in the control of nature

humans and

social

to

have shifted away from

Habermasian scheme,

the

all

I

rationality.

need

be resolved by

to

Conflict over environmental issues appears

transcend this clear cut boundary since these social questions are

defined by their conflicting interests in the control of nature.

The

confrontations between Native groups and environmentalists capture
this

unique situation, tempting one

be resolved even

if

one were

to

to

ask

how such

oppositions might

overcome the current power

imbalances. According to Habermas, using a universal pragmatics, we

should be able

most

to reconcile the

vital question;

and thus more

The

seal

most

Which attempt

rational

view and

to "control

to

nature"

is

answer the
legitimate

ethical?

hunt serves as an example

of this sort of conflict

the debate appears to turn on the ethical treatment of nature.

argue that killing seals

is

where

Natives

simply a means of support and cultural

sustenance, not unlike the use of animals for food and support by
cultures.

They argue that they have demonstrated

sensitivity to

historically their

animal population limitations, having never hunted a

species to extinction.

young

all

seals is cruel

The environmentalists counter that hunting

and unnecessary behavior, putting subtle

stresses

on the oceanic ecosystem that might prevent seal populations from
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overcoming hunting pressures as the market

for seal pelts

expands

in

a global economy.
In a
conflict

Habermasian

fashion, one could argue that overcoming this

does not require that nature (the

seals) participate in the

resolution since from the start the dialogue between Natives and

environmentalists presupposes a mutual interest in controlling nature.

At stake

is

the character of this control and

it

shared

is this

condition that unifies seemingly opposing perspectives.
characterizing the

dilemma as one

in

which nature

is

human

So that by

the victim, the

environmentalists (ecophilosophers) undermine attempts at
reconciliation.

Although we can

dialogue (the legal world

remains necessarily

give nature a voice in

any kind of

an example), the voice that we hear

is

political

determined by our unavoidable

dependence upon controlling nature.
It is

critics

for this

reason that

I

rejected as fallacious the concerns of

such as Whitebook or Ottman over the

to focus

my

criticisms

fate of

on the Habermasian status

communicative community.

It is

nature and chose

of individuals in the

possible to argue that

I

contradict

myself by arguing that a general theme characterizes a flawed

ecophilosophy and, at the same time, insisting that we must preserve
the individuality of voices in a feminist communicative community.

Habermas consistently argues

for

both a shared interest in controlling

nature and a universal pragmatics.
characterization of nature
this distinction

their theory.

I

by arguing

advance this two-fold
that ecophilosophers overcome

thereby undermining the socially relevant capacity of

Habermas

dependence upon

correctly delineates our shared technical

utilizing nature,
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but

I

argue that he misses the

productive potentiality of individual dialogues with nature. These

when

dialogues,
political

accepted, radically change the on-going social and

discussion on

away from a search

how we

for

should best

utilize

nature by shifting

it

a universal voice, forcing theory to include

heretofore illegitimate perspectives (women. Native Americans).

Ultimately the question remains

how any kind

of

Habermasian

dialogue could ever reconcile the diversity of interests that would be

brought to a cross-cultural conversation about the desired relationship

between

human

beings and nature. The

characteristically

Habermasian

level of abstraction that is so

(the redemptive potentiality of

communicative interaction) plagues any attempt
questions.

This kind of abstraction

answer

to

problem that

also the very

is

specific
1

attribute to the ecophilosophical rendition of a nature philosophy, that

ecophilosophy lacks any kind of relevant

then

is to

agenda. The task

construct a dialogical situation that overcomes difference

while maintaining individuality. This
vision (a

political

is

the point at

more enlightened dialogue about our

and the feminist recommendations

for

which an eco-

relationship to nature)

a communicative community

based in solidarity rather than sameness merge. Here

work

lies,

that

we may

find a

community

of

the Habermasian
political

dialogues

from what Habermas hopes

scheme
is to

where the

mutual support and

friendship in the midst of vastly different interests.
this is vastly different

is

Ultimately then,

to accomplish.

Still,

lingers as a reminder that the goal of our

shape and not

to

transcend our shared

dependence upon a technological relationship
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to nature.
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